

JPRS-EER-87-149

28 October 1987



**FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE**

JPRS Report

East Europe

East Europe

JPRS-EER-87-149

CONTENTS

28 OCTOBER 1987

POLITICAL

BULGARIA

Yotov, Panov, Dylgerov Remarks at July BCP Plenum /RABOTNICHESKO DELO, 31 Jul 87/ 1

HUNGARY

Reagan Speech Said To Mistake, Misuse Kossuth's Name /NEPSZABADSAG, 29 Jul 87/ 6
Budapest Proposed as Site of Helsinki Process Meeting /MAGYAR NEMZET, 28 Jul 87/ 7
Data Correction: Transylvanian County Termed 88 Percent Hungarian /UJ TUKOR, 19 Jul 87/ 7

POLAND

Solidarity Registration Attempts in Torun, Poznan /PRZEGLAD KATOLICKI, No 36, 6 Sep 87/ 8
Chief of Israeli Interests Section Interviewed
/Waldemar Piasecki; PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY, 2 Aug 87/ 8
Report on 29 September Politburo Session /TRYBUNA LUDU, 1 Oct 87/ 11
Szczepanski Criticizes Party Role at Consultative Council Session /POLITYKA, 1 Aug 87/ 13
PZPR Daily Assesses Consultative Council Activity /TRYBUNA LUDU, 19 Aug 87/ 16
Labor Code Changes Scored by Catholic Columnist
/Bohdan Saryusz; GWIAZDA MORZA, 13 and 20 Sep 87/ 19
Proposed Changes in Censorship Law Discussed /RZECZPOSPOLITA, 5-6 Sep 87/ 20
Censorship of Catholic Press Assailed /GOSC NIEDZIELNY, 20 Sep 87/ 20
Academician on Public Discontent With Civil Rights /GOSC NIEDZIELNY, 23 Aug 87/ 23
Student Practicums Resumed, Problems Noted /RZECZPOSPOLITA, 9 Sep 87/ 23

YUGOSLAVIA

Albanian Private Businessmen Consider Leaving Kosovo /VJESNIK, 19 Jul 87/ 24
Advance of Constitutional Amendments Appraised
/Jug Grizelj; NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE, 19 Jul 87/ 26
C. Ribicic Discusses Proposals for Constitutional Changes /DANAS, 28 Jul 87/ 28
Controversial Slovenian Writer Queried on Views of LCY
/Rasko Kovacevic; MLADOST, 6 Jul 87/ 32
Prevalence of Chauvinism Among Youth Charted
/Ramiz Kurtesi; NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE, 12 Jul 87/ 38

MILITARY

POLAND

Deputy Minister Describes National Civil Defense Activities
/Tadeusz Tuczapski; ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI, 5 Aug 87/ 41

ECONOMIC

POLAND

Standard of Living Changes Charted Over 1981-1985 Period
/Grazyna Smulska; ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE, 26 Jul 87/ 44

YUGOSLAVIA

Deterrents to Croatian Investment in Kosovo Viewed /Ivo Jakovljevic; VJESNIK, 25 Jul 87/ 49

SOCIAL

POLAND

Depictions of Stalin in Literature Noted /POLITYKA, No 36, 5 Sep 87/ 51

YUGOSLAVIA

Attitudes to Social Distinctions Explored

/Milan Milosevic; NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE, 9 Aug 87/ 52

Attitudes Toward Work Surveyed in Croatia

/NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE, 9 Aug 87/ 55

BULGARIA

Yotov, Panov, Dylgerov Remarks at July BCP Plenum

22000123 Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO in Bulgarian 31 Jul 87 pp 3-4

[Speeches at the Plenum]

[Text] "Fundamental Conditions of the Concept for Further Development of Socialism in the NRB [Bulgarian People's Republic]" and Comrade Todor Zhivkov's introduction speech constitute a new and lofty peak in the development of our party's political ideas and evidence of its theoretical might. They are a new manifestation of one of the most characteristic features of the communist progress of the Bulgarian working class and of the people, stated Yordan Yotov, member of the Politburo and Secretary of the BCP Central Committee. The document, which we are reviewing, characterizes the situation in our country as a turning point. Naturally, we ask ourselves: What brought us to it, what is it that we wish to achieve, how to achieve it, and so on. We could paraphrase Dimitur Blagoev and say: Is there foundation for a new and improved model of socialism in socialist Bulgaria? The discussed document's greatest merit is that it gives a categorical answer to this question and that this answer is absolutely positive.

The old model is completely exhausted. What better proof is there than the fact that we recognize and admit to the presence of a number of distortions and negative events in our lives and that the fight against them is not especially effective?

The most substantial difference between the new model and the old is that the new one presents man, or rather, the people as creators of all material and cultural goods; as creators of history and of quality new positions in society. It gives them a quality new role in progress and defines a quality new place in their own fate, the speaker stated.

If we wish to be totally fair and honest, we must admit that bureaucracy, even with the socialist label which the old model was producing constantly and regularly by virtue of its nature, was depriving the socialist man and creator of the very freedom which socialism grants him in principle.

A democracy of free socialist workers, as described in the document under review, finds its best expression in socialist self-government. I think or rather I am fully convinced, continued Yotov, that in it we have found the spark capable of igniting the release of the colossal creative energy hidden deep within the people without which it is impossible to achieve the lofty goals we have set for ourselves.

When we speak of socialist democracy, its growth and improvement to the level of socialist self-government, it is understood that we speak of a higher level of organization of socialist society and not the reverse.

This principle has one unshakable feature. It is the required submission of the minority to the majority and the complete rule of the majority. The greatest deviations in applying the principle of democratic centralism occur precisely here: in the ways, means, and methods of forming a majority. These are deviations, which in practice lead to complete denial of democratic principle and gross distortions.

Yordan Yotov expressed confidence that self-government, this lofty peak in the development of socialist democracy, will not perish in its beginning. This is guaranteed by the set fundamental principle of the self-government system structure and function and the new place and new role which the document gives to the party as a leading force in a socialist society.

The leading role of the party is the fundamental and most essential norm in the development of the revolutionary process up until, as well as after, the acquisition of political power by the working class.

The question is not the same, however, with the modes, ways, means, and methods by which the party exercises its leading role. This question becomes especially complicated after the victory of the socialist revolution because a new relationship, the relationship between party and state, appears, pointed out Yordan Yotov. The socialist state is presented as an all-inclusive organization of society, while the party, because of its characteristic as vanguard of the working class and all its people, is presented as a leading political force of all of society including of the state itself.

Socialist society's history up to present time, has imposed a single solitary model for the realization of the party's leading role in relation to society and state. The role of the party apparatus is the essential factor in this model.

Created in the image of the state's apparatus, the party apparatus becomes gradually, but very steadily, subject to the government. And not just any subject, but a dominating subject: the top "floor" of the government.

The results from the use of this party-state relationship model in our country, as well as in other socialist countries, are not positive, the speaker emphasized.

The matter, however, is not only about the results in our country and does not even have that much to do with them, but before all, about the philosophy and internal logic of this model for the party-state relationship. The logic is simple: from the unlimited power for a small

circle of people, and from there even to the autocratic rule of one individual. This way socialist democracy can transform itself into its opposite: autocratic dictatorship.

If this objective logic, which is part of the essence of the model, does not bring us to such a tragic and dismal end, then we, our party, and society would owe it to some exceptional chance, emphasized Yordan Yotov. Georgi Atanasov speaks about this and I support him fully. But can we have a guarantee that with the model in effect until now we would not achieve the logical end that is part of it? I am absolutely certain that we do not and cannot have such guarantees. This is why it is vitally important to overcome the model for the state-party relationship used until now by adopting the model proposed in "Fundamental Conditions of the New Concept."

Between the democratization of socialist society and the improvement of the party's leading role there is an objective logical link. The "separation" of the party from the state is equally necessary for both. This is why the new model, or the new formula, for party-state relationship is a vital necessity for the development of our society.

Here, however, we arrive at the practical question: How will the party in any case exercise its leading role with the new formula? The question is answered in "Fundamental Conditions." And this answer is clear and categorical: Through the party's members, through the communists.

There are requirements in the new model not only for a fundamentally new party apparatus with fundamentally new functions to carry out the leading role of the communist vanguard, but also a change in the principle of the individual communist's image. If until now the leading role of the party has been carried out through the authority of a party organ in taking one decision or another, under the new conditions this will be achieved mainly through the authority of the individual communist. Among the many components which make up this authority, moral character will have a decisive significance as the synthesis of political honesty, civil courage, work activism, etc., etc..

This is how the new model of state-party relationship leads us to problems with the dialectical link and interdependence between socialist democracy and the individual communist.

Noting that almost all brotherly socialist nations are at a similar turning point stage of development and that this process is developing most intensely in the Soviet Union, the speaker pointed out that regardless of the difference in advancement level there is one distinction common to all. It consists of the striving to overcome the old socialist model common to all and for each to develop a new model of their own.

Our party is the first one which has come up with an entire new model for the future of socialism in Bulgaria. This is not by chance. It so happens that we are best prepared for such a decisive step. We have been prepared by the consistent implementation of the April policy of our party.

There are events that characterize the April period of the development of our country. These are the frequent changes in structure and function of the state and party organs. They are an external manifestation of an unchanging dissatisfaction, of an internally restless spirit, of an upheaval against certain inveterate patterns, and a socialist model which is as imperfect as it is antiquated.

This permits us to say: The model we are discussing is the crowning glory of the party's April policy, stressed comrade Yordan Yotov.

In conclusion the speaker emphasized that "Fundamental Conditions" is charged up with great political and ideological power, that a new political thinking, new image of socialism, a new and elevated moral character of the individual communist and of all those participating in the development of the new society will be formed. Although it is addressed to the Bulgarian people, the "Fundamental Conditions" will also be heard internationally.

I am convinced that, without any risk of error whatsoever, we can take our plenum right now to those forums which determine the new strategic stages in the development of the revolutionary process. Yordan Yotov stated.

By characterizing "Fundamental Conditions" as a great achievement of the party scientific and technical thought, as previously stated, we are not telling the whole truth. The whole truth consists in that this exceptional party document is one of the highest ideological, political, scientific, and theoretical achievements of the general secretary of the Central Committee of our party. It is our moral duty to congratulate Todor Zhivkov for the revolutionary and civil courage, communist consciousness, and honesty he showed and to express our profound, human, comradely, and communist gratitude, he concluded.

The concept which we are discussing today not only gives the model for future society, but also points to the way of its formation, stated Ognyan Panov, candidate member of the BCP Central Committee and acting director of the Social Management Institute of the BCP Central Committee, in his speech.

The selected method is prepared by the consistent and lasting achievements of the April line, its democratic spirit, and revolutionary nature which permitted us to avoid the serious political and social upheavals which affected other socialist countries. The April line cleared the way for anew and progressive structure of our

national economy, for economic relations, for our cultural life, and now it is taking us to a new stage of revolutionary reorganization which will release the great potential strength of socialism.

The speaker paid special attention to one of the discussed problems which "represents to us and our party a major question of theory and practice in the building of developed socialism in the People's Republic of Bulgaria," that is, socialist self-government and the transformation of our society into a self-governing one.

He dwelled on the main obstacles for the implementation of the principles of self-government.

The very first analyses done at the Social Management Institute during the first half of this year demonstrated that implementing self-government in practice is a complicated process which still has not gained the necessary momentum.

This process is still being hindered by the lack of true economic regulators to ensure economic self-government, by the passive attitude of the workers based on mistrust, by the fear of government organs that there will be a major confusion if no administrative methods are applied, and by the unwillingness of the directors of self-governing organizations to accept new responsibilities without being prepared and motivated for them.

This is why the expected results have not been achieved. The existing reserves have not been tapped, new intensive plans have not been made, and new resources are still being sought without taking full advantage of the existing ones.

The acting director of the Social Management Institute of the BCP Central Committee, considers the method proposed in the concept for total, consistent, and immediate restructuring of the social system on the principles of self-government as the only correct one.

The second question is to determine which is the most important and urgent factor and apply it fully based on these principles. This is something to which the Institute must also contribute its share. It is necessary to retrain all personnel immediately and totally, the speaker stressed. On one hand we need a new type of manager: capable of solving problems independently, ready to accept responsibilities and take risks, capable of socializing and working with the employees. A new activity of the collective administrative organs is necessary, that is, not just a simple approval of prepared decisions, but a true professional discussion of possible alternatives for action with a sense of responsibility and a clear understanding of the positive and negative consequences of the taken decisions.

Thirdly, each worker needs to acquire a new attitude toward participation in the management of his brigade, his enterprise, his place of residence, and his country, that is, not to expect someone from "higher up" to solve his problems and hand everything to him ready-made.

New motivation is also necessary for each worker since otherwise everything would be accepted formally and then usually not implemented.

Based on these objective norms, the speaker pointed out, it is necessary to consistently and uncompromisingly apply the principle of payment according to work results and according to income earned.

These formulations mean to us and the Institute a total review of the system and methods for management training of the personnel.

It is necessary that it be directed wholly toward the needs of socialist practice and of each person. It must be free of traditionalism, bureaucratic formality, and offer training by solving real problems.

Another exceptionally important question is the specific organization of direct practical effort for the implementation of self-government in everyday life. It is not sufficient to have trained personnel; they must also act. If the necessary practical preparation for specific activities is not done, then everything we have discussed will remain wishful thinking.

The speaker reminded us that it is necessary to apply a new method elaborated years ago by Todor Zhivkov, which is to establish a programming organization to carry out activities on development of the system for self-government, to exercise party control, and to evaluate the results from specific programs which are to be developed and implemented by the self-governing organizations themselves.

This programming organization must be of a fundamentally new type. It would not be to regulate, give orders, and demand without involving stimulation of interests as most of our past organizational programs have done, but to create favorable conditions and to act as a catalyst for initiative and creativity.

We are used to tons of normative acts, programs, regulations, and decisions which prescribe in detail what to do and how to do it. Now we have to learn to formulate normative acts in such a way as to stimulate activity toward the desired goals and to limit only those things which go categorically against common interest.

Management through interests and management of the interests themselves is the new understanding of the unquestionable advantage of socialist centralized planning. This corresponds to the principles of self-government and the new image of true democratic centralism, the acting director of the Social Management Institute emphasized.

We must find the specific mechanisms to show the main objective advantages of socialist society which are: unity, purposefulness, and concentration of society's strengths in the same general direction, coordinated with democratic spirit, creative freedom, and all-round fulfillment of the individual.

It is also necessary to describe in the program specific measures to avoid at all costs one serious danger. I am speaking of the danger of exchanging administrative bureaucracy for self-government bureaucracy or to permit the bureaucratization of the self-government system. To eradicate such evil from its roots it is necessary, in the first place, to improve and simplify the existing organization of economic, as well as territorial and government organs and organizations.

In relation to this we feel obligated to effect a cardinal change in the implementation of the theoretical, analytical, practical, and applied work done by the Institute as a link to the party's Central Committee and to influence the comprehensive elevation of the level of administrative science.

We have almost forgotten how to make analyses of social events in such a way as to use them to prepare us to make optimal administrative decisions.

This shows lack of readiness on the part of the social sciences and above all, of management science to help with the actual practice of management.

In conclusion, the speaker stressed, the main condition to guarantee an effective and uninterrupted self-development and self-improvement of the self-government system is the party's role as a nucleus of the political system.

After this, Petur Dylgerov, candidate member of the Politburo of the BCP Central Committee and chairman of the Central Council of the Bulgarian Trade Unions, gave his speech.

With his introduction speech, he said, Todor Zhivkov opened the discussion of the plenum. I say opened because he, giving credit to what has already been achieved, elaborated on the global problems of the building of socialism; he asked directly and with enviable courage and honesty the most burning questions about our practice and reality. The most complicated part—which is the foundation of society—was reached and that is: property, the state, the administration, the government, the party, people and people's life. Such

political and civil courage is necessary to each one of us, because we must touch upon things considered "holier than holy," we must destroy old rules and deeply ingrained stereotypes, we must struggle with ourselves, and what is most important, we must solve the problems of society's development using other means and in a fundamentally different manner.

We know that in the last few years the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have been looking for fundamentally new decisions to renew socialism. This is an acutely felt need everywhere. This way our party has acquired a number of fundamental theoretical studies and significant practical experience. We have entered a period of profound restructuring. But we have arrived at the moment when past and future problems require a comprehensive solution. This is being done precisely with the model for socialist society in our country; it is a document, I would say, with the significance of a party program.

The complexity of this task is understandable, especially considering the condition that such experience is acquired with practice in socialist countries. The progress of restructuring, which we have started, has shown us the inevitable need to thoroughly understand the image of socialism as a social system. Without such understanding we cannot free ourselves from the obstacles to the moving forces of social development which distort the very nature of socialism. Undoubtedly, the comprehensiveness of the model and the fact that it joins into unity both the foundation and the upper structure, is a great merit. But even more important is that it foresees and proposes radical changes which exceed our present ideas about socialism.

It is possible that all this may cause different attitudes, reactions, and interpretations. Questions such as whether we are digressing from some of the fundamental conditions of Marxist-Leninist theory, are not excluded. Are we not denying some of the fundamental principles of socialist development? A convincing answer to these questions is given in Todor Zhivkov's introduction speech and the document we are discussing.

Yes, we are denying and rejecting! Not the conditions and principles, but that which distorts them to absurdity and all the resulting economic, political, and social consequences. We are speaking of something entirely different here. We are speaking of advancing, cleansing, and renewing socialism in the spirit and nature of the April line. Without consistent application and loyalty to this line we would not have gotten to the present plenum.

We seek a change in the formation of socialist society with a different image, the speaker said later on. And this new image is the self-governing society. This is the principle factor in the concept which places a division between the past and future development of our society. The transition toward self-government and the transformation of its principles into universal principles of the

entire social system is an historic step which we are about to take. The idea and establishment of a thorough understanding of self-governing society will fall in place among the periodic studies done by our party, in order to give orientation indecisive moments regarding which direction to take and what to be as a nation and a state.

From the study and the first steps we have taken, I see in the practical sense, two especially important factors of the process of society's transformation into a self-governing one. They are the formation of the entire system of self-governing organs and the establishment of action mechanisms of the internal moving forces of society.

Petur Dylgerov reviewed the significance of the question on structures. Here the step which is being made is decisive, he said. The idea has been carried through to the end, i.e. to the top organs of the government and the administration.

Many structural reforms have taken place in our country, probably even too many. But they usually did not reach their goals because the principles of centralism remained untapped. All attempts to change work habits and diminish the bureaucratic apparatus were unsuccessful. Now the method is different: the principles of self-government will pull the rug under bureaucracy. What is now being undertaken is not a regular reorganization, but structuring of the government from a new beginning. The greatest danger for distortion of socialism, as Lenin warned long ago, is bureaucracy, and now it is being attacked at its roots.

The initial steps of restructuring confirm that it is correct and urgent to build a new type of structures and organs. Let us consider the last few years. It has been a whole decade already since work on the application of brigade organization of contract work was started. Its principles, which correspond to the principles of self-government, were declared. The idea was accepted and innovators were found who were ardent supporters of this activity. They, however, were met with great, simply impossible to overcome, difficulties. The tragic fate of many such work brigades following this path is well known. And how the situation is such that work brigades of the new type in existence can be counted on one hand. The real reason for this is that the structures above the brigades remained unchanged.

The matter with the enterprises developed in the same way. They could not implement in practice their increased authority. Here as well, the reason is the same: all organs above the enterprise were acting in the opposite direction with their administrative and order-giving methods of management.

We are already noticing that it will be difficult for the newly created associations and economic trusts to manifest themselves as organs of a new type in the present environment. The evidence is sufficiently convincing that separate islands of self-government cannot survive

and even economic self-management is impossible. Unless the entire political system is structured according to the new principles, there cannot be self-government.

After this the speaker talked about the economic conditions of self-government. The structure is something very important, he said. But it is only a prerequisite. In the establishment of economic conditions suitable for self-government, key problems which up to now have not been resolved are the price mechanism and the way to establish and regulate the fund "Salaries."

The effect on collective interest is, however, only one side of the problem of the moving forces of self-government. It is not of little importance how interest within the workforce, the work brigades, and each person is stimulated. Here we must overcome the consequences of one of the greatest defeats suffered by excessive centralism: the attitude to expect decisions from "higher up," to expect help and compensation from outside for each difficulty and failure, and to depend on full social security regardless of what is contributed.

Petur Dylgerov pointed out the danger of substituting administrative bureaucracy with self-government bureaucracy. This could happen if there are too many unnecessary meetings, a lot of time wasted, and the accumulation of too many organs. The poorly understood and primitively applied collectivism and democracy can bring a great deal of harm and even invalidate self-government. If self-government does not lead to work efficiency and innovations, then something is wrong.

Later he noted that the elaborated formulations of the political system model have an exceptionally radical nature. All three of its components, he said, have been, until now, viewed in an unfamiliar light. This concerns the party to the greatest extent.

Self-government is the starting point for the formation of all structures, including social organizations. Regarding this, Petur Dylgerov showed the unconditional stance that everything which hinders the development of self-government, regardless from where it comes, be it from the party, the state, or the trade unions, must be removed decisively.

Based on the fundamental principles included in the reviewed document, Petur Dylgerov, dwelled on the place and role of trade unions.

During the recently conducted Tenth Congress of the Bulgarian Trade Unions, he said, the categorical conclusion was made that the present type of trade unions are behind the times and as such they cannot respond to the needs of self-government and the scientific-technical revolution. The restructuring of trade unions corresponds to the main and fundamental factors of the model's principles. The greatest problem with the place and role of trade unions in a self-governing society,

according to the speaker, needs additional work since under the new conditions the principle of voluntary trade union membership must be implemented completely.

The model which we are discussing maps out Bulgaria's future, but it is also our work program for the present, Petur D'ulgerov said in conclusion.

13211/9738

HUNGARY

Reagan Speech Said To Mistake, Misuse Kossuth's Name

25000475c Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
29 Jul 87 p 2

[Text] Well, it has come to that. Lajos Kossuth became a propaganda tool in the hands of an American speech writer. In the capital of the United States, at the "Captive Nations Conference," Ronald Reagan used Kossuth's name to agitate against communism—and to help the Nicaraguan Contras.

The President recalled a vignette from the 1852 visit by Governor "Lazlo" Kossuth. Of course, the slip of the tongue is not his but is of the speech writer, who apparently missed the first name in the heat of actualization. It is a small thing, but characteristic.

In this speech, Kossuth was needed for two purposes. One, so they could tell who he was but in a way that it should get a "timely" echo in American ears less well-versed in East European history. Thus, "Lazlo" Kossuth was "one of the leaders of the 1848 Hungarian revolution, an uprising that—but for the brutal intervention by Russian troops—would have enabled the Hungarian nation to progress toward freedom and independence." (The name of the Austrian in-law is considerably left out.)

The other purpose that necessitated that Kossuth be recalled was a quotation. During his 1852 trip to the United States, in Springfield, Illinois, "the Hungarian leader gave a speech that elicited a spirited discussion among the locals about the international role of the United States." At the end, the town meeting of Springfield came to the decision that the United States cannot follow a policy that "would prevent it from intervening, at any time and in any part of the world, on the side of any nation fighting for its liberty." To this, President Ronald Reagan—in the midst of the Iranian-Contra hearings—added the following, word by word: "So declared the people of Illinois in 1852. I should like it if some of Springfield's population could be with us to pay a brief visit to the Capitol the next time the lawmakers vote on supporting the freedom fighters."

This never happened to Lajos Kossuth! That his name would be used for the financial support of counterrevolutionaries in foreign pay—if you wish: "Latin labantes."

This "Lazlo" Kossuth episode, however, was merely the introduction to a lengthy anticommunist and anti-Soviet speech that, by the way, if not exactly by name, also lists us among the "captive nations"—in a tone that, in our country, has been improper to apply since the 1950's, either in speech or in writing, to the other side. The President also said, among other things: "Last month, when I was in (West) Berlin, I called on Gorbachev, the Soviet leader, to prove to the world that his "glasnost" campaign is more than mere words. I challenged him to tear down the Berlin Wall and to open the Brandenburg Gate." This is propaganda in bad taste. Moreover, this statement was repeated at this time after it had already received an adequate reply from the Soviet side. As it happened, it was here, in Budapest, that Edward Shevardnadze, Soviet foreign minister, replying among other things to Reagan's West Berlin "challenge," said: "The divided Europe is the result of the irreconcilable relationship to the other social order on the part of those who build their speculations today on the consequences of their own policies. There is no question that the dividing lines and obstacles in our total European house remained, but these were necessitated by totally concrete causes and circumstances. Unfortunately, there are people who rejoice at the mere fact of existing barriers because they see in them an illustration of their own views. It is known that neighbors are usually different. In some cases, there is no need for fences—for example, between Hungary and Austria....In the case of others, it is precisely the fences that make it possible to live a normal life without strain and crises. Barriers can be removed not by evocative speeches and melodramatic scenes at the Brandenburg Gate but by concrete proof that they want to live in peace and neighborliness, approach problems in a responsible manner, and are moderate in action. Barriers are removed by peace, security, and actions serving cooperation."

How should we interpret it then when, after this, the President of the United States not only repeated that certain "melodramatic scene" in West Berlin but also expanded his "challenge" that "the countries currently under the domination of the Soviet Union or its Leninist proteges (?) should be opened from the Baltic States to Bulgaria and from Vietnam to Ethiopia. If the Soviet Union wishes to have a new relationship with the West, it can begin by creating a new relationship with its neighbors and allies." Does the West not wish to have a new relationship with the Soviet Union? Are coexistence, negotiations, and the policy of survival a one-way street? What would be the United States' reaction if the Soviet Union would say the same: if it wants a new relationship with the East, it should first develop a new relationship with its neighbors and allies?" Hearing this, what would be the first thought of Ronald Reagan? What of the Canadian or Mexican leaders?

"Thomas Jefferson said that if the people know all the facts, they will not ever err."

This quote is also from Ronald Reagan's speech.

2473

Budapest Proposed as Site of Helsinki Process Meeting

25000475a Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 28 Jul 87 p 3

[Statement by Miklos Barabas, secretary general of the National Peace Council, on the Coventry Peace Conference: "The Concept of Mutual Security is Gaining Ground"]

[Text] The sixth conference on European Nuclear Disarmament (END) was held in Coventry, England, during the last few days. The conference was attended by approximately a thousand participants, from about 30 countries, representing a broad range of European and North American peace movements, and including also a Hungarian peace movement delegation. The experiences and efforts of the Hungarian delegation were described by Miklos Barabas, secretary general of the National Peace Council.

In April 1980, the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation of England issued an appeal with the central topic of eliminating the division of Europe and making the continent free of atomic weapons. The appeal was embraced by a significant part of the West European peace movements, and those who joined the movement have held regular yearly conferences since 1981; they have been organizing so-called convents. At the beginning, some of the West European peace movements were reluctant to effectively cooperate with the East European movements and peace councils, and thus we could not participate in the conference preparations. We know that the convents play an important role in the cooperation among peace movements, in situation analyses, as well as in the definition of common tasks. In the course of the preparation for this year's conference, we noted many new features: the agenda provided for the discussion of a broad range of problems related to European peace and security, and the peace movements of socialist countries also received their invitations in time. Therefore, we decided—in retrospect correctly—that we will express our readiness for cooperation by active participation.

Genuine debates took place at the conference. The basically positive exchanges were centered on the Soviet-United States negotiations on Eurorockets. The participants not only urged the attainment of the earliest possible results, but they also looked ahead and discussed the future goals of the peace movements after the dismantling of the Eurorockets. These manifold tasks include progress in the area of conventional weapons disarmament, the mutual dissolution of military blocks,

and a demand for changing the offensive military strategies, which in turn could lead to achieving the former goals. We were able to note that the concept of mutual security is gaining ground increasingly. At the same time, one could only rarely find individuals who voiced the principle of equal responsibility by the two large powers. The more favorable international climate that evolved in response to the active foreign policy of the Soviet Union contributed to this. It was natural, however, that there was no agreement on every topic. Several West European participants approached the connection between peace, freedom, and human rights in a one-sided manner, considering their own stands as absolute, and criticizing the East European practice. Nevertheless, the tone of the convent was defined by those who sought cooperation and, as a first in the history of these conferences, a joint resolution was accepted by the participants. Among others, it will initiate joint actions at the end of October, during the disarmament week of the UN.

Maintaining its right to represent a separate and independent stand, the Hungarian delegation signed the END resolution in Coventry and thereby became a participant of the movement with full rights, the first among the peace movements of the socialist countries to do so. Our delegation accepted the document because this step provides us with new possibilities to form relationships, to influence the development of the European peace movement programs, and to enlarge our scope. It is also not immaterial that we could accept a direct role in the preparation for future convents, for example, the conference to be held in Sweden in 1988.

Several interesting propositions were formulated at the convent. The establishment of a regular form of cooperation, similar to the Palme Commission, among the leaders and experts of the West European social democratic peace movements and the peace movements of the socialist countries was initiated by the peace movement closely associated with the Social Democratic Party of the FRG. Good possibilities for cooperation with the Belgian, Finnish, and Dutch peace movements present themselves in the field of action against chemical weapons. Attention was drawn to the notion of the Hungarian peace movement that in 1988 Budapest would host the European meeting, and whose task it is to build confidence and carry the Helsinki process further.

2473

Data Correction: Transylvanian County Titled 88 Percent Hungarian

25000475b Budapest UJ TUKOR in Hungarian 19 Jul 87 p 23

[Text] One of this year's most successful books is the three-volume work entitled "History of Transylvania." Its significance as a scholarly work and one that popularizes history was appropriately noted by Hungarian critics. It also received unjustified attacks, which drew an appropriately measured response from the experts.

Here, I should like to write about a single, minute error that appeared on page 1770 of that great work. The page lists the most recent Rumanian census data with respect to the ratio of Hungarian nationals in the individual counties. As we know, Transylvania has 16 counties. Of these, Hargita County has the highest ratio of Hungarian nationals. In contrast to the 44 percent quoted in the "History of Transylvania," in reality Hungarian nationals make up 88.1 percent of the county's inhabitants. As an aside, let me note that the January 1977 census showed a total of 1,707,000 Hungarian nationals in the area of Rumania. At the time, the total population of the country was 21,559,416. By the way, the most important census data were reported in the daily SCINTEIA on 14 June 1977.

2473

POLAND

Solidarity Registration Attempts in Torun, Poznan *Zwischenstaatliches PRZEGLÄD KATOLICKI in Polish 6 Sep 87 p 8*

[Unattributed article under the rubric: "In the Nation"]

[Text] On 11 August the Supreme Court in Warsaw reviewed the decision of the Voivodship Court in Torun to refuse registering the trade-union organizations: the Solidarity of employees of the Torun GEOFIZYKA; the Solidarity of Employees of the Torun ELANA Chemical Fiber Plant; the Solidarity of employees of the Torun MERINOTEX Carding Mill. It also reviewed an analogous decision of the Szczecin Voivodship Court with respect to registering the Solidarity trade-union organization of employees of the Adolf Warski Szczecin Shipyard.

The applicants were represented by the Torun Founding Committees in the person of the Lawyer L. Rutkowski, and the Founding Committee of the Szczecin Shipyard Workers in the person of the Lawyer P. Andrzejewski. They pointed to Article 84 of the PRL [Polish People's Republic] Constitution, Article 23 of the Civil Law Code, and the provisions, binding in Poland, of the International Pact of 19 December 1966 on Civil and Political Rights, the International Pact of 16 December 1966 on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, and ILO Convention No 87 of 17 June 1948. Reference was also made to the Trade-Union Decree of 8 October 1982.

The Supreme Court, deliberating in the persons of W. Myga, J. Bala, and B. Blachowska, rejected the brief of Lawyer Andrzejewski for submitting to the Constitutional Tribunal (through the mediation of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court) the question of consonance between the applicability of Article 60, Paragraph 3, of the Trade-Union Decree and Article 84 of the PRL Constitution and international law. The Court postponed until 25 August 1987 issuing a verdict on the registration of the abovementioned trade unions.

On 25 August the Supreme Court in Warsaw rejected the appeal by the [Solidarity] founding committees in Torun and Szczecin. The decision was orally justified as follows: the Trade-Union Decree has suspended trade-union pluralism at plants and factories for an indefinite period of time. Although the Court stressed that it approves of that pluralism, it also opined that the language of the pertinent Article 60, Paragraph 3, is not ambiguous and does not conflict with Article 84. Paragraphs 1 and 2, of the PRL Constitution, inasmuch as the latter, while guaranteeing freedom of association in general, does not specify the organizational forms in which that freedom is to be exercised.

The Supreme Court also offered, surely for the first time, an official high-level interpretation of the principle of consonance between domestic law and international norms, as based on precedents in the PRL:

"Judges are independent and bound solely by laws. Laws are passed by the Sejm. The PRL constitution does not authorize the Sejm to ratify international agreements; it assigns this power to the Council of State. Therefore, the agreements that are ratified and published in DZIENNIK USTAW are not part of domestic jurisprudence, and hence they are not binding on judges. For this reason, the courts are not competent to check on consonance between domestic laws and international agreements. Ratification constitutes merely an obligation of the Head of State to cause the application of international norms to domestic jurisprudence."

"In connection with the above, the only basis for deciding on matters relating to the registration of trade unions, too, can be domestic law — in this case, Article 60, Paragraph 3, of the Trade-Union Decree, which rules out trade-union pluralism at the factory or plant level."

It thus appears that initiatives such as those undertaken by Torun and Szczecin workers have a chance to succeed only at plants and factories at which no trade-union operates as yet.

1386

Chief of Israeli Interests Section Interviewed *Zwischenstaatliches PRZEGLÄD TYGODNIA W Polish 2 Aug 87 p 6*

[Interview with Mordechaj D. Palzur, Chief of Israeli Interests Section in Warsaw, by Waldemar Pisiecki: "Thinking About the Future"]

[Text] [Question] Toward the end of April, during the ceremonies that awarded the "Yad Vashem" Institute for National Remembrance "Righteous Among Nations" honorary diplomas and medals, journalists learned with some astonishment about the existence of

an Israeli state agency in Poland, and were able to listen to a speech delivered by its chief. It was apparently your first appearance in that capacity.

[Answer] The second one. I had previously attended the ceremonies to mark the 44th anniversary of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising. But it is easy to find a common denominator for those two commemorations. They are linked by the martyrdom and courage that marked Poland's citizens, Poles as well as Jews. Together we have suffered and experienced the greatest tragedy in the history of mankind, Nazism. Under such circumstances, the acts of saving others' life at the price of putting in danger one's own life and that of one's kin, have assumed special significance. It was the expression of the moral resistance against that which was going on around us. And that should be remembered!

To go back, however, to the fact that the Israeli Interests Section, headed by myself, has indeed begun to operate "under the aegis" of the Embassy of the Netherlands—I would just like to say that it functions thanks to a mutual agreement between the ministers of foreign affairs of our two countries, to serve the needs of both Poland and Israel. I am aware that some people might dislike it, or be surprised by it. Recent history has not favored good contacts or relations between our two countries, but the current years have brought some changes for the better. And that is the crux of the matter.

[Question] In Poland a lively, sometimes heated and controversial argument is going on concerning Polish-Jewish relations. During that debate charges of "Polish anti-Semitism," among others, have been raised, which are after all effectively echoed in the West, for instance in such movies as "Holocaust" or "Shoah." What kind of reflections does such "settling of accounts" provoke in your own mind?

[Answer] That is a complicated issue. If Poles feel the need for such a debate, obviously it is an important matter for them. And if it is important for the Poles, it cannot be indifferent to the Jews. I have to admit that I do follow the debate with interest, at least for two different reasons. First of all, as a representative of Israel. Second, as a Jew born on Polish soil, whose family, both on my father's and my mother's side, had lived here for ages.

As a professional diplomat, I can only say that discussion and dialogue are always welcome, since they contribute to producing a fairly complete picture, and to progress in general. It is therefore a positive occurrence. As far as the contents of the debate itself is concerned, I represent a pragmatic approach, in politics—in my opinion—the most proper one. For over one thousand years the Polish nation shared its fate with the Jews. Historically documented contacts go back to years 960-965, when a Jewish traveler from Spain, Ibrahim ibn Jacob, arrived in the "Mieszko lands" and later described the country and its inhabitants. Subsequent years too—as it is being

assumed—brought an influx of Jews from three major directions: from the Rhone River valley, from the Khazar state destroyed in 965, and from the Middle East. Whatever the assumption, the Jewish presence in Poland has lasted over one thousand years. Better known and more numerous waves of Jewish immigration began to reach Poland by the 12 to the 15th centuries, when wars and persecutions drove the Jews from the West. In their new place of settlement they found support for their commercial and handicraft activities, and were granted various rights and privileges.

It is well known that the Jewish community flourished in particular under the reign of Casimir the Great, when it was made independent of the jurisdiction of the Church and the guilds. In practice, this allowed [the Jews] to fully maintain their religious and cultural autonomy, simultaneously coupled with total loyalty to the king. In the 16th century the Jews established their first central body, called the Vaad, which represented their economic interests vis-a-vis the king. They were promoted to prominent offices and positions, they became attached to Poland for good and for worse. Thus they shared the tragedy of many 17th and 18th century wars, which ravished the country and destroyed its towns. It was also in 18th century Poland that the Hassidic movement was founded by Israel Baal-Shem Tov, and played a major role in unifying the Jewish community. Here, too, the Jewish language—Yiddish—was formed: it served the creative talents of many famous writers, like Iitzhak Peretz and Sholem Aleikhem, and contemporary of Isaac Bashevis Singer, the Nobel Prize laureate. In the mid-19th century, Jews played a major role in economic and cultural developments, joining the positivist tendency; one might recall the families Kronenberg, Natanson, Wawelberg, Rotwand, Toeplitz, Reichman, and Słonimski. They actively contributed not only to the growth of a modern banking system, communication (the Warsaw-Vienna railway), or industry, but also to the publishing, phonograph, and film branches. They were the cofounders and sponsors of the National Philharmonic Orchestra. Dealing with more recent times, one might name many Polish artists of Jewish origin who have permanently enriched the history of Polish literature and culture (among others J. Tuwim, A. Słonimski, B. Lewand, M. Jastrun, J. Brzechwa, B. Schultz, J. Korczak, B. Jasinski, S.J. Lec, A. Rudnicki). It should be kept in mind that before the outbreak of World War II, it was in Poland, and nowhere else, that the most numerous Jewish community in Europe (and second in the world) of three and a half million people, existed.

Keeping in mind all the above mentioned facts, one might ask a simple question: "What kept the Jews in Poland?". I assume that, were they unhappy, not so many would have stayed in Poland. The Jews shared with the Poles the times of prosperity and peace, as well as periods of wars and poverty. This was certainly no coincidence. I think such an approach should dominate, rather than dwelling on various cases of mutual hostility or anti-Semitic excesses.

[Question] Since we have touched upon Polish-Jewish relations, let me recall that you have mentioned your family roots, stemming from the Polish soil. Could you expand on this subject?

[Answer] I see no problem. I was born in 1929 in Tarnow. My father, Aleksander Plutzer, was a fine arts painter and an art teacher. My mother, Irma nee Brandstaetter, had also grown up in a family rich in artistic and cultural traditions. Her grandfather, Mordechaj Dawid Brandstaetter, had been a well-known Hebrew writer (actually I inherited from him my first and middle names). He was also the grandfather of a Polish poet and playwright, Roman Brandstaetter. I grew up in an atmosphere of respect for art and tolerance. For 4 years I attended a Polish elementary school, and Polish was the language that formed my consciousness. I had a peaceful and happy childhood. It was disrupted by the war and the Nazi aggression against Poland. Escaping to the east, to avoid the approaching German armies, we found ourselves in the USSR, and then, with the Anders army, we wandered via Iran to Palestine. There my family settled.

[Question] Has the appointment to your present post in Poland been a coincidence, or did it result from your origins?

[Answer] As a rule, diplomats do not discuss in public any decisions of their ministry, in particular not those that concern them personally. Since, however, coincidence in diplomacy is most infrequent, it would be hard to imagine this had happened in the case of my appointment. I rather suppose my roots, my knowledge of the language and the Polish mentality, and, above all, my professional experience, were the decisive factors.

[Question] To what diplomatic missions were you assigned previously?

[Answer] I have worked for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs since 1950. In 1954-58 I was employed in the Israeli legation in Helsinki; in 1961-64 in Mexico City as a consul and second secretary of the embassy; in 1969-71 in Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland as chargé d'affaires; in 1971-74 as chief of our mission in Cyprus; and in 1975-76 as ambassador to the Dominican Republic, and, at the same time, to several smaller states of the region. Last year I was appointed to Warsaw. The periods between foreign assignments were filled with work in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as with lectures on international law and political relations. I have been appointed professor of political science, and have received an honorary doctorate from several universities.

To come back to our Section, it had resided first in the Dutch embassy but later moved to a building owned by Israel at 24 Krzywicki Street. It is significant that the Dutch embassy, which used to represent us, did so for

many years on its own, with greatest devotion, and we are most grateful. At present we are doing it ourselves, although still "under Dutch aegis."

[Question] Almost automatically we have passed to the problems linked to the Israeli Interests Section. What is its purpose?

[Answer] In the most general terms, it deals with all matters concerning Israel and its citizens, as well as issues connected with Poland and its citizens. To be more precise, those are consular, commercial, cultural, as well as humanitarian problems. Our experience has convinced us that there is a surprisingly great interest in all consular matters, in particular those connected with departures. The interest toward Israel as the land of tourism and the country where so many Biblical monuments linked to Christianity have survived, seems obvious. In my opinion, equally obvious is the desire to keep in touch with friends who used to live in Poland and now reside in Israel.

[Question] Equally obvious is the booming trend of departures of Polish artistic ensembles, singers, musicians, and bands.

[Answer] Yes. There never has been such lively traffic. Just recently we were visited by "Mazowsze," Krzysztof Penderecki of the Cracow Philharmonic Orchestra, and Ewa Demarczyk. They were enthusiastically received; their concerts were fully sold out. One has to remember that about half a million people born in Poland, or whose parents were born in Poland, live in our country. They are naturally attached to the Polish culture; they have neither forgotten nor repudiated it. Since for a long time there was no possibility to import Polish culture, a certain "craving" for it had developed, hence the present level of interest and the need for it. I do not have to add that this is a most beneficial occurrence, since it proves our mutual links and their character. By the way, I would like to mention that Krzysztof Penderecki was awarded the Ricardo Wolf Prize, granted for outstanding accomplishment in the area of culture and art. This year the exchange will include a visit to Poland by the Israeli Philharmonic Orchestra conducted by Zubin Mehta, with the famous violinist Itzhak Perlman. A number of Polish publishers came to the Jerusalem Book Fair, where Polish literature roused very great interest. The Henryk Tomaszewski theater and the Cracow Old Theater also visited Israel this year. To sum up, one cannot but welcome such a lively exchange.

[Question] You have mentioned a numerous group of Israeli citizens with links to Poland, similar to your own. Could their interest in our country be just a symptom of a certain "fad" for Polishness, parallel to a similar growing interest for Judaism in Poland?

[Answer] You have raised a complicated question. The establishment of an Israeli state crowned the aspirations of many generations of Jews, and the Polish Jews had

contributed to them in a magnificent way. It should be kept in mind that Jewish migrations, which arrive in Israel consecutively, have been most diversified as far as culture, language, and politics were concerned. They simply drew on the environment they used to live in. Out of this mixture a new cultural and national category began to take shape, the Israelis. Obviously, this process is not yet over, and the following generations will solidify it. Under such circumstances, the reference to the various cultures with which they had contact and in which they grew up, are most natural. I am repeating myself, but I think that, had the past contacts with the national culture of the country in which [Jews] used to live not been harmonious, or even identical, there would not be today such an enormous group of Israelis who crave Polish culture and contact with Poland in general. I do not suppose that is just a "fad." Similarly, I do not believe that the interest for Judaism in Poland has arisen just from snobbery, rather than from the simple fact that the Jews have left a tangible trace in the history of Poland.

Such reasoning should at least result in treating the Polish Jews as a *sui generis* kind of Polonia [community of Poles living abroad]. After all, the overwhelming majority of them has been educated in Polish, on Polish literature, in Polish schools. It is therefore a significant potential asset, which to a certain degree Poland might be able to use. Similarly, there are some ideas concerning activization of the American, French, or West German Polonias. The Polish-Jewish relations have been, and are, obviously affected by the events of the fairly recent past, but the present positive changes are, after all, tangible and received in an unambiguously positive manner.

[Question] In a conversation about mutual Polish-Israeli relations one cannot ignore the political conditionalities and the state of world international relations. That seems to be an obvious truth. Do you share this opinion?

[Answer] Yes, naturally. We live in a politically divided world, often very deeply and painfully divided. It does not mean, however, that we should feel free from any obligation to look for agreement, or at least a rapprochement between our various positions. It seems that in the present difficult period the only rational way consists of focusing on whatever brings, or might bring us, nearer, while avoiding any stress on all that divides, or might divide us. It is probably a difficult way, but I am convinced, the only one. What counts is "today" for the sake of "tomorrow," and that provides the focus for our attention, our efforts, and our endeavors.

Thank you for the interview.

12485/9738

Report on 29 September Politburo Session
AU062103 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish
1 Oct 87 p 2

[Text] PAP—At its 29 September session the Politburo discussed a report submitted by the Party-Government Commission for Reviewing and Modernizing the Organizational Structures of the Economy and the State. The report, which evaluates the commission's work to date, contains a skeleton program for the realization of adopted decisions.

The reviews, which were sponsored by the 10th party congress, continue to be made in many sectors in order to modernize the running of the state, to improve the performance of the economy, to counter red tape, to streamline the services provided for citizens, and to rationally deploy cadres.

A large group of activists, scientists, and practitioners continue to participate in these reviews. The work of the commission, its working groups, and voivodship teams continues to be backed by suggestions and proposals submitted by social organizations and individual citizens.

The reviews are now entering a decisive stage. As an important part of the second stage of the economic reform they are closely geared to the new system of economic performance. The commission has prepared alternative principles of transforming the organizational function and structure of the economic center and of the supreme and central bodies of state administration.

The Politburo examined proposed changes in the supervision over state economic units. These changes must ensure that the enterprising spirit and efficiency of plants and plant managers in properly exploiting, enlarging, and protecting national property are really accounted for when their performance is evaluated.

The Politburo studied the commission's views on changes in the economy's organizational structures to conform with the requirements of the second stage of the economic reform and the reconstruction of the center. The Politburo agreed that it is necessary to increase the differences between the organizational-legal forms of economic units and to radically eliminate the administrative barriers that block initiative and the enterprising spirit.

It is necessary to back the development of small enterprises, including innovating enterprises, that know how to flexibly cater to consumer needs.

We must support the process by which the branch monopolist structures are eliminated and we must fully exploit for this purpose the legal facilities to be provided by the law on combatting monopolist practices, which will come into force as of 1 January 1988.

In some infrastructurally important sectors of the economy it is necessary to use new organizational forms of the syndicate [koncern] type because such forms ensure the necessary integration of economic activities, while preserving the legal status of enterprises. This applies to energy, coal mining, petrochemistry, metallurgy, and paper production.

The Politburo studied the evaluation of organizational structures in the cooperative movement. The evaluation indicates that the inflated administration of many cooperatives weakens the self-governing nature of the cooperative movement and the independence and enterprising spirit of cooperative members and that it helps to consolidate monopolist practices. It is necessary to effectively support activities that seek to reduce bureaucratic excesses in cooperatives. In particular, it is necessary to effectively support initiatives and activities within the cooperative movement itself. In this connection, necessary changes will have to be made in legal regulations.

The Politburo discussed results of activities to change organizational structures of the trade with production equipment and stressed the need to eliminate unnecessary intermediaries in this trade and to promote wholesale trade with this equipment.

Services for the population are an important sector of the reviews. The present sporadic improvements in services have not been really effective. One reason for this is the fact that services have been neglected for many years, the low efficiency of organizational structures, and the excessive and detailed verbosity of regulations. The Politburo agreed that it is possible and necessary to make rapid structural-organizational changes in the units providing services for the population, to simplify the bureaucratic administrative procedures used in dealing with citizens' problems, and to cut down the number of various certificates and other burdensome formalities required of citizens.

The Politburo advised a radical simplification of legal regulations. In this connection it is desirable to make an experiment by authorizing selected model service units to do their work without having to toe detailed administrative regulations and to follow their own simplified procedures and rules. The performance of such experimenting units must be in accordance with the law, that is such units must not violate the basic norms of the law.

The Politburo stressed that the government, the people's councils, and state administrative bodies should make intensive and consistent efforts to improve the services for the population.

The Politburo examined a report on the inspection of social organizations receiving state subsidies and agreed that it is necessary to expand the activities of these organizations, entrusting them with some tasks hitherto realized by state administration. It is necessary to reduce the personnel of the regular apparatus, to take greater

advantage of unpaid social work, and to support the development of economic activities by social organizations and associations. The Politburo approved the commission's proposal to reduce the budgetary subsidies used to finance most social organizations and to gradually abandon the practice of unqualified subsidies in favor of subsidies tied to the fulfillment of socially useful tasks.

Noting the commission's contribution to the program for modernizing organizational structures, the Politburo stressed the need to improve certain solutions, to accelerate the work at hand, and to display resolution and consistency in realizing these solutions.

The Politburo studied a report on Wojciech Jaruzelski's talks with Erich Honecker during the working friendly visit to the GDR.

The Politburo noted with pleasure that these talks revealed complete agreement of views on basic international issues and confirmed the resolve of the two states to intensify efforts to strengthen peace and security, to expand cooperation between the two states, and to promote friendship between the two peoples. The two parties will actively support the Soviet proposals to eliminate nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, to prevent militarization of space, and to reduce conventional weapons and armaments in Europe. The two sides reaffirmed their support for the Polish plan to reduce armaments and to increase confidence in central Europe and for the GDR and CSSR proposals to establish a nuclear-free corridor and a zone free of chemical weapons.

The Politburo approved and highly evaluated the decisions made during the visit with regard to developing bilateral relations.

The Politburo stressed the favorable implementation of the tasks of the multiyear program for developing Polish-GDR cooperation in science, technology, and production up to the year 2000. The increasing rate of mutual trade is one feature of this. Direct cooperation between Polish and GDR combines, industrial associations, and production plants continues to produce increasingly better results. This cooperation should be comprehensively developed in science, technology, and production.

The Politburo stressed the importance of partnerlike cooperation between voivodships and districts in all spheres of public life, primarily in the area of the Oder-Nysa border of peace. Party cooperation will be developed between allied political parties, parliaments, governments [rzadow], and social organizations.

The Politburo noted that that the large-scale vacation exchanges of Polish and GDR children and youngsters continues to develop favorably and agreed to expand and enrich youth cooperation and to raise it to a high level by virtue of a comprehensive accord between the two states.

The Politburo expressed the conviction that the realization of the decisions made during the visit will help deepen internationalist friendship and strengthen the development of comprehensive cooperation between the two parties, states, and peoples.

The Politburo studied the course and results of the official visit paid to Poland by the federal chancellor of the Republic of Austria at the invitation of the chairman of the Council of Ministers.

That visit was an important event in the development of friendly Polish-Austrian relations and helped to map out the lines of the two countries' future cooperation, especially economic cooperation.

Candid and constructive talks confirmed the convergence of Poland's and Austria's positions on basic international issues and contributed to the development and intensification of the all-European dialogue in favor of stability, detente, and peaceful cooperation on our continent.

The Politburo assessed the visit as a demonstration of good Polish-Austrian relations, which are favorably developing, and as an example of fruitful cooperation between the states that believe in different socioeconomic systems.

Szczepanski Criticizes Party Role at Consultative Council Session

2600779 Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish 1 Aug 87 p 3

[Article by Zbyslaw Rykowski: "Who Should Provide for the Parsley"]

[Text] We can complain about various shortcomings in Poland but not about a shortage of diagnoses, reports, and studies. "My God," cried Prof Jan Szczepanski at the second meeting of the Consultative Council. "I myself have written a great deal, many articles and alarming opinions in Lord knows how many reports. I have participated in many commissions, councils, and conferences where the whole sense of the meetings boiled down to—well, I won't say to lamenting, but to painting a dark picture and repeating the incantation: Let someone do something." He proposed that the Council seek an answer to the question: What should be done to get Polish society out of its current situation? How to find an a way out? What causes the general impotence? On what forces can we depend?

The proposal was adopted. Prof Szczepanski agreed to prepare a paper indicating the possible ways out. The Consultative Council began discussion of the paper on 18 May and continued it at its fourth meeting on 17 July. A special issue of RADA NARODOWA includes the text of the paper and the comments of the Council members at the previous session.

"A society is in crisis," writes Prof Szczepanski, "if its institutions, collectivities, and individual members are incapable of ensuring the necessary actions to maintain and develop it." Since 1981 there has been "a serious advancement in the development of society." However, we are still "in critical condition in various areas of the lives of individuals, institutions, and collectivities." The crisis has not been overcome. Worse. "It functions . . . as a myth justifying inaction, inefficiency, incompetence, lack of imagination, carelessness, etc., by the citizens and institutions."

What needs to be done to overcome the crisis? It is easy. Prof Szczepanski seems to say: let society do its own thing, for "societies create their own spontaneous forces for enduring and developing." It suffices "to find them, unblock them, and harmonize them with planned efforts." This is the basic assumption of the paper, one could say of his philosophy. In accordance with it, the author describes the components of society, indicates what is alive in them and can be used for development, and what limitations are restricting the liberation of the national forces for general benefit. He is certain that "the organized forces of the state and political parties, the mass organizations are insufficient for overcoming the various forms of the crisis, and thus we must find new forces, activate them, and use them to awaken economic development."

Let us say at once that in Prof Szczepanski's opinion society is to gain strength from below, from its foundations, for it lost strength chiefly because of bureaucratic life from above.

The composition of the paper has its logic. The quality of the social building materials is most important for the author.

We will begin our review not by examining and laying bricks, but by presenting the plan according to which Prof Szczepanski recommends making the changes.

Too Much State

The citizens who are the substance of the state "have lost their sense of identification with it." "After the revolutionary take over of power, the marxist-leninist party creates a political-authority structure embodied in committees and party organizations and also forms the state to manage the citizens' affairs and to socialize the economy. The management administers and in the popular mind also is identified with the state. The adjective state in this popular sense means the same as managed by the state administration."

The state took upon itself a huge task, ranging from industrializing the country to providing parsley; the administration manages everything. The citizens, relieved of responsibility for themselves and their affairs, lost their initiative. Meanwhile the state, "having reached the boundary of its capacity, the limit of its

abilities...is not able to perform its excessively expanded tasks." A bureaucratized administration cannot be made more efficient. Only the principle of the general omnipotence of the state over the citizen can be changed. The administration "by nature is incapable of releasing society's forces. It can only control and apply the proper regulations to the citizens' initiatives and actions. This means that it can limit the finding and exploitation of society's forces to overcome the crisis. If this is the situation in the economy and the state of the relations of production become chains for the development of the citizens' activeness, then according to Marx we enter into a revolutionary period."

Maintenance of the existing situation will cause increasingly sharper conflicts with the citizens. The social effects "can be disturbing"—the warning is clear. "If socialism does not want to choke itself to death with its own hands, it must begin a new revolution." The economic and political reforms must "return citizens independence in caring for their own affairs so that the citizens are responsible for their own lives, so that they have economic initiative, and are themselves responsible for their shoes, housing, potatoes, and parsley."

Prof Bobrowski considers the prescription overly general and emotional: "Not just the judgments but even the style of the report changes when it discusses the state administration and the socialized sector of the economy. In general these are sweeping judgments.... Prof Szczepanski does not consider details: he has a global answer which British or French neoliberals formulate as follows: 'too much state'." Prof Bobrowski indicated that the sources for this 'too much' should be sought not only in the doctrinairism but in the historical situation and in the people's attitudes. "The system has not become a monolith but a hybrid." This complicates not only diagnosis but also therapy.

During the discussion, however, the central idea of the paper was felt to be correct. Prof Bialkowski: "There is...an unwritten contract that we cease to concern ourselves with certain things and count on them being handled by the legal and political system under which we live, by the legal and economic system under which we live. The state has not met these expectations, whether they are realistic or not is another matter. And I would say that in this manner the citizens feel they have been relieved of their responsibility for meeting their obligations. I believe that this is the core of our crisis..." Atty la-Nowicki: "We must give society the ability to... must release society from its artificially... childhood and cease holding the child by its hand... will perhaps obediently do what the state... tells it to do."

Where to Begin?

Reform of the economy and state must begin with the party. Prof Szczepanski stated. And he recalled the words of Primate Wyszynski: Poland cannot exist without the party but it must be the party of its statutes.

The paper is concerned primarily with how the party operates in society: it has not evaluated its own capacity and strength to overcome the crisis. The previous techniques for performing the leading role by exercising omnipresent control through the administration, treating organizations as transmission units, and believing that party members will embody their words in their work, he stated, has failed. "For the party the primary task is to develop ways to coexist with administratively uncontrolled social forces." We must also "clearly and unambiguously define the range of responsibility for particular levels of authority for specific decisions" and "consider the practical sense, especial the economic sense of the operation of the so-called nomenklatura."

It is not hard to notice that these are not new ideas. They have appeared after every breakdown, they have been made formal promises. The pressure for the party apparatus at ever higher levels to make direct decisions in increasing numbers of matters, however, has been stronger than the formal promises and than learning by experience. I believe neither building an optimal model for the leading role of the party nor ceremonial promises of self-limitation will suffice. The bad norms return when the party weakens as a social organization and as an ideological movement.

The party, ineffective as a social force, unattractive as a center of intellectual life, routinized and ritualized, will also tend toward a bureaucratic, administrative method of control. We must seek a way to ensure the party members' influence on policy not only at the level of the factory or the township but also nationally. The experiences of 1956 and 1981 (in spite of everything) must be thoroughly analyzed.

The aim to increase participation by the unaffiliated in the management of society cannot replace efforts to improve the quality of party personnel. They will after all hold positions of authority. It is hard to imagine the future without trepidation when one observes ambitious young people fleeing political careers; a flight caused by their antipathy toward the existing style of politics.

Only a democratized party can perform its tasks under pluralism. One can put this another way: there will be no enduring pluralism without a strong party. The socialization of the party's policy is the corner stone for change. It is sad the paper passed over this problem.

Prof Baszkiewicz drew attention to the duality of the relation of the party members to the unaffiliated social forces: "Reforms can be bolder and more energetic the more solid their social support is. And thus I do not believe that it is correct to simultaneously complain about the negative selection of personnel and refuse to accept proposed personnel, proposed positions, even if in all respects the proposed candidates are competent....It is also incorrect

simultaneously to demand bold, energetic reforms and to refuse to help in the development of those areas of social life that have been reformed."

Self-organization

We are not Prof Szczepanski writes the "organizational society" of the sociologists that organizes itself to act. We are an "office society" that organizes itself, not to act, but in order to hold office.

People could act in voluntary organizations or in local self-governments if they could be formed and had something to do. And what an accurate observation: "Voluntary organizations are at present rather pressure groups conducting talks with the administration." The conviction reigns that "only the administration can act and associations of citizens can only appeal, ask, pressure, demand, in a word can only be petitioners awaiting a decision." We must overcome the authorities' anxiety in the face of volunteer social organizations formed to act.

This point of the paper provoked the most lively discussion. Are the existing organizations authentic, genuine? In the opinion of attorney Sila-Nowicki, they are not, for society regards them (the Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth, for example) as agents of the state, state organizations. Prof Przeclawska protested against "an overly facile classification of the various social objects as authentic or inauthentic": "Each should have the right to search for his own high road to help in the development of Poland." Wojciech Jaruzelski also spoke on this issue: "I think we must make such arbitrary judgments more carefully. We must honor the accomplishment of activeness, the authority of so many important, responsible organizations."

Should we create new organizations since there are so many of them that everyone can find an appropriate one for himself? Prof Bialkowski answered this question: "an organization is not only a charter and the principles of operation in it but also its history, traditions, its existing modus operandi and its resulting social visage. Not everyone by joining...wants to take responsibility for all the characteristics of organizations to whose formation he did not contribute or even once opposed."

Examples of the difficulties encountered in registering new associations were given. Prof Skubiszewski demanded "revisions of the law and practice in the area of associations and groups." Gen Jaruzelski announced that study of modifications on association law are already well advanced.

Prof Baszkiewicz looked at this issue in a different way from attorney Sila-Nowicki and Prof Skubiszewski. "Bureaucracy has its own rationality and the understanding of this bureaucrat who forbids registering a voluntary association can be reconstructed. The understanding is as follows: if we allow the formation of a social organization that escapes from our control, a political content,

opposition will immediately fill this gap regardless of the declared statutory goals of the organization....Activating society's energy by releasing the collective initiative is not a technical legal problem. It is a political problem par excellence. Here a change in anachronistic resolutions on associations and the right to appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court will not suffice....We must simply create a new political situation....In addition to the will of the political party, we also need the will of those spontaneous social forces, the will to respect elementary. I repeat, elementary principles of our social order, for they must be respected regardless of how critically we judge the defects of this social order."

An Analysis of Forces

I have attempted to present the basic position presented in the paper. I have foregone the recommendations on the economic reform for they in general agree with the known conceptions.

Prof Szczepanski appeals for an analysis of the social forces materially and not ideologically interested in the reform. Unfortunately, he does not make such an analysis. And this is the basic weakness of the paper. He does not take into account the structure of the group interests; he does not indicate ways to use and change the structure. And the failure of the reform derives from its failure to activate sufficiently its own, new materially interested social forces. The reform has not opened new prospects for social advancement. The paper also does not discuss contradictory interests; there are no proposals for resolving them.

The professor trusts in people. He notices the influence their characteristics and attitudes have on the economy. He seems, however, only to engage their better "natural" drives in the transformation, and he does not note their drives that hamper the reform.

Attempts to adapt the people to the ideological model have failed, Prof Szczepanski says. Opposition appeared. "We must change our method and take people as they are, use their motivating forces for achieving overall social goals by harmonizing the order's ways of operating with them." Yes, but the point is that although the people were not changed or improved according to the ideological image, they have adapted to the system's way of operating. The learned attitudes in public life that differ from those in private life. In public life, defensive postures dominate as we know (take no losses, no risk, keep others from succeeding), conserving the system. Entrepreneurship, inventiveness, risk-taking are characteristic in efforts on one's own behalf.

Prof Szczepanski gives an argument for the necessity of making the economy more market oriented. It ends with these conclusions: "Begin analysis of the enterprises with a technical and economic analysis of the sense of their jobs. Eliminate employment for the sake of employment. Eliminate surplus employment. Analyze the methods of

political managing the economy and the enterprises. Analyze the extra-economic functions of the enterprises from the point of view of the economic reform." And I read in POLITYKA of opinion surveys in which the specific economic measures, especially those whose effects threaten their sense of social security (for example, reducing the role of the state in setting prices or the ability to release employees) have the lowest level of social support.

W. Jaruzelski indicated in his comments "how deeply we are entangled in the psycho-social dependence, how frequently it is difficult to reconcile the optimal decision with society's ability to approve." He admitted: "For us the most difficult opinion remains open: Whether and how to tighten our belts? How to ensure observance of the principles of social justice? How to achieve the essential social understanding and consent?" Authorities' decisions cannot please everyone simultaneously. "The problem is to find an optimal point of selection including the existing conditions and the demands of the future. In making such decisions every reasonable authority needs counsel."

A Difficult Issue

The paper presented to the Consultative Council has the charm of a comprehensive study. Everything is related to everything else and is situated in accord with the dictates of common sense. If we do not know how to do something, it suffices to see how others do it, we read in many places in the paper. Its author seems to abstract away from the fact that others have composed everything over a long period through a complicated interplay of social forces and that we cannot reconcile ourselves to all the consequences of imitation, for we do not consider socialism the longest road to capitalism.

Prof Szczepanski sceptically evaluates the ability of rapidly achieving the desired results. Returning the citizens' sense of autonomy "will be a difficult issue." "We need not delude ourselves that permission to form volunteer organizations will immediately produce the desired results." The percentage of citizens wanting to take advantage of the right to take economic initiatives "will be small." The economic and political reforms will be "a slow process."

These forecasts are not optimistic. It is true, that all societies sunk in crisis have found the forces to defend themselves. Not all, however, strove to make use of them at the appropriate time. Those who were tardy dissipated. Circumstances drive us to hurry.

We still do not know the comments of the members at the fourth meeting of the Council; they will appear in the next special issue of RADA NARODOWA. The communiqué announces that "the discussion's common denominator was the conviction that we must act more radically, systematically, decisively so that Poland can keep up with the advance of world civilization."

Precisely: From diagnosis to action!

13021

PZPR Daily Assesses Consultative Council Activity

26000004 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish
19 Aug 87 pp 1-3

[*"No Recommendations and Suggestions Are Left Unanswered: Following Four Sessions of the Consultative Council"*]

[Text] The Consultative Council under the Chairman of the Council of State has been active for 8 months now. Its members have so far met four times, but notwithstanding it can be said that they have been working almost ceaselessly, without any major interruptions.

This can be concluded because, according to PAP reporter Anna Wiciek, each meeting of the Consultative Council results in a flood of recommendations, comments, observations, and various proposals; so far 120 have been recorded and they concern nearly every aspect of life of the nation, the society, and the state, beginning with matters relating to socioeconomic issues, public health, environmental protection, social justice, legality, and penitentiary policy, and ending with church-state relations, national reconciliation, respect for good work, and humane interpersonal relations.

At the office of the Chairman of the Council of State in the Belvedere these topics are, following each Council meeting, grouped, complemented with corresponding excerpts from the stenographic records of the discussion, and transmitted to appropriate agencies and institutions. That office has provided PAP reporter Anna Karas with a complete record of both the proposals made and the responses from the Government Presidium, the ministries, departments of the PZPR Central Committee and allied parties, and heads of institutions. This voluminous record is available any time to interested members of the Consultative Council. A review of that material points to topics of social interest and at the same time represents a kind of report on many problems of the state and the economy.

The Council members raise any topic they consider important. They discuss it freely and candidly. Despite their differing motivations and differing points of view, and despite their independence of thought, they intend to work out formulas for mutual understanding. This is the first conclusion ensuing from a reading of the stenographic records of the discussion. And as for the responses to the opinions and recommendations of the Council members, regardless of the importance of the issue raised, these represent noteworthy practical results of the first few months of activity of this important consultative group.

In this connection, W. Jaruzelski declared that all these recommendations, regardless of their complexity and feasibility, have provided a momentum for either concrete action or further analyses and expertises undertaken by the government, the ministers, commissions of the Council of State, the Prosecutor General, etc. In many cases either specific responses have been obtained or a position has been taken. "I wish to emphasize," the Chairman of the Council of State declared, "that the responses obtained are specific and the addressees consider and investigate attentively and seriously the problems raised at sessions of the Council. Such an approach will contribute to a successful resolution of these problems."

Below are several examples. At every one of its meetings the Consultative Council has been raising the issue of alcoholism, which harms the morality and health of the society and the economy of the country. Many persons have commented on this problem, especially Professor Andrzej Swiecicki and Professor Tadeusz Koszarowski. Attention was drawn to the ineffectiveness of the Decree on Education in Sobriety and Counteracting Alcoholism. So now a position on this issue was taken, as predicted by W. Jaruzelski, by the Politburo of the PZPR Central Committee at its July 28 session. On considering the critical opinions and far-reaching recommendations of the PRON [Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth] and the members of the Consultative Council, the Politburo pointed to inconsistencies in enforcing the provisions of that Decree. Sobriety should become a universal and highly valued norm of societal life, the communique on the Politburo's session declared. Further intensification of the struggle against alcoholism was announced. Combating illegal production and trade in alcohol will be intensified and broadened. Heads of enterprises and institutions will be obligated to toughen the struggle against inebriation of employees. The government will strive to develop a socially justified policy on the production and sale of alcohol. More energetic steps will be taken to counteract the presence of intoxicated persons on streets and in public places. The anti-alcoholism program being drafted by the government should be strengthened and consistently implemented, it was announced.

The government's response to the desiderata of the Council members also includes the prediction that the policy on alcohol prices will be oriented in the direction of causing these prices to rise faster than personal incomes. As for the postulate that all buyers of vodka be required to show their I.D. cards, that was deemed unrealistic because "that would curtail civil rights."

The question of the return to Poland of those who had left the country in the 1980's and the related passport policy with respect to the Polonia [foreigners of Polish origin] and emigres was raised at Council sessions by, among others, Lawyer W. Sila-Nowicki, Prof. A. Swiecicki, Prof. P. Zaremba, and Prof. A. Rajkiewicz. They have succeeded in obtaining a response addressed to the

Office of the Chairman of the Council of State and moreover their postulates turned out to be consonant with the intentions of the state authorities, as reflected in the adoption of a specific government decision intended to enable Poles living abroad to maintain free ties with their homeland. The point is that these Poles should feel themselves to be full citizens of their fatherland, while those who reside permanently abroad should not, while retaining loyalty to the countries in which they settled, sever their contacts with the homeland. Following this idea, on 1 July of this year the government abolished the requirement that Polish citizens residing abroad on consular passports apply for so-called entry clauses when desiring to visit Poland. Considering the stabilization of the sociopolitical situation in this country, the restoration of Poland's standing in the world, and the need to maintain and develop contacts with Polish emigres, from the oldest to the youngest generations of emigres, a flexible treatment of the problem of Polish citizenship abroad was adopted. In practice, this consists in tolerating dual citizenship and issuing visas to foreign passports in cases justified by the interests of the state and the citizen. Poles living abroad on Polish passports were enabled to renew their passports for a period of 10 years, thus making possible their free entry into and egress from Poland. It should be added that during a recent meeting between W. Jaruzelski and Polonia representatives from 29 countries at the Royal Castle in Warsaw, these representatives included many of the most recent emigre generation benefiting from the new passport policy, for which they expressed their most cordial gratitude.

W. Sila-Nowicki proposed that sentences passed during the martial-law period be invalidated. The government's response was that this certainly concerns sentences imposed for actions carried out from political motives and this postulate can be accepted. Implementing this postulate will not, contrary to what might be assumed, weaken the state; it would rather contribute to alleviating the tensions still occurring in connection with and owing to such verdicts. Invalidating them could represent yet another important expression of the state's willingness to end the period of social conflicts in this country. However, as we read in the documents transmitted to the Consultative Council, to protect the state's interests, the expediency and possibility of invalidating these verdicts should be made contingent on the defendant's attitude at some subsequent period (e.g., 5 or 10 years after serving the prison sentence).

And hence, this is not a "no" answer.

Prof Andrzej Swiecicki and Dr Julian Auleytner appealed for permitting the formation of Catholic care organizations. The government's response admitted that the needs are tremendous, especially as regards care for the elderly and chronically ill. The state's activities in this respect are being assisted by social organizations such as the PKPS [Polish Social Assistance Committee] and the PCK [Polish Red Cross], as well as by religious

organizations, such as the homes operated by "Caritas." In addition, there exist eight homes managed by monastic organizations and subsidized from voivodship budgets. In the currently drafted new decree on social care the suggestions of the Consultative Council will be reflected in, among other things, the provision that care for the elderly, the chronically ill, etc., will be within the purview of "tenant self-governments in cities and villages, associations and societies, churches and other religious associations, and individuals." The direction is thus obvious, and the implementation should be operatively resolved.

In the debate on diagnosing the malaises of contemporary Polish reality the place of honor was given to the need to adjust properly staffing policies. Comments on this matter were presented by, among others, Prof Anna Przeclawska, Prof. Aleksander Gieysztor, and Prof Zdzislaw Cackowski. They viewed critically the organizational structure of the so-called "centrum" [central authorities] and the bureaucratized — in their opinion — operating system of local administrative offices. The government's response presented in detail directions of action undertaken with the object of, consonant with the resolutions of the 10th PZPR Congress, "vetting" organizational structures and workstations throughout the state. Such a review should assure a streamlining of services to citizens and affect favorably the implementation of the economic reform. The 10 April 1987 session of the Council of Ministers adopted decisions on conservation measures in the national economy that also include reducing the number of executive positions at ministries and central offices — subsecretaries of state and directors general and their equivalents. The Council of Ministers issued an ordinance on reducing the number of vice voivodship governors, deputy mayors, and deputy chiefs.

At the same time, the government explained that employment in state administration totals 178,000 persons, which accounts for barely 1 percent of overall employment in the national economy and about 1.5 percent of employment in the socialized sector. This is only less than one-fourteenth as much as employment in the economic administration. The operating cost of state administration, as established by the budget decree for this year, accounts for about 1.9 percent of the state's expenditures. On the monthly scale this comes to not more than 54,000 zlotys per employee, with the principal part of these expenditures being represented by the salary, reaching 27,000 zlotys, plus social security, social services fund, housing fund, etc. Equipment, transportation, and repair account for 14,500 zlotys. Contrary to popular opinion, salaries in state administration are not high, with the average [monthly] salary amounting to 22,503 zlotys [in central offices] and 20,757 zlotys in local offices. This information was complemented with the assurance that work on an integrated system for training managerial personnel for enterprises is continuing. The purpose of that work is to provide advanced training for enterprise directors and enhance the economic effectiveness of their performance.

The fate of each of the 120 recommendations made during discussions of the Consultative Council could be traced in a similar manner. Thus, for example, the Ministry of Labor, Wages, and Social Welfare, has analyzed very thoroughly the [Council's] suggestions concerning social security, employment, and the interdependence of labor and wages. "In Poland it pays to be sick. The belief has arisen that everyone is entitled to being paid for working regardless of whether he has actually worked," Prof Jarema Maciszewski declared. "In the next 15 years persons of post-ablebodied age will account for nearly a million out of the 3-million population growth. The problem of maintaining instead of curtailing the state's traditional function as the mentor has to be resolved," stressed Prof Kazimierz Secomski. "Protection of large families is inadequate. Upbringing allowances have in practice died a natural death, because the income thresholds of eligibility have not been raised [to keep pace with inflation]," emphasized Prof Maciej Gertych. And Prof Antoni Rajkiewicz suggested, "The preference for monetary benefits is a weakness of our present system. There is a need for reorienting our welfare system in the direction of a greater share of services and allowances in kind."

The Ministry deemed the above recommendations to be consonant with the position of the 10th PZPR Congress, in particular as regards sickness pay, relief for the economically weakest families, and provision of social services to, chiefly, the families and individuals who need the state's protection the most. In its letter to the authors of the recommendations, the Ministry declared that it is in the process of analyzing all the welfare benefits provided so far and drafting a comprehensive proposal for changes which, following broad public consultation, and especially consultation of trade unions, will be presented at a national conference of PZPR delegates. In December of last year the government approved the assumptions of the new decree on social services. For the last 6 months these assumptions have been the subject of a lively debate that enriched the original proposals with new and more specific solutions. It was proposed that financial benefits be extended to three main groups of the needy: the disabled in categories I and II since childhood, regardless of the material situation of their families; the disabled in categories I and II who cannot work and lack families obligated to support them; and vision-impaired persons in categories I and II, regardless of the material situation of the persons obligated to support them. However, as emphasized in the discussion of the new decree, the principal role in social welfare should be played not by monetary benefits but by services and material assistance. New forms of these services are proposed. In addition to homes for the disabled, there would be special forms of so-called protected housing, as proposed at the forum of the Consultative Council by Prof Halina Skibniewska, along with an expanded scope of the provision of household care services, etc. In response to these recommendations of members of the Consultative Council the [government] has conceived the idea of amending the

decree on economic services with provisions on economic education relating to household services as a form of services that is particularly needed by incapacitated persons. A new approach to appointing guardians of such persons through elections by tenant self-government is also envisaged.

It is impossible in a newspaper article to describe all the voluminous material resulting from and "elicited," as it were, by the recommendations of the Consultative Council. We mentioned only certain assessments and comments because these provide, as it turns out, a way whereby the society can influence the exercise of power by the state and its functioning. This thus is fulfilling the hope voiced at the inaugural session of the Consultative Council by W. Jaruzelski: "The purpose of the Council, if we agree to establish it, would not, however, consist in representing structures (classes, social strata, groups, or factions). For the members of the Council will offer their knowledge, wisdom, and experience for the benefit of the general public; representing an emanation of the thought of the public, which they represent, they can submit to the Council's forum the opinions and views of their constituencies, but without the obligation of making them official.... Properly speaking, we can discuss anything, including also the status of the Council within the social panorama of the PRL [Polish People's Republic]. It is up to us whether we can surmount the divisions while retaining the authenticity of views."

1386

Labor Code Changes Scored by Catholic Columnist

26000009b Gdansk GWIAZDA MORZA in Polish
13 and 20 Sep 87 p 8

[Article by Bohdan Saryusz: "A Tightened Set of Regulations"]

[Text] For several months now a strange discussion has been under way concerning the assumptions for revising the existing labor law code. I use the adjective "strange," because it is difficult to resist the impression that many of the arguments advanced during that discussion — particularly from one direction — serve to conceal rather than uncover actual intentions. The starting point for the so-called public consultation, offered by those who favor introducing the revisions, is a justification identical with that which has preceded the passage of an avalanche of amendments, revisions, and changes in the hundreds of decrees and ordinances added immoderately to the PRL [Polish People's Republic] legislation in the last 5 years. First, it is claimed that our labor law code, which is already (!) 12 years old, is obsolete (despite its having been "en route" updated six times), and second, that it makes no allowance for the imperatives ensuing from the principles of the economic reform, as well as for the recently passed decrees, including chiefly the decrees on trade unions and on workforce self-governments at state enterprises.

I fear that there is a lot of hypocrisy in these arguments. For the proposed revisions of the labor law code clearly indicate that their authors consider it necessary to make its provisions more repressive and thereby strive to eliminate by legal means the negative aspects of the existing labor relations. That is, the approach taken is exactly the same as in the unsuccessful attempts to regulate with decrees on petty fines and penalties the growth of the black market, speculation, alcoholism, the production of shoddy goods, waste, etc. This is clearly a naive approach, though it is much easier than dealing with the heart of the matter, that is, eliminating the actual causes of evil, rooted in a faulty structure of the economy, incompetent management, and the disregard of basic motivational factors.

The proposed new labor law code resembles not so much a corpus of laws as a set of rigorous regulations for a hard-labor camp. Their authors believe, though they do not say so openly, that the Polish worker is sloppy and undisciplined and his sense of civic responsibility is low. And as for the obstinate, lazy, and disobedient, for them the best argument is the whip. During the building of the Pyramid of Cheops the presence of a coldblooded overseer brandishing a whip was to spur the ignorant and resisting Egyptian fellah toward greater effort and harder work, regardless of whether he knew what he was doing or not. Would the "anekdotchiks" have built the White Sea-Baltic Canal within less than 3 years had they been treated to appetizing delicacies? It can be assumed, mutatis mutandis, that precisely this idea underlies the proposed new revisions to the labor law code. It also ensues unambiguously from these proposals that the Administration of Z. Messner has decided in favor of a situation in which dignitaries will be able to recline comfortably in soft armchairs and, smugly twiddling their fingers, murmur, "Well, we did everything we could. We have an excellent tool for persuasion; now everything depends on making sure down there in the engine room that the propeller will start rotating."

It will not start rotating. Our lawgivers seem to forget that superfluity of laws breeds lawlessness, as the world has known for millennia. This precisely is how the Roman phrase *summa iniuria* has originated. The proposals for revising the code are intended to enmesh workers in a spiderweb of Draconian laws and turn enterprise managers into overseers. The sharper penalties and sanctions are explained by pointing to the requirements of the second stage of the economic reform instead of creating a climate of labor relations that could genuinely promote that stage of the reform, and release mechanisms of creative motivation instead of intimidating.

The discussion also is strange for another reason. Namely, the existing labor law code does not, I believe, hamper in any way an efficient management of enterprises, and the proposed drastic restrictions of employee rights will not at all spur incentives for diligent work, and neither will they of themselves elevate to a higher level the civic

consciousness of the worker. What is more, the commission for revising the code, appointed by trade unions, has not hesitated to state that the proposed changes will cause Polish labor law to rank at a bottom place in Europe so far as its humanization is concerned, and that some of the revisions will simply conflict with the rights of workers as formulated by the internationally recognized conventions of the International Labor Organization.

There are no bad soldiers; there are only bad generals. This known maxim of military theorists illustrates clearly the situation of our labor market. I do not intend to respond to the argument that we have a good system and enlightened laws and the only problem is that Poles themselves are unwilling and do not know how to work industriously. This is a counterfeit argument, readily employed by those who are the least entitled to decide authoritatively on anything. This type of "chinovnik" [Russian term for bureaucrat] protected by bureaucratic-legal fortifications, was already well-known to A. Pushkin, who wrote 160 years ago:

"I don't value greatly laws proclaimed in a stentorian voice. Which caused turbulence in more than one head..."

1386

Proposed Changes in Censorship Law Discussed
26.09.1987 a Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
5-6 Sep 87 p 2

[**"Proposed Revisions of Censorship Decree"—PAP Report**]

[Text] The following [Sejm] committees: Administration, Internal Affairs and Administration of Justice, and Legislative Work, discussed at their 4 September session a draft decree for revising the Censorship Decree, presented by the Council of State. The proposed revisions are intended to simplify the procedures for censoring publications and entertainment.

First, computer programs are to be excluded from prior censorship by censors. During the first half of this year alone nearly 1,000 items of such software were submitted to the Main Office for the Control of Publications and Entertainment, and monitoring them was either extremely difficult or simply not possible.

Second, it is proposed that the possibilities for excluding publications or entertainment from prior censorship upon request by editor, publisher, or entertainment organizer be broadened. Currently this is possible if the thematic scope itself of the publication or entertainment precludes violating the Censorship Decree. In the future, the Censorship Office could in such cases take into consideration, e.g., the consonance of the prior longtime activities of the editor or publisher with the Decree on the Control of Publications and Entertainment.

Under the existing Decree, decisions to prohibit publication or entertainment may be appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court. This poses the question of who can appeal, a question whose interpretation has so far been eliciting doubts. Could the appeal also be made by the author of the questioned publication, or can it be made only by the publisher? Censorship offices are bound by deadline regulations, and this complicates the matter in cases in which it is difficult to locate in time the author of the questioned publication, notify him of the decision, which he could appeal, etc. Hence, the proposed revisions provide that the right to judicial appeal will belong to the person or organization applying for consent to disseminate a publication or organize entertainment. This last question elicited lively discussion. The commissions decided to discuss the problem in its entirety at their regular meeting next week.

1386

Censorship of Catholic Press Assailed
26.09.1987 Katowice GOSC NIEDZIELNY in Polish
20 Sep 87 pp 4,5

[Article by Slawomir Siwek: "The Decree on the Control of Publications and Entertainment: Assessment Factors" (Excerpts from Speech to Press Council)]

[Text] The Decree on the Control of Publications and Entertainment dates from 31 July 1981. That is, it dates from the famous attempts of the society toward a broadened scope of civil liberties in the state and for a clear rule of law to be followed by that state.

It was and to this day is a paradox that one of the basic civil rights, the right of free speech and free press, was at the same time restricted by the censorship decree, negotiated by all the social forces that count, and that the appearance of that restriction was regarded as a success.

Clearly, we shall have full freedom of speech once offices censoring the words of citizens are no longer needed. This should be the goal. This would crown the democratization of relations in Poland. At the same time, though, the framers of that decree, meaning also the public side or the side of editors and reporters, were realists. There exist basic reasons why the decree is evil rather than good, but a necessary evil. Its intent was, after all, to restrict the extralegal system for thought control and word control. But I happen to know that one of the framers of that decree stated that the greatest mystery of law is that, at the time a law is drafted, no one can foresee the uses to which its particular provisions might be put.

Laws in a state whose aim it is to provide safeguards for unrestricted personal growth and growth of the community cannot serve as tools for manipulation by individuals or selected groups. That "mystery of law" should always be opposed.

It is thus natural that the — subsequently accomplished — intention to amend the 1981 Decree, an intention that became fact on 28 July 1983, met with a negative response from Catholic publishers, too. For it turned out that the government-proposed amendments to a fairly new decree (because it is hardly possible to verify its operation within less than 2 years) were intended to restrict the free exchange of thoughts and ideas as well as to introduce restrictive provisions of an unclear duration. A negative assessment of the amendments was also spelled out in the position paper of the Secretariat of the Polish Episcopate. The instances that occurred during discrete periods of operation of the Decree corroborated the anxiety. I will not discuss any further that position of the Episcopate. It is well known to the government. But I wish to dwell on certain details and general conclusions ensuing even now from an analysis of the decree and its implementation.

The decree directly affects problems of special interest to Catholic publishers and journalists in its Article 2, Point 8, which prohibits violating the feelings of believers and nonbelievers, and in Article 4, Point 10, which exempts from prior censorship the following items if they are approved by the Catholic Church and other churches and denominational associations: writings, pictures, and audio records relating to the dissemination of religion; liturgical, theological, monastic, prayer, catechetic, and pastoral documents and texts; documents, notices, and guides relating to ecclesiastical law, radio and television transmissions of religious ceremonies; cultural-religious entertainment organized on church grounds; letters, circulars, printed matter, forms, and other documents pertaining to the operations of these institutions.

Thus, as can be seen, the letter of the law can be evaluated positively. But there remains the problem of interpretation — not just of selected regulations but of the entire law. I believe that correct interpretation should be based on Article 1, Points 1 and 2, of the aforementioned Decree, which states that the Polish People's Republic safeguards freedom of speech and press in publications and entertainment, and that this safeguarding is the duty of agencies and institutions of the state as well as of political and social organizations.

Hence, the Decree unequivocally imposes the duty of interpreting its provisions in accordance with the basic principle: freedom of speech. Restrictions of that principle are so explicitly defined in the Decree that the problem of negative interpretation should not exist. Furthermore, the duty of safeguarding that principle is unequivocally imposed on the institutions of the state. Nowhere in the Decree are these institutions given the

right to take any restrictive measures. Neither the Censorship Office nor any other administrative institution of the state, nor any political party or association, can restrict this principle without becoming liable to a glaring breach of the rule of law in the state.

Given this interpretation of principles, in no case may the provisions of the law be subordinated to, say, current political tactics or the ideological beliefs of any one social group. In his polemics with the late Kazimierz Romanuk (POLITYKA, 30 May 1987), a spokesman of the Main Office for the Control of Publications and Entertainment claimed that perils to the security of the state, which "are historically variable," may justify restrictions on freedom of speech. But first it would be necessary to define conclusively the concept of the state as viewed by all citizens and the concept of the security of precisely that state. Otherwise we would be dealing with bending the law to fit current needs. It is my belief that we all here should gather to discuss the weaknesses of law with the object of causing the state to become more and more fully a mansion belonging to all citizens.

Bending the interpretations of the letter of the law — in this case the Censorship Decree — to fit extraneous exigencies has occurred during the brief history of that significant decree. In this respect, the year 1983, for example, was special. The Decree afforded the opportunity, as it turned out, for making numerous tasteless attacks against various aspects of the life of the church, while at the same time the ecclesiastical press, or more broadly, the Catholic press, was not allowed to engage in polemics against even the most egregious attacks. Consider for example the public attack by the non-Catholic mass media against the Theses of the Primate's Social Council concerning, after all, dialogue and national reconciliation, combined with the banning of the publication of articles describing these theses or criticizing those attacks, in PRZEGLAD POWSZECHNY or NIEDZIELA.

This gave rise to the assumption, which does not appear unjustified, that the activities of the censorship offices are subordinated to recommendations of a political center rather than to the provisions of the Decree. If law is to be law in our country, such a tendency should not recur. The government must realize the socially negative consequences of that tendency. State offices, including also speech control offices [as published], have no right to pursue any policy other than that of acting in compliance with the laws which called them into life. Yet, at that time there also arose another very acute problem, namely, the very fact of [objections by the Catholic press to] the censor's interference in Catholic periodicals was regarded as an antistate activity. This was officially stated in contacts with not only the Catholic press but also the institutions of the church. We thus dealt with a kind of reversal of concepts: the reliance by the Catholic press on the rights granted to it by the Decree was regarded as violating that Decree. This should not happen again — for the good of the rule of law in this country.

The Decree prohibits violating religious feelings. Yet significant examples of such violations occurred in 1983, too. Catholics read [in the government press] about the "religious psychosis" induced by the pope during his second pilgrimage to the Fatherland; about the "alliance of the cross and the swastika" in the Third Reich; about the Catholic press in Poland as being inspired by "divisive centers"; about the symbol of the Madonna as a symbol of political struggle against the state; about pilgrimages as political road shows; or about a pope who is a "myth."

When on 5 March 1984 the Secretariat of the Polish Episcopate transmitted to the authorities a letter concerning interference by censors with the Catholic press, it expressed its great perturbation over the fact that, at a time when so many essentially defamatory, libelous, and distorting anti-church articles are being published, the same censors' offices are so strangely sensitive to Catholic publications. Such "sensitivity" is an understatement when we consider the censorship — and the prohibition against mentioning that censorship — of the pope's speeches, of the announcements of the Polish Episcopate, of the declarations of the Primate of Poland, or even of the by now historical writings of Cardinal Wyszyński. This is simply acting contrary to the law in force. It is difficult to agree that this was due to any "historically varying peril to the state." This was of a certainty a catch that is bound to arise whenever the law is interpreted broadly or selectively. (...) This did and does apply to the prohibition against printing the name of the Papal Theological Academy on the grounds that this would conflict with an article of the Decree prohibiting the publication of criminal writings. It is hardly possible that the Holy Father has committed a crime by calling that school into life.... This is besides a perfect example of what happens when attempts are made to adapt the activities of censorship offices to current policies formulated outside these offices. On some days papal academies could be mentioned in the Catholic press and on others, their mention was prohibited — the pertinent decisions were often changed from one day to another. I could cite many other examples, such as the fact that the attempts of some pastors to combat alcoholism have been questioned in the official press depending on the church of jurisdiction. This is something I simply cannot understand (...).

In this context, I have to draw attention to one other question: the extralegal activities of censorship offices. Thus, during the period from June till October 1985 the censors repeatedly censored articles published in PRZEGŁAD KATOLICKI — the editors have recorded 66 such decisions (between June and August, out of 144 decisions protested, 35 were affirmed). Of the 66 instances of censorship 10 concerned comments by the Holy Father, 2 by the Primate of Poland, 15 by cardinals and bishops. In addition, 9 instances concerned accounts of church ceremonies and 19 instances, reports on the church's role in the life of the society. And hence, 55 instances or 85 percent directly concerned ecclesiastical

problems, and half of these concerned comments by the church hierarchy, which to believers represent documents for transmission of faith. These represent significant instances of dilatory treatment by the censorship office, which avoided specifying a deadline for the negotiations and censored passages which it had previously not questioned, at the moment when the editors demanded a decision in writing. Or, too, the censorship office would prohibit the publication of an article in toto when the editors demanded more than four decisions. I happen to know that none of these ways of manipulating the editors is specified in the Decree in question, and they represent disturbing instances of outside interference with editorial policies. This fact also, as well as the major and minor attempts of censors to discriminate against certain writers, I consider to be inadmissible violations of the letter and spirit of the law. Actions of this kind also represent an attempt — inconsonant with the Decree — to force journalists into self-censorship and into assuming part of the burden of the activities of the offices established for this purpose.

I am evaluating the implementation of a decree which is of immeasurable importance not only to the self-concept of reporters and editors but also to the civic self-concept of the entire society, which desires to live in an increasingly law-abiding country. What matters at present is not revisions but the actual implementation of the Decree. Despite all my basic reservations about the very imposition of a framework restricting freedom of speech, I view the fact of the existence of this Decree as a major victory for both writers and readers. It has clarified or defined many matters. It has made clearer the operating procedures of the press. Anything that obscures them — and the above examples indicate that the problems were, are, and certainly will continue to be many — should be successively eliminated.

What should be chiefly eliminated is whatever directly transcends the operating system of the press alone and of the censorship offices alone. This will answer the fundamental question: do we intend to build a new operating model of the state as a structure for the benefit of citizens? In such a state the principles of the rule of law operate more fully and are interpreted in a similar manner by the rulers and the ruled. Differences in interpreting decrees such as the one considered here diminish.

Such a direction of action is to my liking. If this direction is maintained, press criticism will cease to be evaluated exclusively on the basis of political or ideological criteria. The state and its institutions will not assume the function of regulating public awareness by administrative fiat, a function which serves neither the state nor the society, and which does not either enhance the authority of government offices and officials.

Academician on Public Discontent With Civil Rights
Znakiem Katowice GOSC MEDZIELNY in Polish
23 Aug 87 p 7

[Article by (P.W.): "We Read"]

[Text] We read the article "Man and Law" by Piotr Kowalski of the Polish Academy of Sciences, published in *ODRODZENIE*, No. 30, which polemics with the comments of the minister of justice.

"The comments of Minister Brod reflect the conviction, supported by the authority of the United Nations Committee for Human Rights, that Poland is a country in which all civil rights are practiced and effectively safeguarded."

The popular feeling is, however, quite different. Polls by the Public Opinion Survey Center indicate that the public's view of the status of rule of law in this country is decidedly critical, especially as regards the actions of the prosecution and the law enforcement agencies. Similarly, the polls commissioned by the Institute of State and Law "point to a negative public view of the extent of the implementation of political and civil rights."

The author provides specific examples of the deficient legal provisions prompting such a view:

"There are fundamental objections from the standpoint of safeguarding such a basic civil right as personal freedom, against the activities of the collegiums [community courts] for transgressions, which may deprive citizens of their freedom for a prolonged period of time without monitoring by the regular courts...."

"So far there exist no opportunities for judicial appeals (e.g., appeals to the Supreme Administrative Court) against decisions of administrative agencies on matters of such basic civil rights as the right to assemble (parades, demonstrations). The entire appeal proceedings in such cases are of intra-administrative nature and take place within the framework of broadly outlined administrative competences. This is a classic example of an administrative agency acting as the "index in causa sua," with the common citizen being reduced to the role of a petitioner rather than an entitled plaintiff."

Were genuine rule of law, such as is desired by the respondents to the above-mentioned polls, to exist, "The agencies of state could not arbitrarily avail themselves of, e.g., the 'law and order' clause in order to eliminate from public life critical comments and modes of conduct if these happen to be inconvenient to the authorities. For the fundamental principles of a democratic society include a free exchange of various views, manifested both individually and through the mediation of various kinds of organizations. Hence also, a refusal to register an association [i.e., Solidarity] must be accompanied by written indication of the manner in which forming that

association would be detrimental to, e.g., the security of the state, and of the reason why the importance of that peril is so great as to result in curtailing socially elementary human rights."

An obvious characteristic of a country governed by rule of law appears to be the equality of citizens before law. Hence, "The problem of the existence of the so-called 'nomenklatura' or 'key' [personnel] in relation to executive hiring policy at various levels elicits various doubts. The informal practice of restricting the access of certain groups of citizens (e.g., non-party members) to executive positions or certain state offices undoubtedly constitutes a violation of the basic principle of equality and nondiscrimination."

In conclusion the author offers the reminder, "Adherence to and exercise of political and civil rights is not a gesture by the authorities but a prerequisite for the practice of democracy, regardless of any additional definitions that may precede this concept."

1386

Student Practicums Resumed, Problems Noted
Znakiem Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
9 Sep 87 p 1

[Article by (akow): "A Criterion for Crediting Points: Student Work Internships"]

[Text] (Own information) (A). Student work internships—what are they, and what should they be? This question is again topical, because this year several thousand newly admitted freshmen have the obligation of serving as interns. The Ordinance of December 1986 of the Council of Ministers considers such internships to be an integral part of the instructional-educational process. And since that is so, credit should be given for these internships—most of which are performed precisely in September. Can such credit be expected to be of value?

The reintroduction of work internships following a hiatus of 7 years has, like any other obligation, failed to elicit enthusiasm among higher educational institutions, students, and even among plants and factories, although to some of the latter this affords an excellent opportunity for compensating for their manpower shortages associated with the vacation season. Despite their complaints about lack of manpower, especially seasonal manpower, plants, institutions, and enterprises have not been "in a rush" to employ students. Most higher educational institutions so far are having considerable trouble in finding such internships for their students.

How will credit be given for work internships at, e.g., Warsaw University, which has reported lack of employment for 675 students? Similarly, at Jagellonian University internships cannot be found for about 600 freshmen.

At economics academies, for 165 students; at agricultural academies, for 560 students, and at the WSP, for 635. Based on incomplete data, it is expected that approximately 3,400 students will be unable to perform the obligation of work internship.

These are not pleasant figures. They demonstrate that for a large part of students the obligation imposed on them will remain on paper alone, that they will not participate in any work-related education which, speaking most generally, is the purpose of the work internship.

It turns out that following the hiatus of several years, internships have to be reorganized from the scratch. The persons responsible are no longer the same, and the conditions and needs are different. Contacts between universities and the enterprises which used to employ students have been disrupted. There is no time left now for establishing new contacts, especially considering that at present this is more difficult. Many plants which in the past were anxious to recruit interns now do not want to bother with them. A personnel director at a major Warsaw enterprise explained this as follows: by the time work is prepared for students and they are trained and started on the job... they are gone. The internship lasts only 4 weeks, and they all have to be provided with tools, work clothing, etc.

These arguments pertain only to the productive aspects of the internships. Assistance to the national economy, particularly in the fields with constant or seasonal manpower problems, is an important premise of the internships, but it is not the paramount objective. Neither is physical labor itself the paramount objective, although this is how student work internships are popularly interpreted. Were this to be the sole purpose, the universities would accept certificates attesting that students have had experience in physical labor.

The paramount objective is work education, precisely on the occasion of performing specific and useful labor together with one's fellow students and with the participation of university instructors. This affords special possibilities for the integration of newly admitted students, exchange of views, familiarity with personal problems of young people, or even simply with their names, which is not without significance in the university instructor in his future educational work with them.

This is precisely how student interns and work organizers should interpret work internship instead of regarding it merely as an obligation to work. A substantial part of students has already gained experience in this respect.

The problems in finding internship jobs in plants and factories demonstrate that meeting these requirements this year will not be easy. For the internships have not been properly organized by the universities and employers. Yet, their proper organization is a prerequisite for their success. Without an efficient organization of labor, without providing youth with adequate conditions,

including financial ones, and without a proper attitude by mentors conscious of the objectives to be served by the internships, not much can be accomplished.

1386

YUGOSLAVIA

Albanian Private Businessmen Consider Leaving Kosovo

28000245 Zagreb *VJESNIK* in Serbo-Croatian
19 Jul 87 p 5

[Article by Milan Jaksic and Nada Avdic Vilasi: "Emigration Threatens Albanians, Too"]

[Text] The Matosi brothers (Din, Malo, Alija, Sokol, and Muslija), together with the Karic brothers (both families live in Pec) work so well as small-scale entrepreneurs that they are frequently cited as an example which should be followed, in particular in Kosovo if our province intends to put into action more energetically a more efficient way of engaging in economic activity.

This is particularly true in the case of agriculture, which is the sector that could alleviate the problem of unemployment the fastest in Kosovo. This is because agriculture holds in itself enormous reserves. That distinction is proven convincingly to us by the Matosi brothers by means of the results which make even the best organized agricultural kombinats [integrated factory farms] envious. The Matosi brothers work from dawn to dusk. They employ all 36 members of their family and 25 more workers who are able to earn even more than 200,000 dinars in a month. They raise cattle and they grow vegetables. They even reach out to the Adriatic shores with their produce. However, along with such results they are also experiencing great problems. Those problems are so great that they are even thinking seriously about leaving Kosovo and settling on the coast of Montenegro. They do not even hesitate to say that this will be an emigration, if it comes to that, under pressure.

Cattle Breeding Pays Off

Here is what the head of this family-owned agricultural cooperative, Din Matosi, has to say:

"A few years ago we started out practically from zero. We didn't have any land at all, but we leased 12 hectares and we put that land to use to feed cattle and raise vegetables. We supply meat and meat products to practically all of the working organizations in Pec and to some working organizations in the vicinity. We also supply the local hospital, and we ship most meat to the Montenegrin coast, particularly now during tourist seasons. We sell all that we produce. For us the question does not arise at all regarding whether or not this type of activity is profitable. At this moment we have 219 head

of heifers and calves in our own fattening operation and we have 10 to 20 head in each of our subcontractor operations because we have entered into business arrangements with 10 families. We thus provided jobs for them, too.

"If we were to obtain credit to expand the farm we would provide employment for 50 to 60 more workers. Together with the members of our family, this would come to a total of about 120 persons. If our example were to be put to use then that number would most surely grow quickly, faster than in industry, I am certain. But as to credit, we are not getting any at all. We are not being helped by the trend of society toward small business, in particular in agriculture, nor by the fact that about 130,000 persons, mostly young people, in Kosovo are seeking jobs. And that's not all. Continuously they speak badly about us, they interfere with us at every opportunity, the municipal government does not allow us to open a butcher shop in the town itself because the one we have is located at the periphery. Even our intention to sell meat at a price which is cheaper than the price it is usually sold at, not to mention its quality, is no help. We bought a house in Pristina for the purpose of opening a self-service store there where we would sell meat and meat products. In the meantime, however, a man moved into that space by force. He opened a vegetable store, and there is no way that we can remove him from there. Do I need to tell you anything more?"

Clear Arithmetic

The Matosi say that the most convenient thing for them to do would be to close down their business because they have already earned so much money that they could live off of the interest alone. They are not eager to do so, however, because of their desire to create and to work, to show how well a person can live even from agriculture, even in areas where the opinion is prevalent that agriculture is a Sisyphean task, in particular as concerns animal husbandry. They have no problems with savings and they are prepared to make new investments. In order to achieve the goals which they have set for themselves, however, they also have to obtain credit. It is true that they do have several trucks and also a refrigerator truck and that soon they will be buying still another refrigerator truck. As concerns the expansion of the farm, however, in which they would provide employment to about 60 workers (the Karic brothers employ about 300 people) they need the help of the municipal authorities of Pec. Those authorities have erected a big wall of empty promises for them.

Perhaps the state of mind around the house of the Matosi family will provide the best confirmation of the refusal on the part of the president of the Assembly of the Municipality of Pec to assist the VJESNIK reporters in preparing their article, since he expressed the opinion

that the Matosi family is not at all any special example, while some other administrators in that municipality expressed an entirely different opinion about the Matosi family.

We asked Din Matosi why it is profitable for them to produce meat when our entire meat industry is operating at a loss. They reply is edifying:

"The problem involves how much we work and how we work, to what extent rationality is present in that business. Each one of our brothers is responsible for something, the same as our grown-up children. We handle administrative matters to the minimum, and in our family only the oldest brother has to do with such matters. We do not have many office workers, nor do we need them. In the social sector, in the industrial plants, unfortunately, there is also quite a bit of theft and this is perpetrated in several ways. I shall describe just one of the ways. When a heifer pushes up to a weight of 400 to 500 kilograms what happens - that it secretly changes its place of stay and ends up in a private meat-packing plant, and the person who, to use a polite expression, moved the heifer buys a calf at the same time at the marketplace and ties it in the manger of the kidnapped heifer. Thus, the calf is given the number of its more grown-up predecessor, and the difference in terms of kilos has to be borne by the plant as a loss."

"This cannot happen to us, even by accident, just as it cannot happen to us that the entertainment given to a business partner would cost us more than 20,000 dinars, which is, cross my heart, nevertheless a decent amount for a lunch, and we know to what extent our social representation is burdened by such business lunches or dinners. Our arithmetic is clear: We buy calves for 1,000 dinars per kilogram live weight, while we sell the heifer, after fattening it, at prices that are even lower than the customary prices. Because these prices are the costs of doing business, which we always bear in mind, so that losses are an unknown factor to us."

The Matosi also gladly talk about current social and political events in Kosovo, voicing the opinion that Kosovo will overcome most easily the problems with which it is confronted if a determination is made in favor of more work and initiative, also continuing with such efforts toward which they themselves have become inclined. Sokol Matosi therefore states that it is much easier to get young people on that other, unfriendly side if they are without a job and if they do not have any prospects. He adds that on their farms they never had even the slightest of nationalistic excess even though they provide jobs to workers of different nationalities. As the Matosi described the present opportunities in Kosovo they also confirmed their suggestion to the municipal authorities that they, themselves, be included in the action to provide jobs to those Serbs and Montenegrins who left Kosovo but would like to return to the extent that, if necessary, they would gladly offer all 60 new positions. However, as things are at the present

time, it is difficult to even think about such new jobs. We must once again believe the Matosi when they talk about these things, bearing witness to recent events.

Decorated But Ruled Out

Last year the Matosi brothers saved the life of Radojko Vuksanovic from Gorazdevac who was employed in the "Secerana" (agricultural combine) in Pec. After a serious accident they brought him in record time to the hospital in Pristina, and they did not leave him until they had made certain that their efforts had not been in vain. What exactly happened? Radojko Vuksanovic borrowed a tractor and a fertilizer tank car on that day from his brother-in-law. He wanted to use that equipment to till and to fertilize some land. At the end of his task he wanted to verify whether the rod on the valve of the tank car was in the correct position, that is to say, the plastic rod which serves as an indicator showing the amount of fertilizer in the tank which sprays the fertilizer under high pressure. During that moment, however, the valve exploded and Vuksanovic lost one of his eyes. The unfortunate man found himself with blood all over him and in danger of also losing his other eye and even of bleeding to death. Just at that time the truck in which Alija and Vesnik Matosi were riding came upon the scene, and they immediately came to the aid of Vuksanovic. They put Vuksanovic into their truck and they sped off in the direction of Pec, where the doctor at the health center was not able to help the injured man. Therefore, the accident victim had to be taken quickly to Pristina. The health center did not even have a vehicle to take Vuksanovic to Pristina. The 20-year-old Vesnik Matosi did not hesitate in the slightest. He ran 4 kilometers to the house of the Matosi family and told the head of the family, Din Matosi, all that had happened.

Din Matosi said "At that time a physician, Dr Djevdet Admaj, was in my house. We immediately jumped into the automobile, and I took along 100 million old dinars which we might need if we had to go to Belgrade or to Skopje. The four members of the Matosi family (Din, Alija, Sokol, and Muslja) set out to get the injured Radojko Vuksanovic. They were also joined by Bozo Krstic, the chief of beer production in the Pec brewery, and by Dr Djevdet Admaj. They reached Pristina, about 80 kilometers away, in 43 minutes. However, since the elevator in the hospital in Pristina was broken there was no other way than to carry Vuksanovic physically to the seventh floor, where he had to be operated on. Alija Matosi by himself carried the injured Vuksanovic on his shoulders all the way up to the seventh floor, where he quickly received medical aid and his remaining eye and life were saved.

The operation was successfully performed by Dr Chamil Hadziju. Before the operation, Din Matosi said: "Doctor, weigh yourself. I will give you as much money as you weigh if you can save this man's other eye!" Professor Dr Hadziju only smiled at this spontaneous offer by Din, and he successfully performed the surgery, so that at the

end of the operation he shook hands with the Matosi brothers and told them: "My cap is off to you." Radojko Vuksanovic will never forget the Matosi brothers, whose gesture made a great sensation in Kosovo in particular as a selfless deed and as an example which provides a real hope for greater closeness between the peoples in this area and also speaks for man and his virtues. On account of his work virtues as well as his human virtues and qualities, Din Matosi was proposed for the Order of Labor and the Order of Brotherhood and Unity. He received a citation for that heroic deed, but someone crossed his name out while he was en route to the ceremony where he would have been awarded the decoration. Is there any cause for surprise, therefore, when the Matosi brothers say that they want to leave Kosovo? The Municipality of Ulcinj has already offered them a large plot of land between Ada and Bojana and credit so that they could set up a farm there in order to supply meat to the Montenegrin coastal area.

If the Matosi family leaves Kosovo it will be a double defeat for the local policy and its intentions to make up for all of the weaknesses which place a burden upon this province of ours. It will be a double defeat, inasmuch as in this way a short-term policy battle will have been lost and also an example of long-term significance to the development of the province will have been lost.

13272/6662

Advance of Constitutional Amendments Appraised 28000259 Belgrade NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian 19 Jul 87 pp 22-23

[Article by Jug Grizelj: "Behind Closed Doors"]

[Text] One can already see plainly the two courses along which the discussions of changes to the Constitution are being conducted. One course comes from the state and party leadership, from which the official initiative came, as well as the specific proposal for the framework in which changes to the Constitution "may" be discussed. With all of the institutional systemic seals and approvals, this course is descending to the republic and provincial assemblies and their constitutional commissions, and will then go back up to the "federal level," to the SFRY Assembly's Coordinating Group for Changing the Constitution, headed by Hamdija Pozderac, which is the working body of the Constitutional Commission of the same body. Along this course, at least from the standpoint of what reaches the public, the work on the changes is proceeding smoothly, or at least without major upheavals, and thus a few days ago a paper on the preliminary draft amendments for the future changes to the Constitution (admittedly, classified "strictly confidential") was delivered to the delegates.

Judging by the occasional speeches and statements from that headquarters, there are no unsolvable problems, and the scenario—just as it was conceived and planned—will be brought to a close in a year and a half, when the

Yugoslav Assembly is to vote on the changes to the Constitution. If there are any disputes along this course, the public does not have even an approximate idea of them, because journalists are not admitted to the meetings of the Coordinating Group for Changing the Constitution, and communications with the public—even from the meetings of other bodies discussing changes to the Constitution—are mostly handled through "controlled" announcements.

Side by side with this institutionalized course, which has a strict calendar and procedural rules, a large number of round tables and panel meetings are being held throughout the entire country, at which discussions of changes in the Constitution are also being conducted. The discussions at these meetings—as well as numerous statements by public figures in various professions within the framework of numerous newspaper surveys and studies—seem to be conducted according to a quite different calendar, which can scarcely be said to be coordinated with that institutional calendar. As the discussions in this second course are public, and we keep learning more and more new details about them from the newspapers, radio, and television, it is not difficult to perceive the obvious collision between these two courses.

While on one hand the delegates of the Yugoslav Assembly are already being given the preliminary draft amendments to look at, along this second course it seems that the participants in these public discussions are not aware that we have "already come that far," and thus in many places, among lawyers, sociologists, economists, and businessmen, and even in some veterans' organizations, people are still talking as if we were in the initial phase and it were necessary to establish the overall framework for the changes. In numerous surveys, at "roundtables" and symposiums, the essence of the framework for the proposed changes to the Constitution is still being discussed, and it is not unusual for this framework to be assessed as mostly unsatisfactory and inadequate.

Overall Dilemmas

As it is really quite unlikely that prominent Yugoslav lawyers, economists, and businessmen are not informed about "how far we have come," the conclusion that remains is that they are not satisfied with this very accomplishment. At these countless public forums, which have been reported by the news media in recent weeks and months, a long list of criticisms has been presented, and a number of issues, usually global strategic ones, have been raised: whether the proposed framework for the changes (which are frequently characterized as "minor changes" of a cosmetic nature) are sufficient for us at this time, or whether the present crisis of our society, and even of world socialism, requires a strategic reexamination of the global concept of socialism; in regard to this, it is generally concluded in these discussions that the existing draft is "too short" and too unambitious.

In addition to this overall dilemma, several theoretical criticisms have been heard in recent days that have to do with the fundamental constitutional categories in which "no changes are anticipated." One of which it is said that they must be changed because they have contributed to the crisis of society. In this regard, the second usually question the results of the implementation of the delegate system, the fundamental issues of direct and direct democracy, property relations, the economic principles of our model of socialism, capitalism, the place and role of the SFRY, the electoral system, the introduction of the League of Producers into the SFRY Assembly, the position of Serbia in the federation and the position of the autonomous provinces in the Serbian Republic, and so forth, and so forth. As the crowning example of this procedure for changing the Constitution has been taken into account the views of the rank and file. It is usually cited the fate of the nationwide and "mass" discussion on the occasion of the 13th session of the LCY Central Committee; it is said that it did not draft "in the form of a plebiscite" much greater changes than those now being worked on, ranging from the place and role of associated labor in the overall structure of society, through the position of the market model of the economy and society, to the unity of the country in all respects, with the state and party hierarchy also being criticized in all of this. We have heard and read in the last few days that the framework adopted for the constitutional changes is not a product of the aspirations of the rank and file, but the result of a pact among the republics and provinces.

Another Type of Criticism

Although the newspapers, radio, and television have been flooded with reports from such critical meetings, it is not known whether (really, and not formally) the positions, assessments, and conclusions from those discussions have even reached the table of the Coordinating Group, or the Constitutional Commission, and if they do reach it, whether they are even taken into consideration. Judging by the procedure adopted for working on the changes to the Constitution, it is quite logical to assume that these bodies view those criticisms as belated quarrels with a fait accompli.

Another type of criticism, formally expressed a few days ago by the delegates of the Slovene Assembly (for example, Miran Potre), has to do with the publicity given to the work on changing the Constitution during this phase. Simply put, the question could read as follows: will the constitutional changes, on this occasion as well, regardless of their formal institutional democratic nature, be made within a closed circle of representatives of the republics and provinces, so that the public will be invited only to the ceremonial fireworks on the occasion of the adoption of the amendments to the Constitution, or will the work of the constitutional commissions, councils, and coordinating and other groups be open to the public, since changes to the Constitution profoundly affect every citizen of the SFRY?

This question—of the publicity of the work on changes to the Constitution—can be justified by past experiences. Specifically, it is improbable but true that the minutes from the numerous meetings at which the 1974 changes to the Constitution were discussed have not been made available to the public even today, almost two decades after that Constitution was prepared. Will that situation be repeated, with all of the relevant talks, conflicts, and views expressed at the closed meetings being classified as secret this time as well, not only during this phase, but also for the next 20 years?

If that happens, we will be faced with the same danger that we faced both before and after 1974. In proclaiming the new Constitution, we gave it labels like "the charter of the world self-managing socialist model," "a gigantic step toward the realization of the historic ideals of socialist and communist society," and so forth. Then, very soon after the adoption of the Constitution, even when it turned out that it was not quite right, and when it was clear to almost everyone that certain provisions of that same Constitution, together with the ZUR [Law on Associated Labor], meant only a gigantic step forward in the crisis (basically, this is also the general message and conclusion of the Economic Stabilization Program), it was not at all clear who should be called to account for this, since even up to the present day we do not know who advocated what, who proposed what, or who reached agreement and came to terms with whom, since, as we have already stated, the true picture of the events related to the preparations for the 1974 Constitution, even in 1987, is still available only to those who are willing to sign an agreement that they will read the minutes from the closed meetings at Brioni and in other places as a very strict state secret.

How Far Things Have Gone

Very, very little optimism is offered by the chance that all Yugoslav citizens will have to voice their opinions in the public discussion that will soon be conducted about the proposed draft amendments. This is because, as all of our experience shows us, once constitutional changes get to be draft amendments, not much more is expected from the public than distributing the commas and periods or an occasional conjunction in the already packaged definitions.

And that is the essence of all of the criticisms that have been heard and are being heard today at numerous meetings throughout the country, which are being attended by hundreds and even thousands of public workers. We are not denying that politicians, and experts, within a restricted or even closed circle, should prepare and propose the specific text of the amendments. What is arguable is whether the framework of the changes offered represents a sufficient guarantee that the changed Constitution will meet all of the challenges of the times in which we live, and whether it finally resolves

or even creates the conditions for resolving all of the dilemmas during the present phase of the development of our self-managing socialist society, or not.

We are receiving two opposite answers. One, the "institutional" answer, says that the framework of the changes anticipated, after a lengthy and difficult process of consultation and agreement, has been adopted by all of the republics and provinces, and that it represents a relevant answer to all of our dilemmas and crises, at least with the current "balance of forces." This framework, it is added, has also been accepted by all of the republic and provincial assemblies and all of the "competent institutional" bodies of both the federation and the republics and provinces, and in this regard there are no more open questions and dilemmas, nor can there be a return to any beginning of "new theoretical discussions."

The other "noninstitutional" answer is far from being so resolute in believing that the framework of the changes is the answer to all of our crises. This answer supports the standpoint that it is more important than all of the planned calendars, procedures, and respect for institutional ranks to assess, once again, "how far we have come," because a change in the Constitution, in a country that is in a crisis already declared long ago, is a fundamental event that resists all the arguments of the procedure and the calendar.

And what now?

9909

C. Ribicic Discusses Proposals for Constitutional Changes

28080761 Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian
28 Jul 87 pp 12-14

[Interview with Ciril Ribicic by Marinko Žalic: "Who Is Milking the Federation"; date and place not given]

[Text] DANAS: Among the number of issues raised by the debate about the constitutional amendments the question of federalism has not been the most important and supreme topic from the standpoint of theory, but the discussion has thrust it into the foreground where it has no rival. What are the consequences of this?

Ribicic: It is true that relations in the Federation are not the most important topic of these discussions of ours, and I think it is not good that so much time and attention has been paid to them. The focus ought to have been on development of socioeconomic relations, first because this is crucial to whether and how rapidly we will get out of the economic crisis, and second, because the causes of the straining of relations in the Federation should frequently be looked for precisely in overemphasis of the role of the Federation in regulation of those relations. I am convinced that our problems would be much smaller, and the present debate calmer and more even-tempered if the Federation had less authority in the domain of

economic relations and if it did not interfere so much in the laws of the market as it is doing at present. In that case a number of issues which are now being raised with greatly elevated voices would simply disappear or would lose the importance now being given to them.

DANAS: The debate up to now has nevertheless been mostly characterized by treatment of the Federation as a kind of central storehouse of political power over whose distribution there are angry discussions, but recently opinions which are even extremely heretical have been "permitted." Has the basic idea of federalism passed the examination of these very frank discussions

Ribicic: That is not easy to answer. I think that the constitutional conception of the federation is being implemented unevenly and that it has been achieved to a greater extent when it comes to achieving the independence and equality of the republics and provinces and to a lesser extent when it comes to their responsibility, not only for their own development, but also for development of the country as a whole.

It is self-evident that interpretations of the basic constitutional conception which negate the need for nurturing that integrity of the country with the unified Yugoslav market are not acceptable. But this also becomes a pretext for criticism of the present conception of the Federation, which again we cannot agree with—instead of insisting on greater responsibility of the republics and provinces, a broadening of the powers of the Federation is being sought on the basis of motives which ultimately signify expression of a lack of confidence in the republics and provinces.

But in spite of all of that, I would not altogether agree with you that the doors are now open even to "heretical" options. That certainly is not the case with those options contained in the Proposal of the SFRY State Presidency, which unambiguously states that there will not be a change in basic constitutional principles, in which relations in the Federation are worked out in considerable detail.

DANAS: We might go back once again to those "heretical" views. At this point we would like to round out the answer to the previous question. How valid for us are the diagnoses made in certain other countries with a federal system that the Federation is a "dairy cow" from which everyone takes, and no one gives anything?

Ribicic: I think that the entire constitutional conception of the Federation has precisely been turned against transforming the Federation into a "dairy cow." When the change in the concept of the Federation was undertaken in the sixties, the motive was to concentrate the federal units on development by their own resources, i.e., on their taking responsibility for their own development instead of fighting for the largest possible piece of the federal pie. Unfortunately, we were never altogether successful in that. As a reflex reaction to that you have

the flood of criticism of the federal administration, criticism which certainly is not unjustified in this time of restrictive measures, but which is nevertheless an expression of the old conceptions. What is more, I would say that it also contains a constant threat to bring back the old relations, since the Federation is no longer seen as a community of nationalities and ethnic minorities, but merely as a federal administration. That is the basis for the torrent of all those accusations about lawfulness and inferiority being exchanged by the advanced and underdeveloped parts of the country.

DANAS: All are, of course, equal in the present debate, including those who do not particularly like federalism and who are not interested in seeing the present constitutional conception implemented. How much real resistance is there to federalism even within the legal "subjective forces" in society?

Ribicic: That is not easy to answer either, but we should not harbor illusions that the failure of the Federation to function according to its original conception will not once again heat up the dissatisfaction and rejection of federalism.

It is quite clear, for instance, that the reproaches addressed to the republics and provinces related, for example, to enforcement of federal laws in their jurisdiction are feeding that kind of disposition and that the only true remedy for it is for these shortcomings to be corrected, not passed over in silence.

DANAS: It would seem that this has also resulted in radicalization of certain constitutional amendments as in the case of direct elections, which the sponsor (the SFRY State Presidency) imagined on a very modest scale, but the public has been demanding much more, and there have even been proposals that the SFRY State Presidency be elected directly.

Ribicic: There really is a need to move more boldly with the idea of direct elections, and there is more consensus on this than before. There has been quite a bit of dissatisfaction, both here in Slovenia and elsewhere, with the solution originally proposed by the SFRY State Presidency, since it was limited only to direct elections in opstina chambers of local communities, while the citizen's direct election of sociopolitical chambers would be abolished. The prevailing belief now is that direct elections should be introduced for the Federal Chamber, and I believe that the same thing will win out in the case of republic and province chambers of associated labor as well. But a search should also be made for certain other mechanisms in the electoral system, primarily to strengthen the principle of work function, just as there should be resistance to certain proposals, in my opinion, above all the proposal to abandon the principle of parity representation in the Federal Chamber.

DANAS: Here is a question of "pressures" on the bodies writing the Constitution, which are obviously welcome, but there are also others coming from the ranks of the "opposition" which say that Yugoslav federalism has a built-in "dliberate mistake." The last such assertion came from the Memorandum of the Group of Members of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts in which it was stated that Tito and Kardelj created a kind of "Catholic coalition" against the others, especially against Serbia. It would be a mistake to conceal that this argument found a certain response in a portion of the public, a small portion to be sure. Do such arguments also represent a kind of burden on the official discussion of the constitutional amendments?

Ribicic: It is certain that the extreme approaches are a burden on the official debate. Incidentally, this is not anything specific just to this discussion, but rather we have had similar examples before. Thus from the standpoint of the Memorandum of the Group of Members of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts the Proposal of the SFRY State Presidency is seen to be minimal and "cosmetic," and you know that phrases to that effect have been in rather wide circulation. It is also a fact that there has been stronger pressure for us to go back to the 1963 constitutional arrangements. To be sure, it cannot be said of such ideas that they are directly inspired by the Memorandum, but it is a fact that they fit into the climate of demands for us to renounce our present solutions and to go backward.

DANAS: The second argument which caused sharp reaction came from your own community. In the recent discussions in the Cankar Center certain Slovenian writers and cultural figures have been saying that the present constitutional amendments, as they have been formulated in the Proposal of the SFRY State Presidency, represent a concession to unitaristic options; they even speak of collusion with the people who are behind the Memorandum. You were one of those who opposed such arguments on the spot. What arguments do you use in rejecting such opinions?

Ribicic: The Proposal of the SFRY State Presidency has been perceived quite differently here than in the Memorandum. It is said, as you have said, that the Proposal is aimed in the direction of centralism, unitarism, even Stalinism. If you compare the statements made to ridicule the Proposal of the SFRY State Presidency by certain members of the Serbian Academy and by certain Slovenian cultural figures, you must ask yourself whether they are talking about the same document and whether the two sides have the same material in their hands. Of course, in both cases we are dealing with an extremely superficial view of that document not backed up with argument, one that comes down to altogether black-and-white assertions lacking a supporting brief to the effect that that proposal would take us back to the old Yugoslavia or even Austro-Hungary, that it pursues the same line as the Memorandum, and so on.

Given that kind of mental confusion, problems have been created even where there were none, and all attempts to regulate things in certain areas (the schools, information, and so on) at the level of the Federation have immediately been seen as unitaristic "conspiracies." To be sure, it should be admitted that some of the proposals that have been heard even within the federal sections of the Socialist Alliance are objectively such that they provide the grounds for unacceptable positions of this kind coming from elsewhere. But this does not justify the presentation of those extreme views, since they create an atmosphere in which solutions are sought under the coverage of distorted ideas rather than arguments. What particularly bothered me and the rest of us in Slovenia who have taken part in the agreements concerning the changes in Belgrade were the assertions that we were yielding to centralistic and unitaristic pressures, which certainly is not the truth.

DANAS: And how great actually are those pressures?

Ribicic: There have been pressures, and we in Slovenia who are concerned with the constitutional amendments through our scientific work or in political forums called attention to them some 2 or 3 years ago. I must say that within the League of Communists of Yugoslavia we have managed to resist the pressures, as is best confirmed by the conclusions of the 13th LCY Congress, which clearly state that there are no changes in the fundamental constitutional status of the republics and provinces and that party members must accordingly fight consistently against nationalism (in their own communities) and against centralism and unitarism (at the center). Then they reiterate once again the strategic commitment to build the Federation from bottom up by strengthening the role of associated labor in the republics and provinces. But still some of us in Slovenia, as I have said, have been accused of opportunism and laxity, but it seems that this cannot be avoided and that one must become accustomed to being accused of one thing in debates at home and of something altogether different in certain federal discussions.

DANAS: In spite of your interjections in the Cankar Center, a portion of the public is still convinced that the views that were heard there were only a somewhat more radical interpretation of the official Slovenian view.

Ribicic: That is, of course, inaccurate. What still should be said, and I said this in the Cankar Center, is that centralism represents a real danger. But I also said that it is inaccurate that commitments to centralism were triumphant in the Proposal of the SFRY State Presidency. I think that in the meantime it has been confirmed that the Proposal of the SFRY State Presidency will not be on the line of centralism, but rather a weapon against centralistic and unitaristic aspirations.

DANAS: Would you like to comment on yet another argument which has been climbing rapidly to the surface in the recent past? A weekly has recently published an

interview with one of the deans of our constitutional law and a "constitution drafter" who now in his latter years seems to be revising certain of his previous positions, and among other things he says that the 1974 Constitution sanctioned the demands of the mass movement and that Kardelj himself sponsored that, since he did not dare to oppose it. In a "passing" conversation on that occasion you told us that the assertion was out of place, since the concept of the 1974 Constitution and of the entire constitutional reform were agreed on before that. Would you like to argue that in more detail at this point?

Ribicic: What I said to you at the time does not need any very extensive substantiation. Incidentally, we are talking about a rather old idea which does not occur only in that version, but also in the diametrically opposite one (I have already mentioned the thesis of alleged unitaristic pressure in the Proposal of the SFRY State Presidency). But now that we are already talking about the argument that the Constitution was the result of nationalistic pressures, it should be said that it is based on a different thesis concerning the supposed confederative system of Yugoslavia. Although it certainly cannot be denied that there have been those who favor such a model, it should be said that Kardelj's intention was quite different—to strengthen Yugoslavia, not weaken it, by strengthening the responsibility of the republics and provinces for their own development and for the development of the entire community. Incidentally, this is in fact acknowledged in the interview you mention.

It should be said that the thesis about the Constitution as the result of nationalistic pressures exists even among Slovenian nationalists. It is said that certain events like the "highway affair" resulted in the constitutional amendments in 1971. To some extent it might be said that this is actually the case, but only in the sense that the aggravation of economic relations among the republics showed that economic functions should be passed on more rapidly to the republics and provinces. Thus between these two things there stands approximately the connection that exists between, say, the existence of wars and the emergence of peace movements.

DANAS: Recently there was criticism from Slovenia because the present discussion is being conducted behind closed doors. This was immediately related to the comments in the newspaper to the effect that that was also the case during enactment of the Constitution, which reinforces the rule that participants in the final discussion only follow the existing "balance of power" in keeping with the interests of their own republic elites regardless of any consequences and without any responsibility for what they do. Must these discussions truly be so "conspirative"?

Ribicic: The procedure for amending the Constitution requires that consensus be achieved at the beginning and end of discussion, and between those two agreements there is the present discussion among the republics and provinces in order to reach agreement. I think that there

are no objections that can be made to that procedure. However, the question of whose views are being presented in this, whether exclusively the elites of the republics and provinces or a broader range of people, is another matter. That in fact is a point relevant to the criticism you mention. We are aware that the most important part of the discussion will begin toward the end of the year, when the proposal containing the constitutional amendments is before the delegates of the SFRY Assembly, and later during the public discussion. But it is our opinion that in the meantime we should make it possible to inform the public more fully about the job that is being worked on now. Quite a bit has been done in Slovenia on this, and thanks to this kind of commitment, we have had proportionately large interest and a large public response, and the Slovenian writers have become involved in the discussion, although this is not their specialty.

I must also say that in other places, including the Coordinating Group in Belgrade, the prevailing belief and opinion is that the proposal containing the constitutional amendments should be placed before the judgment of the broad public as soon as possible.

DANAS: In the meantime the Slovenian writers have made themselves heard once again.

Ribicic: Yes, they have made a new statement calling for a referendum on the constitutional amendments, for a vote on each individual issue in the constitutional amendments, not on the "package" as a whole, and so on. But aside from the good aspects, since it increases the interest of a broader group of people in these matters, this statement still tends to create an atmosphere which can hardly assist a creative discussion.

DANAS: One of the issues the public has received particularly scant information about is the possible redefinition of the constitutional status of SR Serbia. Following the secretive proposal of the State Presidency of SR Serbia, now after the discussion in the recent meeting of the Serbian LC Central Committee, it is nevertheless clearer what the various principles are looking for concerning this issue. Yet still there is no hint of how this knotty question will ultimately be untangled.

Ribicic: The proposal of the State Presidency of SR Serbia, which was subsequently included in the Proposal of the SFRY State Presidency, raised a number of issues which truly do deserve attention. First of all we should see whether the SFRY Constitution favored a situation in certain normative sections that reduced Serbia to Serbia proper and put the provinces on a par with the republic, and whether this so prejudiced relations that ought to be worked out within that republic and its constitution. But if it turns out that something should be amended along those lines, this still does not mean that we should commit ourselves to solutions that would reduce the provinces to mere components of Serbia and not a constituent portion of the Federation as well.

DANAS: Does that mean that in future there are no dilemmas whatsoever about this status of the provinces?

Ribicic: No, that follows from the constitutional principles, which are not being questioned. In general we should not anticipate any essential changes in the constitutional positions of the provinces and this republic, although by all appearances the position of the provinces as a part of SR Serbia is being stressed more emphatically. That is, the extreme opinions which argued that nothing should be changed or that the provinces should be reduced to mere parts of Serbia on the other hand have been dropped. Of course, this does not achieve very much, but the constitutional and legal foundations are being created for political action within SR Serbia, which at present is not effective enough. Here in fact it is not primarily a question of constitutional law, at least not to such a degree that it would require major modifications, but rather it has to do with mutual relations, greater confidence, and spirit of community within that republic.

DANAS: A little while ago you just mentioned in passing the "balance of power" as an unavoidable aspect of the present discussion. Some people say that that balance of power was such in the seventies that it favored "republican" solutions. But it is added, it has changed in the meantime (some people explicitly mention the republics which in the meantime have changed "camps"), and now we supposedly are closer to "unitarist" solutions.

Ribicic: I have already said what I think about that in commenting on the positions taken in the Memorandum and in the discussion in the Cankar Center. But since we are also referring to other more well-intentioned reflections of this kind, I think that a word or two should be said about this.

It is certain that it is not possible to avoid the question of the position which the various republics and provinces take on these issues and whether and to what extent they consistently stick to principles and views once they have been adopted. This is particularly the case concerning those republics which have fallen into economic difficulties, which then might sometimes fuel the hope that increased centralization and greater influence of the Federation might mitigate those problems, at least at first.

But I would say that this kind of logic is short-lived and that over the long run it only creates problems. Pragmatic solutions of this kind will not result in any great economic benefit; however, they will bring new headaches and lags in development of the socioeconomic relations of self-management.

DANAS: In conclusion a "personal" question. In your book "Nadglasavanje ili usuglasavanje" [Outvoting or Reaching Consensus], which you published last year with Dr Zdravko Tomec, you say that you are not a

"defender of the Constitution" and that you favor maximum changes, but within the present constitutional conception. Nevertheless, you certainly are aware of the opinion that you are a protagonist of the "hard" line who basically wants to cement the present political system. How do you "put up with" those criticisms?

Ribicic: I think that that book shows best what line is being followed by my reflections and views: I do not favor the status quo (conceived as a preservation of statism at the federal and lower levels), nor do I favor rejection of the present constitutional concept of the Federation. I think that the advocates of the "hard" positions are often those on the other side in the debate, whoever they might be. I took a similar position at one time in the debate over indirect relations of direct elections. At that time I was against the position that direct elections could solve all the problems and I was against the opinion that nothing should be touched in our present electoral system. It is no wonder, then, that I have critics on both sides, that I belong to the "hard-line" or dogmatic current. But I have already said that I have become accustomed to that crossfire.

7045

Controversial Slovenian Writer Queried on Views of LCY

28000249 Belgrade MLADOST in Serbo-Croatian
6 Jul 87 pp 14-17

[Untitled interview with Spomenka Hribar by Rasko Kovacevic; date and place of interview not specified]

[Text] [Question] At the very end of your article in issue 57 of NOVA REVJJA, which concludes, in a way, with a position against excommunication as such (and in favor of the broadest possible humanism and tolerance), you say that "Hostility toward the communists is just as fatal to cooperation as any other hostility..." Consequently, hatred toward anyone or anything dissolves the community. Does this mean that repression is also perpetuated, i.e., that the former targets of repression, without considering the need for the continuing definition (or redefinition) of the principle of humanity and tolerance, become responsible for repression? If so, what might this mean for cooperation and the community?

[Answer] The article from which you quoted that passage is entitled "Vanguard Hostility and Reconciliation." Part of it was also published by KNJIZEVNE NOVINE (Belgrade, 15 March 1987), and so it is not necessary to state the context in which that passage occurs.

But the fact that the former targets of repression, as you say, have become responsible for it, i.e., that repression is perpetuated, can be seen from our situation. Those who were once persecuted themselves are today persecuting others, or demanding the persecution of those who think differently. My warning that hostility toward communists represents an equal danger to all of us, to society, like every other hostility, is not unfounded. Our

crisis is increasingly deeper, people's dissatisfaction is increasingly greater, their difficulties are barely tolerable, and the responsibility for that situation lies most of all with the communists, i.e., the party which has so far guided society as a whole and determined its fate. People's dissatisfaction, and above all their inability to make a real change in anything (because the party is still ruling, and it is still naming and persecuting "internal enemies" instead of listening to people and giving them an opportunity to participate constructively in seeking a way out of the crisis), is growing into a new "class antagonism," naturally "from the bottom to the top" now, as a response to the "class antagonism" that the party itself has been initiating for years, "from the top to the bottom." Thus, in Yugoslavia today the forms of antagonism are multiplying: we also have national and intergenerational antagonisms.... Yugoslavia has an entire tempest of antagonisms. This is understandable, since the rationalization of people's dissatisfaction has not been permitted, and problems, when they break out, have not been permitted to be solved through the limited mechanisms of the legal state and civil society. In such social circumstances, antagonism and a search for irrational means of "solving" the problems naturally occur, and this directly threatens that "history will repeat itself" and that repression will be perpetuated.

Reconciliation Is a Call for Humanity

[Question] There is a feeling, and perhaps even a belief, that any raising of the issue of the monopoly over power held by a group or organization necessarily also implies a desire that such a group or organization be destroyed, wiped out, and this in turn produces all sorts of irrational impulses. In what way can such a fear be eliminated, or at least considerably reduced?

[Answer] If I understand you correctly, you are asking me whether making an issue of power also means a rejection of the rulers as people. And furthermore, whether any calling of the party into question, or even a reduction of its monopoly over power, also means a social and personal danger for communists. My answer, naturally, is no! Reconciliation, first of all, implies recognition of every person's right to his own human inviolability and dignity, recognition of everyone's right to his own "subjectivity," and recognition of the right to make mistakes, since we are all only human, and communists are also only human; they are not "supermen." Reconciliation, then, also implies calling upon those "supermen" to return to their own humanity, and it implies that these "supermen" come down among the people. Otherwise, such a descent would take the aura of "supermen" away from the communists, but it would make it possible for them to be, or even establish them as being people in human and historical terms.

You see what is happening today: since the communists, the former fighters, are so categorically demanding the submission of entire generations in the name of their own personal torments and contributions to freedom,

and, in the name of their personal contribution to the revolution, even today, 40-odd years after the liberation, they are demanding the repression of those who think differently—more and more people are giving them less and less recognition for what they really did: there are more and more people who are denying the veterans the respect due them both as individuals and as veterans, while saying, "They really did fight, even for as long as four years, but what are they doing now and what do they have from that struggle of theirs now, after 40 years of living in freedom?" And instead of respect for their contribution to our freedom being something self-evident and spontaneous—just as respect for any person should be self-evident—a rejection of anything like that is happening more and more often. And this respect, naturally, should not be idolatry, but rather toleration of the difference, and consequently the uniqueness, of each person.

Personally, I think that most of the veterans have been manipulated by their representatives and officials... I also think that most of the veterans are unfortunate, not just because of their personal (and economic) position, but most of all because of the unfulfilled expectations for the sake of which they gave everything that the times demanded from them. The veterans' dissatisfaction has been skillfully channeled by their own bureaucracy into hostility toward those who think differently. A few days ago one of those disillusioned veterans told me, "You know, if I met you on the street I would run over you." Only a minute later, however, he spoke like a disillusioned and wounded man, by no means "bloodthirsty," but rather contrite. There really was no hatred or hostility in him. But it is precisely the concealment of past mistakes, the party's continuous insistence that everything in the past and the present has been absolutely correct and right, and in connection with this the suppression of any criticism and possibility of purification, that may one day result not only in the loss of the communists' "moral capital," but also in demands for a radical "solution to the problem," for payment for the mistakes and blunders that have been made, and for sanctions for the wrongs done to people because of this.

[Question] What are you actually denying the party?

[Answer] Let us understand each other: I am not denying it the right to advocate its goals, and to struggle for power on the basis of its programs. These programs and the means of realizing them, however, must be continually verified through free elections—among the people that it leads. What I am denying it is the right to consider itself to be, a priori, the legitimate creator of history; I am denying its right to be the sole factor in which one is not permitted to doubt, or often even to think of doubting. I am denying its right to have a lease on absolute truth and its right to control our destiny. I am denying it the inhuman characteristic of always being the only one to be right about everything, and to establish and maintain its "rightness" and "its truth" by means of the state and all of its attributes (the police, the army, etc.).

Ideological Exclusivism

[Question] Do you think—in connection with one of the conclusions of your present article—that the separation of the party from the state (from power), which is after all the position of a certain number of "liberal" communists, would really constitute an extreme threat to, and possibly even eliminate, the currently excessive amount of ideological exclusivism? And furthermore, what would the elimination of that exclusiveness mean for the future development of socialist self-management?

[Answer] First of all, let me clarify that this is not a question of the "separation of the party from the state (from power)," as you put it, since in our country the party is above the state. The state is responsible to it; the state acts in accordance with its directives, and carries out its aims. By means of the state, the party persecutes "its" opponents, etc. Consequently, the state is merely the party's tool (or weapon) for maintaining and strengthening the party's power. And this is precisely why I talk about "the party's descent from the pedestal of the vanguard" in the previously mentioned article. Such a descent naturally does not mean the rejection, prevention, or persecution of communists as people, but rather merely constitutes a recognition of intellectual opposition—legally sanctioned and truly permitted. A Slovene national proverb says, "The more people, the more they know," or, "All people know everything." Intellectual opposition, which in principle is not permitted today (although this does not mean that all opponents are in jail at this moment), does not necessarily also have to be political opposition in the sense of a multi-party system—although in principle this issue has to be completely open; life itself will form one means or another of manifesting the pluralism of ideas. This is consequently just a matter of our allowing thought, which is always necessarily diverse, free and open room to express itself. This is what will (or would!) eliminate the currently excessive amount of ideological exclusivism, as you put it.

What would the elimination of this exclusiveness mean for the further development of self-management? Almost everything! "Self-management" could actually become co-management among equals. Self-management as a "form of dictatorship of the proletariat" has no chance of really democratizing society, but co-management does. Self-management as a form of dictatorship of the proletariat, in fact, means that "the party has all the positions in its own hands," while the workers have formal rights. In real life, this means that those who do not have political power in their hands are responsible, while those who have political power are formally and legally not responsible (not even for their own actions). One cannot arrive at responsibility in this way, and without responsibility, one cannot create any kind of firm, binding relationships among people.

When I talk so much about the party, I have to point out a possible misunderstanding: I am talking about the party as a locus of power, and not about party members

as people. Communists are like everyone else: good or bad, strong or weak... I have many good friends among communists; my father was also a communist, and my mother still is today; she was active, especially as a communist, throughout her entire working life. I myself was in the party for 26 years. Consequently, we have to distinguish the people from the ideology.

[Question] You have been dealing for a long time with "party intolerance," and specifically with the type of Bolshevik-Communist origin—opposed to religion and to young religious people. After all the research you have conducted, how do you feel about the circumstance that for a long time while you were doing this work you were a member of the LC? And consequently, how was your position formed, was it tolerated, and if it was, how did that tolerance end?

[Answer] You are misinformed; I have not dealt with party intolerance—naturally, of Bolshevik-Communist origin—in the research I have done at my workplace, in my "job." It is true that I have been studying youth for 20 years now, above all youth's values and the dependence of its values on its world outlook and beliefs. Thus, in my job I do not deal with party intolerance—not because I would wish to keep my official and "private" work separate for the sake of financial or personal security, but rather because young people do not perceive party intolerance or do not view it as such (at least, not most of them), and above all because intolerance toward believers is only one of the forms of party intolerance toward people in general. Party intolerance toward believers, peasants, the intelligentsia, etc.—these are only special forms of party intolerance per se. Dwelling on only one form of it (or phenomenon) would necessarily lead to an incomplete approach, and that would eliminate any possibility of comprehending the essence of this phenomenon.

I first came to articulate the problem of party intolerance through my own life, and through my own experiences. In the 1970's, after the well-known party letter, when increasingly greater ideological and political repression was taking place, which dragged the entire society into a maelstrom of "political turmoil," disqualifications, suspensions, and the firing of thousands of political workers, businessmen, officials, editors, and intellectuals, I had a personal encounter with ideological exclusivism: my husband, Tine Hribar, was accused of not being a dialectical materialist, and—solely on the basis of a party evaluation!—lost the right to "educate students," i.e., to lecture to them. The same thing happened to his colleague Dr Janez Jerovsek, while his colleagues Dr Vladimir Arzensek and Dr Veljko Rus (themselves eminent Yugoslav sociologists) lost their jobs at the Faculty for Sociology, Political Science, and Journalism in Ljubljana. As you may recall, eight professors at the Belgrade Philosophy Faculty had experienced the same fate a little earlier.

Purification

When I began to understand, at least approximately, what was really going on, I began to research that ideological exclusivism, which until then I had not seen as intolerance raised to the level of a principle. Naturally, I had to begin by studying our recent history; I was interested in the party's behavior during the war (or before it) and after it. It was only then that the reality of the party's ideological intolerance and the role this played in the NOB [National Liberation Struggle] became apparent to me. The tragedy of this intolerance, naturally, was not felt by the "national masses" (as an ideological category), but rather by thousands and thousands of specific individuals. What was it that happened in our country "in the name of freedom, truth, and justice"? What, for example, was done with the peasants at the time of the so-called repurchase (Mladen Markov—who deserves credit for this—writes about it in his novel "ISTERIVANJE BOGA" [The Expulsion of God]).

That is how I came to understand the essence and phenomena of (ideological) party intolerance, and so I had to describe it in order to unburden my soul. It was only then that the issue of my "party loyalty" came up, in connection with the article "Blame and Guilt," which was published along with a dozen other essays in the "Kocbek Anthology." In that essay, I tried to formulate the problem of one of the "results" of party exclusivism, which was expressed through the liquidation of thousands and thousands of unarmed Home Guardsmen, who were prisoners of war, after the war, without a trial, en masse!

Then, when the first public "criticisms" of my essay began, along the lines of "some people there are demanding a reconciliation with White-Guardism and demanding the erection of a monument to the Home Guardsmen"—I still had the opportunity to leave the LC by myself, although I did not want to. I had done my part by writing that article and submitting it for publication, and now it was the party's turn to take a position, not on my article, but on the act it had committed, on the slaughter of the former Home Guardsmen. If I may say so, the party had a historic chance to respond to a challenge that did not condemn the communists as people, but rather condemned a part of the party and called for purification. The party did not make use of this opportunity.

Those days and months of "public polemics" were very difficult for me personally and for my family, but—I do not mean this to sound like self-praise—I held out to the end. In defending myself before the party, I explained things over and over again... No one was able to reject this defense for substantive reasons, but only by means of insinuations and political disqualifications. And the party finally reached a decision: since my basic organization at the school did not want to expel me, the opština committee expelled me from the party.

[Question] Do you think that some of the latest program attempts in Slovenia are really following in the footsteps of the coalition ideas established at the time of the formation of the Liberation Front?

[Answer] The "program" and other democratic trends in Slovenia are after all citing the coalition basis of the Liberation Front, but they go far beyond that basis. The coalition basis of the Liberation Front was based on an accord among individual groups; and an accord occurs when individual autonomous political groups (or parties) or individual autonomous spheres (culture, civil society), for the sake of a common goal, leave the leadership to one group (or party), and give up their own autonomy. Usually some party, while it is still not strong enough itself, agrees to an "accord" with the other groups, and then when it becomes stronger it rejects them—and that is the end of the coalition. That is also the way it happened within the Executive Committee of the Liberation Front: when the party became stronger, it "abolished" its allies, because it placed itself above them and subordinated them to itself—that was done through the well-known Dolomite statement.

The citing of the coalition basis of the Liberation Front by the democratic movements in Slovenia today is an attempt to point out that a sort of "pluralism" also existed in the Liberation Front—until the signing of the Dolomite statement—so why shouldn't it exist today? Such a reference, in my opinion, is a sort of justification, which is essentially unnecessary: today's democratic movements in Slovenia (and in other republics) are quite legitimate and must have the right to express themselves, regardless of the coalition nature of the Liberation Front and regardless of the fact that this coalition nature of the Liberation Front actually never existed at all—the party was in the vanguard from the start. Why should we always have to cite the past in order to justify the present and the legitimacy of the demands that emerge spontaneously from the present?

Today's trends in Slovenia thus are not derived from the coalition nature of the Liberation Front, but rather from awareness of the autonomy of each sphere (culture, science, etc.), and primarily from awareness of the autonomous "value" of each individual person as a unique mortal being. In that sense, these trends are not consenting to any sort of "accord" with the authorities; usually they are in more or less open conflict with them.

Democracy of Differences

[Question] It could be said that in your works there is a rather undeveloped overall attitude toward the so-called class approach. Specifically, it seems that you do not make a sufficiently clear distinction between the ideology of the class approach, and the real divisions within each nation. If each nation is stratified, including the Slovene nation, then a significant question arises: how is a democratic mechanism established that permits the existence of an opposition within that nation to its own national state? This is because, when such matters are specifically examined and defined, then there is not so much room for a homogeneous national ideology...

[Answer] Oh, that "class approach"? Naturally, each nation, or more precisely, each social community, is stratified and structured in terms of thought and ideology; thank God that ideological (party) hegemonization was not carried out! There is still too little of this internal differentiation in our country! My speaking out explicitly against party exclusivism constitutes speaking out against that ideology which in our country today is the only one homogenizing (or hegemonizing) all of the contradictions within any (national) social community as the sole and absolute hegemon; the party is thus by definition the hegemon of society.

I am consequently not talking about a "homogeneous national ideology," as you put it, but rather the opposite: I am talking about pluralism, about democracy within a social community, and not just the Slovene one—why should the Slovene people be an exception? And why would I demand democracy only for the Slovenes, and not for the other peoples with whom we are living together? Democracy, moreover, is indivisible; in the long run it is not possible solely in one republic or province, but is only possible throughout all of Yugoslavia. Slovene "democracy" is a fly that could live for a single day, that could die tomorrow on its own or be abolished because of pressure from a different form of "democracy," namely one that cannot endure difference, but only a "unified democracy." Democracy, as I understand it, allows not only an individual nation, but also every individual to be different. The lack or ban on real democracy in our country is based on party hegemonism, which actually insists upon a unified "homogeneous national ideology" throughout all of Yugoslavia, as if Yugoslavia were a single-nationality state. This "homogeneous national ideology," naturally, is a Yugoslav "inter-nationalism," which erases the significance of the actual national differentiation within it, and shifts the significance of nationality to a secondary level.

The basic question, of course, as you have formulated it, is how to establish a democratic mechanism that will permit the existence of an opposition within that nation to its own national state.

The answer to your question—to the extent that it affects the establishment of an opposition within the Slovene "national state"—is the same as for the establishment of an opposition for any other "national state" and for any other Yugoslav people: by establishing true equality and equal "worth" for all people and for each person individually, this naturally rules out one party's being the vanguard and being a priori linked to power. This is consequently a question of establishing an opposition of ideas and legitimizing various forms of opposition, as I have already said.

The so-called "class approach" that you have mentioned, which should be some sort of alternative to "national ideologies," is, of course, no alternative at all! On the contrary, all of the "national ideologies" of the Yugoslav peoples (or republics) are based precisely upon

the "class approach," upon the ideology of the "working class." Let us understand each other: they are not based upon the ideas and demands of the workers, but upon the ideology of the "working class," i.e., on the ideology of the party, since the ideology of the "working class" is the ideology of the party—by definition! And the ideology of the "Yugoslav working class" is based upon the ideology of the Yugoslav party, because the vanguard of the "working class" is the party—who else? The nationalisms of individual peoples in Yugoslavia (or republic nationalisms) are based precisely upon this "class approach" that you mention, just as Yugoslav "internationalism" (which is manifested as "uni-nationalism") is based upon the "class approach." Furthermore, the national politocracies are based upon, or speak in the name of, "their (national) working class," while the Yugoslav politocracy speaks in the name of the "Yugoslav working class."

"Working Class" Is Not an Expression

[Question] Then you think that the "working class" is only an ideological expression, and nothing more?

[Answer] You see, since the "backward masses," "peasant masses," and "material for the party" do not exist, the "working class" does not exist either—and therefore, these are merely the expressions of some (Bolshevist) ideology. This, naturally, does not mean that more or less educated people do not exist, or that peasants and workers do not exist, even though they have a hard time existing! Their lives are difficult and miserable, and in the past, for instance, the peasants, i.e., people, were treated harshly and inhumanely... precisely in the name of the ideology of the "working class." Within that ideology, the peasant is not the one who sows and harvests the fields, who loves his land, cherishes it, and produces bread for everyone, but rather more or less of a kulak, a "backward element," socially and nationally unreliable, and in any case not revolutionary; he has to be shown what a "real revolution" is, and the devil and God have to be driven out of him... The "peasant" as a Bolshevik category and the peasant as a human being are by no means the same thing, just as the workers and the "working class" are not.

In other words, the "workers' interest" articulated by the party is *a priori*, ideological assumption, a precondition for the real (and diverse) interests of the workers; consequently, in real life it is necessary that workers' real diverse interests be continually reduced to that "workers' interest." That "workers' interest" is naturally the interest of the party. The "working class," viewed from the standpoint of real life, is the working population (specific workers) reduced to the interest of the party, and from the party's standpoint, the "workers' interest" is determined *a priori*. Consequently, there is always a discrepancy and a contradiction occurring between the "working class" and the workers, for instance: the workers are interested in the legalization of strikes, but the "working class" (viewed ideologically!) cannot strike

"against itself," because it is the "working class" itself that is "in power." The workers and peasants that actually exist have different interests (the Slovene worker or peasant certainly has different interests than those of Vojvodina or Kosovo), while the "working class" always and everywhere has the same interests, which is logical, since it is merely an ideological expression."

There is no greater concealment of the "real stratification of each nation," as you put it, than the ideology of the "working class." We all fall onto this ideological fiction of the "working class" not only the actual workers, and I as an intellectual, but naturally also all of the politicians, who are likewise "workers." Politicians can be "workers" only as an ideological fiction, we might say, within Bolshevik logic. Naturally, I am not denying that political workers also work, but are they consequently "working class"? But naturally they are the "working class," because they are the ones who in general articulate what the "working class" is? The actual, live workers are the ones who only work... During the public discussion for the 13th session, I saw on Ljubljana television a broadcast from Vojvodina television in which some worker said, "He whose pay is 120,000 dinars and I, who have 30,000 dinars, cannot be in the same party." The worker, on the basis of his own experience, articulated correctly and quite spontaneously what for some people is an unintelligible and unsolvable theoretical problem.

Someone who uses the expression "working class" and in so doing thinks of specific workers and their difficult position and their right to a "class struggle" (strikes, free elections, etc.) falls into a dangerous terminological and ideological confusion which will prevent him from thinking in an alternative way, and from acting in an alternative way within that policy (or logic) which in the name of the "working class" establishes and consolidates its own absolute power. I will not put particular emphasis upon the fact that the ideology of the "working class" itself has already become somewhat obsolete, in view of modern technological development, which is leading to a point where "workers" and thus the "working class" as a body will not exist at all, since they will be replaced by cybernetics and robotics, which will be controlled by a creative individual, an autonomous, innovative personality. The ideology of the "working class," even when it has an "expert, scientific" basis, is an expression of our lagging behind technical and social development in the world, and it "self governs and even intensifies that lag."

Not in One's Homeland

[Question] Aren't you rejecting the attempts of those intellectuals (sociologists, political scientists, etc.) who speak about the working class, and have in mind actual workers and their rights vis-a-vis the workers' vanguard?

[Answer] I respect their intentions, but I also regret their inability to disassociate themselves from official party terminology, and thus from the ideology and its real actions toward workers. I am also surprised that they cannot see that by using the same terminology, they cannot separate themselves at all from the official ideology of the "working class," just as they do not see that by thus using the same terminology, whether they want to or not, they are supporting the ideology that they want to speak against. The shortsightedness of the official ideology is what is blocking them, and what is giving them the deceptive appearance of already being some sort of intellectual opposition to the rule of the "working class." Perhaps they even are an opposition, but an opposition within the same thing. I am surprised that this "opposition" does not see that people can be designated as "backward masses" only from the standpoint of "progressive people," and that one can speak of "human material" only from the standpoint of an "ideological force," about "national masses" only from the standpoint of an "idea," and about the "working class" only from the standpoint of the "vanguard" (where the "working class" is the vanguard of the entire society, and the party is the vanguard of the "working class"). These are Bolshevik metaphysical pairs. I regret that these people cannot break through the horizons of Bolshevik ideology! But aren't their unthinking references to the "working class" (even in the sense of the real interests of the workers) an expression, not of anything radically new, but rather perhaps of "preparation" for "repeating history," i.e., for a new "class revolution," now against the "rule of the working class"? But any revolution objectivizes "class antagonism" into counterrevolution—and then there is no end to this. Hasn't one revolution been quite sufficient? But real democratization begins, first of all, with intellectual (and terminological) distinctions.

Consequently, it is not a question of advocating the "rights of the working class," but rather advocating human (and civil) rights, advocating human rights (which also may be the so-called "class rights," the rights to association, to intellectual opposition, to public speech, to national determination, etc.), as expressed by the Declaration on Human Rights, which Yugoslavia has ratified (and these decisions are thus part of our legislation) but is not implementing.

In Yugoslavia, the question is nothing more than respect for the Declaration on Human Rights, since the Declaration contains everything: if I am permitted to exist as a human being, as a person, then I am permitted to exist as a Slovene, as someone "controlling the results of her work," to exist as a citizen of my homeland, and in short, to be a free, equal human being. I am permitted to say, in accordance with my conscience, "Yes" or "No," without fear or any real danger that I will be singled out in my homeland and treated as an "enemy of the homeland"...

Hasn't the time come, 40 or more years after the liberation, for us to live in real freedom? And isn't it time yet,

even today, to put a stop to ideological exclusivism? Isn't it time for that exclusivism to correct itself and put a stop to itself? Isn't it time, even today, for us all to live humanly, as people? I have tried to answer these questions as well through the idea of the mutual reconciliation of all of us.

9909

Prevalence of Chauvinism Among Youth Charted
28000254a Belgrade NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian 12 Jul 87 pp 21-22

[Article by Ramiz Kurtesi: "Regularity of a Nightmare"]

[Text] At the Marxist Center of the Central Committee of the Serbian LC, in a discussion on the subject of "Young People and Inter-Nationality Relations," it was stated that nationalism is equivalent to manipulation, although perhaps it cannot always be reduced to that alone. The occasion for this discussion was the preliminary report from a study of nationalism among young people (see box).

At the very beginning of the discussion, the opening speaker, Drago Roksandic, expressed the view that there is a great danger that, without a serious and complete definition of the concept of youth and the concept of nationality, we may understand the problem of their relations in a reductionist manner.

"Since the Kosovo events of 1968, the question of nationalist orientations in the youth population has been an open question for the Yugoslav public. Since then, it has constantly been more or less present, and the center of attention for smaller or larger parts of the country. The roots of the contemporary development crisis of Yugoslav society are rather deep. They go back to the years before most of the youth population whose views we are discussing today were born. This population's social maturation has been substantially determined by the experience of the crisis. It thereby differs from the preceding postwar youth generations, which in different periods and in different ways inherited the experience of Yugoslav revolutionary optimism."

Advantage or...

"Since the relations among nationalities in contemporary Yugoslav society, with the socialist experience that we have inherited, half a century's worth already," Roksandic says, "are much richer in controversy than has ever been the case before, and since it has many forms, our attitude toward the multinationality of Yugoslav society must necessarily be different from what it used to be. And this means that the concept of national relations and the attitude toward individual nationalities can hardly be reduced to the formulas to which they could have been reduced previously. And really, no one

really needs to be convinced that the national awareness of Serbs in 1912 is not the same thing as the national awareness of Serbs in 1987, not to mention any other historical parallels."

If this warning by Drago Roksandic can be considered to be one of the central ones at this meeting, the participants made an effort to explain why the multinational composition of our country is not a comparative advantage. Zoran Vidojevic says that it is undoubtedly a step forward that nationalism is no longer reduced to and understood as a mere distortion of awareness. "Nationalism as a phenomenon," he continues, "as a tendency and a social problem, is obviously on the increase in many of today's socialist societies, and in others as well. In some of them, it occasionally assumes dramatic and explosive forms. This obviously occurs in accordance with some deeper internal logic of social change. The genesis of nationalism in our contemporary society clearly demonstrates this."

Dream of the State as Savior

Prvoslav Radic feels, in regard to nationalism, that it is obviously a question "of a historical decline that is unfortunately produced in a systemic manner." "One result of the study is disturbing. It says that almost half of young people are inclined to believe that a strong state and repressive measures could overcome the interethnic conflicts that persist in our country. Even though what lies behind this is not some cherished a priori unitarism and awareness, and no finished violated awareness of a firm hand, I believe, but rather, I would say, more the inability to offer more reliable answers to interethnic conflicts, the fact is that the younger generation, as a result of the chaos of irrational programs for emerging from the crisis, does not have any new and fresh alternative for opposing that crisis."

"It seems that a certain psychological strength exists among young people, and it lies in the fact that they do not reduce a person to a nationality, but rather look for his individual and personal characteristics. It seems, however, that there is no intellectual willingness to resist the manipulations originating from the bureaucratic fabric of the nationality and from the bourgeois ideologues who have multiplied recently."

From all indications, nationalism, in the eyes of the participants in the discussion, is not just a consequence of poor ideological work, a poor interpretation of Marxism, or even the activity of antisocialist forces. "Its ontological prerequisites lie in the large boundaries of the economic and political essence of modern socialist societies. It is, above all, a reaction to what socialism is not, on the broader level of civilization, but what has been expected of it among broad sections of the working population of young intellectuals with a revolutionary orientation," Zoran Vidojevic asserts. "The younger generation views self-management much more critically than the older generation. It raises the question, much

more often, of what self-management is and what really contributes to it. They do not take either self-management or Marxism, or the party or socialism, on faith. This is not a negative fact, nor does it mean the depoliticization of youth; on the contrary, it is an insufficiently formed critical awareness on the part of the contemporary young generation, along with which there is also a hidden dimension of a desire for ideals. But there is also a much more realistic assessment of the existing social conditions, an awareness that can be a positive force for necessary social changes."

These observations take the strengthening of parochial awareness as their starting point. The very fact that the study was conducted in Serbia proper was taken as proof of this thesis. If we abandon ourselves to the spontaneous development of parochialism, perhaps some day we will also arrive at a study of the nationalism of the inhabitants of Palidula with respect to those of Zvezdara (parts of Belgrade).

Velja Tomanovic feels that parochialization has captured not only the economy but also some scientific and social areas. "This is to some extent an expression of our reality. From the example of the study conducted by Professor Vrcan, which applies to all Yugoslav youth, I would mention that the factor that most divides Yugoslav youth is not class or professional identity, and so forth, but precisely national identity. That is where considerably greater differences appear. The differences in orientations and attitudes between Slovenes, on one hand, and the members of other peoples, are much more profound than those between young workers and peasants of the same nationality. National divisions thus exist."

In conclusion, let us mention two ideas that were voiced by Proslav Ralic and Drago Roksandic. They are associated with responsibility and emergence from the crisis, which is manifested in this way as well. "I would say that it is not true that one can establish the responsibility of those who put Yugoslavia on the blacklist both domestically and abroad, unless they yield their positions to those who have not already used up their right to make mistakes, and here I am thinking above all of young people. That is what this revolution did in 1941 and 1945. After all, otherwise this revolution could not have been radically continued further," Ralic said. And Drago Roksandic warned that "one must never lose sight of the fact that there are frequently tendencies for different generations' perplexity, confusion, exhaustion, or crises after the period of youth, through more or less consistent use, to be assumed by youth to be its own perplexity, confusion, exhaustion, or crisis."

[Box, p 22]

Ramiz Kurtes: "Framework for the Picture"

The Research and Publishing Center of the Serbian Socialist Youth League, in cooperation with the Center for Political Science Research and Public Opinion of the Belgrade Institute for Social Sciences, conducted a study (headed by Dr Dragomir Pantic) entitled "National Consciousness of Young People in Serbia Proper," using a sample of 955 young respondents from all categories in all nine regions of the republic. The findings confirmed the main hypothesis of the study, that the awareness of members of the contemporary young generation is stratified and differentiated, but that in spite of its complexity and heterogeneity, internationalist attitudes are predominant among young people, and there is a relatively narrow group of young people with nationalist attitudes (13 percent). The study showed that there have been no fundamental changes among today's youth with respect to the tendencies observed among young people two decades ago and in several later studies.

Today most young people acquire information about their nationality, interethnic relations, and so forth through the mass news media (four-fifths), followed by academic institutions, personal contacts, and general literature. Only then come family and relatives, while sociopolitical organizations, political schools of all types, and labor campaigns are rarely mentioned as channels of information. The study confirmed that young people have considerable interest in nationality problems. Nevertheless, there are not many who are extremely interested in these topics (only 18 percent). There are 52 percent who are "fairly" interested, but a considerable number of people have little or no interest in this area (30 percent).

According to this study, it can be stated that young people have a realistic view of the current state of interethnic relations in our country, and that their views objectively reflect the situation and trends in society. Their assessments of the state of interethnic relations are more negative than in similar previous studies, however.

In regard to interethnic relations in Yugoslavia and relations in Serbia (including the socialist autonomous provinces), most of the respondents consider them poor (54 percent). In contrast to this, many of the young people polled consider interethnic relations in a local framework to be very good (37 percent) or satisfactory (53 percent), while the number of negative assessments is minimal (9 percent). Young people are quite critical of the situation in Kosovo; 87 percent of the respondents state that the quality of interethnic relations there is poor.

One of the characteristic phenomena revealed by this study is that young people view individual symbols of the state, the National Liberation Struggle, and the revolutionary tradition of fraternity and unity as the most important factors in the cohesion of our society. Thus, a mixture of elements of statehood and traditional values is predominant. To a lesser extent, young people see a factor linking our peoples and national minorities

in ideological values of more recent vintage, such as self-management or nonalignment, and least of all, in more distant historical integrating factors (common ethnic origin, or similarity of cultures) or in the LCY (only 1 percent) and the unified working class and market (also 1 percent).

This study also confirmed that considerably widespread and undesirable unitaristic ideas of Yugoslavism do not exist among young people. Only 9 percent of those polled see Yugoslavism in this way, that is, as giving rise to a new nationality or "supernationality." Most young people, almost one-third, understand Yugoslavism to be the equal closeness of all of our peoples and national minorities. This concept is particularly supported by those who most strongly reject nationalism. Almost a fourth of the young people equate Yugoslavism with citizenship. Some young people link the meaning of Yugoslavism today to protest against national rifts and divisions, and thus view it as being a tool, though one serving the purpose of the unity and integration of society, which they perceive as disrupted and threatened. As many as four-fifths of young people are convinced that the children of nationally mixed marriages should be designated as Yugoslavs. The same majority of young people feels

that a person should perceive himself equally as a member of a given nationality and as a member of the Yugoslav community, implying a so-called dual identification.

Most young people (as many as 37 percent) perceive political leaders to be the ones mainly responsible for nationalism, followed by the humanistic intelligentsia (13 percent), while considerably fewer singled out the members of other social strata and large social and professional groups.

In all groups of young people, those who reject nationalism are predominant—from 52 percent among young farmers, to as much as 90 percent among employed young specialists. A strong rejection of nationalism is characteristic of the more educated categories of young people, while more poorly educated young people display this aspiration less intensively. Every sixth respondent has mixed feelings or is not interested. Overall, nationalism occurs among 13 percent of young people, which is approximately the same as in several previous studies.

9909

POLAND

Deputy Minister Describes National Civil Defense Activities

26000785 Warsaw ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI in Polish
5 Aug 87 p 3

[Article by Gen. Arms Tadeusz Tuczapski, Deputy Minister of National Civil Defense, Chief Inspector of Territorial Defense: "Civil Defense in Security Service and the Peaceful Development of the Country"]

[Text] In the hierarchy of socially recognized value systems, the necessity of ensuring national security and public defense occupies one of the foremost positions. In this day and age, nuclear arms constitute a real threat to all of mankind. The chances for man's survival increase as the threat of obliteration decreases and the further removed are the sources and limits of this threat. Meanwhile, the development of the modern world has multiplied these sources and drawn closer to the limits of danger. The greatest danger is the threat to peace and the threat of nuclear annihilation.

The enormous accumulation in the heart of Europe of military potential together with a powerful concentration of industry, the specificity of land-use management and the density of population, means that the vision of an arms clash, not only with nuclear weapons but even with the conventional means of warfare which today possesses an unprecedented power and striking precision—becomes unimaginable. In case of war, the boundary between military and civilian targets, between the old concept of a front and the zone of interior, between the degree of military and civilian safety, would in practice disappear. Even a small nuclear strike would cause widespread devastation, contamination and infection, fires and the penetration into the environment of toxic chemical and radioactive substances deadly to all forms of life. The destructive effects of cumulative damage would affect entire macroregions and ecosystems.

In the Face of Threat

The militarization of the way of thinking and living; existing social conflicts; the technological complexity, quantity and unparalleled power of destruction of present-day weapons as well as the escalation to the highest level of military readiness of nuclear-missile systems on the ground, in the air, and within the ocean depths have made the fate of nations and continents dependent not only on the possibility of making a voluntary, criminal decision of using this weaponry, but also the possibility of using it by mistake, misunderstanding or the lack of strategic imagination. The possibility of unleashing an atomic nightmare as a result of a simple chance occurrence has also increased incomparably. Disturbances or errors in computer information or what might seem a minor flaw in the electronic circuit

systems of armaments and their control could, under specific conditions, lead to the uncontrolled escalation of occurrences with unpredictable consequences.

The current perception of existing and potential danger has abolished traditional stereotypes and attitudes towards the phenomenon of war as an extreme form of resolving conflict in international life. Currently, when mankind has been faced with the global threat of nuclear war, a new form of political and strategic thinking is necessary that would correspond totally to the harsh realities of this era.

The practical expression of this are the efforts made by the Soviet Union and our allied countries aimed at averting the threat of war and at ensuring lasting international peace and security. In this very spirit, a Polish proposal was formulated that is contained in Jaruzelski's Plan and aimed at strengthening trust, reducing the number of nuclear arms and conventional weapons in the area between the Rhine and Bug rivers [Poland], making concrete efforts geared toward finding roads leading to lasting peaceful coexistence and to the assurance in the heart of Europe of conducive conditions for international cooperation in the interest of a peaceful future among nations. The issue of such a change in the character of war doctrines was proposed for the first time in Jaruzelski's Plan so that they [doctrines] could become mutually recognized as strictly defensive. However, the NATO countries are in no hurry to accept the initiatives of socialist countries and are always coming out with new objections, reservations and conditions. At the same time, they are continuing with unrelenting energy the deployment of constantly more advanced technological-arms systems. This attitude of imperialism determines the general policy assumptions of socialist countries in the international sphere. They are: peace protection and the assurance of a system of general security. At the same time, as long as there exists the threat of the escalation of wars and military conflicts by imperialism, socialist countries will be forced to maintain their defense systems at a level guaranteeing the ability to ward off every attack.

Poland, as an important element in the defense system of Warsaw Pact nations, plays an important role in the calculation of NATO officers. This importance is determined by the position and strategic significance of our country in Europe and by its developed communication, industrial and technological-defense infrastructure. All of this defines the main priorities of the PRL defense policy, its concept, assumptions, goals, principles and organizational-task structure of the defense system.

Determining Factors

The present-day notion of a nation's defense and security has a complex and multifaceted character. It encompasses a series of factors and elements that are impossible to specify and classify explicitly according to more or less comparable criteria, goals, structures and tasks. It is

most frequently accepted that a country's security and level of defense is determined by its economic and demographic potential, geographic position, cultural-civilizational achievements, armed forces and their combat equipment and readiness. Of key significance are political system factors, alliances and other international associations, internal order, and public patriotic-defense awareness. The state of a country's defense and security also depends on a properly organized, well and up-to-date equipped, and properly prepared civil defense.

Civil defense, as one of the basic elements of the defense system of the PRL, best reflects the strictly defensive character of our war doctrine, defines the essence of current military and ecological threats, and determines the directions and principles of indispensable preventive undertakings. For this reason, civil defense is organized and perfected as a multifunctioning, properly prepared and equipped body capable of taking on defense-rescue activity for the assurance of public safety and a nation's material goods and culture not only during wartime but, what is of particular importance, during peacetime. This is the basic and most important characteristic of civil defense because man's life and his environment are not threatened only by war. In recent years, we have become convinced numerous times that despite extraordinary successes in the field of science and technology, problems involving the reliability of technical equipment and problems with discipline, order and the proper organization of operational-production processes continue to be a source of many hazards.

The catastrophes in the Italian village of Seveso, in the Indian city of Bhopal, in Skopje, in Chernobyl; the pollution of the Rhine and Oder rivers; the forest fires in China and in Siberia; and here at home, the frequent serious flooding remind us constantly that even if we were to overlook the greatest danger, which nuclear and conventional weapons represent, it would turn out that there is a multitude of various nonmilitary threats to mankind: dramatic catastrophes, accidents and various natural disasters striking at the life of man, destroying his environment, and disorganizing or downright preventing production-economic activity in vast areas for long period of time.

The awareness of existing military and civilizational dangers has broadened the functions of civil defense and has outlined new tasks for it. The socio-political, organizational-economic and cultural changes taking place in the life of the country have created solid bases for the organization and functioning of civil defense as an integral part of the nation's defense system. The introduction of the particular elements and structures of civil defense into the entire administrative and economic system of the country; i.e., into various institutions and enterprises, work establishments in the city and in rural areas, social and cooperative organizations, and the specific outlining of defense responsibilities of the public in general, means that civil defense in Poland today constitutes the most effective form of individual and collective self-defense.

For Man and for the Environment

The constant updating of the long-term program of improving all the elements and integral parts of civil defense in accordance with the various kinds and aspects of threat, the requirements of scientific-technological progress as well as the economic potential of the country are conducive to the effective implementation of civil defense tasks. The organizational-technological and training-upbringing tasks contained in the program have been defined precisely in normative-legal documents which set and regulate, among other things, the principles of civil defense service, training in the system of general self-defense, as well as the procedure of appointing, organizing and operation of the forces and means of various services and rescue units. The powers of officers dealing with matters of regulating civil defense have been defined; matters involving protective building construction have been set in order; conceptual, planning and legislative work is being continued for the purpose of raising the overall level of the technological-defense readiness of the entire system.

The development of civil defense—beginning with the Regional Anti-Aircraft Defense formed 36 years ago and then the General Civil Defense, all the way to the current structure of Civil Defense [OC]—indicates that the rate with which it must deal with problems arising from the development of increasingly more dangerous military concepts, new combat measures as well as with complicated production processes often hazardous to man and the environment, requires the implementation of increasingly more advanced methods of preventing various hazards, of keeping up with ever-increasing needs in the area of modernization and introduction of qualitatively new types of technological outfitting of OC forces, the introduction of new ways of managing complicated rescue operations, as well as organizing general and specialized training of the public and of OC units.

In particular, many immensely informative proposals and considerations have been the result of, among other things, the tragic events in the Chernobyl power plant. They have been thoroughly analyzed both within the context of the future development of atomic energy in Poland and from the point of view of the assumptions of the overall methodology of preventive-defense operations pertaining to, among other things, the concept of the functioning of civil defense. Attention may be called her to such features as: a constant, high level of readiness to assume immediate rescue action; the unfailing reliability of the functioning of contamination and poison detection systems which should also detect their nature, range, speed with which they spread and possible effects, as well as the indispensability of possessing a precisely functioning general alert and alarm system for the public, for the authorities and work establishments at all levels of control. Such systems must be equipped with a constantly monitoring, densely distributed network of early warnings possessing the most advanced means of

processing information electronically, including equipment for the early detection and assessment of the level of contamination in the air, water, soil, agricultural products and the ability to determine the safe consumption and use of various food products, feed and basic goods.

Signs of a hazard forming on a plant, city, provincial or regional scale, detected in time, have an important significance for the safety of man and his environment. The constant monitoring, prognosticating and control of various phenomena indicating the possibility of an impending danger and the detection and analysis of their causes, character and ways of manifesting themselves—all of this makes it possible to assess the situation in time and undertake indispensable preventive measures and in case of need, to take immediate rescue action.

The developed network of plants of the chemical, metallurgical, power, and mechanical industries as well as the system of pipelines and fuel storage, installations and hydraulic systems based on increasingly newer and more advanced technologies that are also not deprived of sensitivity and risk, undergoes radical changes in structure and character, increases the likelihood of the occurrence of various greatly complicated breakdowns, catastrophes and tragic events which often entail a considerable number of victims and environmental contamination, and causes great financial losses.

Under extreme conditions, plant forces and rescue measures would not be capable of independently controlling the situation.

In such instances, what is necessary are the concerted actions of various specialized forces, the coordinated bringing into action of various divisions and units, i.e., medical first-aid, fire-fighting, chemical warfare defense, deactivation, engineering which at times are equipped with unique devices, means of transportation and communication, and other equipment. Only a professionally trained operational-technical team forming a civil defense staff is capable of running this type of very complex and large-scale operation. Only a staff prepared in this manner is able to effectively direct the activity of numerous rescue services; offer plant work forces and

the local public indispensable assistance; organize an informational system, supplies and care; and conduct an evacuation in case of need from a threatened area.

Legally, the heads of civil defense in a territorial system are the governors, city and gmina mayors and leaders, and plant managers. Therefore, it is their responsibility to constantly increase efforts aimed at creating conditions for the proper implementation of OC tasks by their subordinate task force, to adhere to the technological regimen and standards, to care for internal order and discipline, to inform the public about various hazards, to take appropriate remedial measures in case of need as well as to be constantly concerned about keeping the remaining forces and means at their disposal in a constant state of readiness to take appropriate action in case of various impending threats. This function is furthered by a process of general defense training and staff drilling which is organized at various levels of the state administrative structure. A variety of scientific-research work is necessary for assuring perspective orientation as to the character, range and directions of the development of civil defense. No problem of greater significance can be solved in practice without the thorough analysis of its character, substance and significance as well as theoretical formulation and substantiation.

The country's civil defense, shaped according to the needs of assuring safety to the collective body of Poland, its material goods and culture, complies with the objective norms of the nation's peaceful development. It is not a static structure but together with the entire social, economic and government body, and changes in the political-strategic situation and scientific-technological progress, it is subject to the process of constant development and improvement and becomes an important element in the services of national defense and security. The concept of the organization and functioning of civil defense, service in its ranks, the implementation of training and organizational tasks are convergent with the strategy of the nation's socioeconomic development and productively serve the integration of society around the concept of the further strengthening of the power and promising future of our homeland.

POLAND

Standard of Living Changes Charted Over 1981-1985 Period

26000766 Warsaw *ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE* in Polish No 30, 26 Jul 87 p 5

[Article by Grazyna Smulska: "Five Lean Years"]

[Text] How did we live in the first half of the 1980's? What is the balance in the previous 5-year period for various socioeconomic groups, both rural and urban? For whom were these especially lean years, and for whom were they just the opposite? Which areas defining the standard of living were abandoned and which succeeded in surviving regress? An attempt at an answer to these questions—important not only from purely cognitive considerations, but from practical ones as well—is contained in a GUS [Central Statistical Office] publication entitled "Living Conditions of the Population over the 1981-1985 Period." Not without reason was it a subject for discussion in the Planning Commission.

This is a very interesting compendium of knowledge prepared by the GUS Department of Social Research, with cooperation from the Departments of Demographic and Nonmaterial Services Research, Internal Trade and Communal Economy, National Economy and Price Balances, and Work and Wages. Information and numerical data on the state of the population and its income, costs of living, consumption, the equipping of households with durable goods, housing conditions, health care, social welfare, education and upbringing, and dissemination of culture are printed in seven chapters.

Is this answer comprehensive? That's debatable. Experts call attention to the lack of data on, among other things, the second circulation of income, on the outside help from which many households profit, on allotment gardens, which often have significant impact on family budgets, and to the neglect of the minimum social category, etc. However, these shortcomings do not shake the basic significance of the study, which may, in simple terms, give rise to the argument that admittedly many very essential changes occurred from 1981 to 1985 in nearly all areas defining the life of the community, yet this period was not homogeneous. Several of the changes canceled each other out, which returned us to our starting point. Others appeared to be permanent, and are continuing. Whether this is beneficial or not is already another matter.

Left-Handed Tilt

During this time our population increased by more than 1.5 million (1,606,000), wherein a high growth rate was noted at the beginning of the 1980's, which slowed in 1985. The birthrate in that year was the lowest in the past decade. As previously, the growth in urban population was faster, while the rural population stabilized. As before there also were more women: 105 for every 100

men in 1985 (although more boys were born). In 1985 for every 100 individuals of working age there were 71.5 not of working age, while in 1980 there were 68.6.

The standard of living is measured primarily by income level. Wages, which constituted about half of income, had the greatest effect on shaping it. (This share decreased in 1980-85 to 47.9 percent).

In 1985 the average wage in the socialized economy was 3.3 times greater than in 1980. Industrial jobs paid the highest wages; construction was second (the opposite from 1980); next were science and technology (in fourth position in 1980), agriculture (sixth in 1980), and administration of the state and of justice. The last places were held, as in 1980, by health care and social welfare, trade, and education and upbringing. In 1980 finance and insurance were also among the lowest salaried areas, but in 5 years they advanced, thanks to the largest (3.8 times) increase in wages.

Health care and social welfare workers were the lowest paid during the entire 5-year period except in 1982, when insurance, culture and art, physical education, tourism and recreation, and education and upbringing were still lower on the wage ladder. In 1980 the average wage in the highest paid area was 43-percent higher than for health care and social welfare, and in 1985 it was 46-percent higher. Thus, the pay degradation of this area worsened.

In evaluating living conditions, working with averages is misleading, however, inasmuch as it turns out that the majority of workers do not earn the average wage, but less. Statisticians call this "the left-handed tilt of distribution curves toward lower wages." It does not appear in all sectors of the economy. It is just the opposite in industry and construction, which means that a relatively large proportion of these workers earn high wages, and relatively few earn lower wages. In the areas of science and technological development and transportation and communications there is no "tilt," for both high and low wages are the lot of a small fraction of the workers. On the other hand, this anomaly is most of all apparent in education and upbringing, culture and art, health care and social welfare, physical education, tourism and recreation, and administration of the state and of justice: there is a relatively large number of workers in the lower wage brackets here, while few are in the higher ones.

In the study of this, it was not stated expressly, but one can believe that social services, especially pensions and annuities, show a similar characteristic. In 1985 social services money constituted 15.4 percent of income, while in 1980 it was 11.4 percent (but the largest share, 17.2 percent, was attained in 1982). The number of pensions and annuities, which took first place among these services, was nearly 40 percent greater in 1985 than in 1980; payments were 4.8 times higher, and the level of the average pension and annuity was 3.4 times higher.

Stipends increased the most slowly, only by a factor of 2.2 in 5 years, whereas social security benefits rose the fastest, by a factor of 8. (ZUS [Social Security Agency] states that the latter increased by a factor of 5.3, counting benefits connected with compensations for family members). In 1982 family and nursing benefits began to play a particular role. These payments rose by a factor of 11.3 (according to ZUS), for the most part in 1982, and the average level increased by a factor of 10. In 1981 an educational benefit also appeared, payments of which first increased quickly (until 1983), and then fell. As a result the average level of the educational benefit was almost the same in 1985 as in 1981.

Progress in Rural Areas

The income of farmers allocated for consumption and nonproductive investment rose faster than wages in 5 years, by a factor of 3.5, but more slowly than social services money or income from work in the nonsocialized economy outside of agriculture (growth by a factor of 4.4) and also income from activities on the side (3.9 times).

However, it is characteristic that in the entire 5-year period the average income of farm households surpassed that of other groups of households. This was the basic change in comparison with the earlier period, although since 1983 this lead has been shrinking.

The income of households connected with farming increased significantly faster than the rest. Most pronounced were the gains of the farm-worker group, whose income level in the 1970's was close to that of pensioners and annuitants (a distance of a dozen percentage points or so separated both groups from workers' households), whereas in the first half of the 1980's their income per person in the household increased by almost a factor of 4 (by 294 percent). Somewhat smaller was the increase in the income of the farm population (289 percent), but they were initially in a better situation. The least favorable was the 5-year balance for workers' households (income increased by 252 percent) or that for pensioners and annuitants (237 percent).

These changes did not take place in an even way. At first, in 1982-83, the income of farm households and of pensioners and annuitants grew the fastest, then both groups had the lowest increase in income, and then farm households again outstripped the rest. Commenting on this phenomenon, the authors of the study said that the division of income between the population in the socialized economy and individual agriculture is continually not stabilized.

The Poor and the Rich

In spite of gains in average income, farm households more often than the rest were in the low-income group. For example, in 1985, 20 percent of individuals in workers' households, a little over 20 percent in farm

workers' households, and more than 30 percent of farmers or pensioners and annuitants had incomes lower than 7,300 zloty per month. The average of farm families appeared only at high-income levels. In 1985, 10 percent of the farm population had incomes higher than 21,340 zloty, while the top 10 percent of worker households began at incomes of 17,890 zloty, farm workers at 17,530 zloty, and pensioners and annuitants at 14,270 zloty.

The low-income area, for which 8,000 zloty monthly was taken as the upper limit in 1985, included almost every third member in farm families (30.3 percent), and more than every third member (34.9 percent) in families of pensioners and annuitants. On the other hand, in worker or farm-worker families, every fifth person (corresponding to 18.5 and 21.2 percent of those studied) was in this level.

The greatest contrast in levels of affluence always characterized rural areas, and, in relation to 1980, they have widened even more. For the remaining household categories, the differentiation and distribution of income in 1985 was similar to that of 1980, which does not mean that in the course of 5 years there was any lack of reshuffling. This calls attention to the fact that, in worker households, differences in income were not really large, but were to the advantage of the better situated group, whose income rose faster. However, in pensioner and annuitant households it was the opposite, to the advantage of the more impoverished households.

In the study, an analysis of the makeup of the low-income level during the entire 5-year period is omitted, and this perhaps is its basic flaw. Only the status in 1985 is given, when in this stratum there were 7,536,000 individuals, that is, 22.6 percent of the population represented in the study of household budgets, in which 3,434,000 were members of worker families, 1,645,000 were members of pensioner and annuitant families, 1,331,000 individuals were from farm-worker families, and 1,126,000 were from farms. There is also a comparison with 1984, when the low-income level upper limit was 7,000 zloty and there were 675,000 individuals in that income stratum, that is, 8 percent more. In 1984-85 the greatest decrease was in the proportion of low-income individuals in farm-worker households (by 6.5 points), and then in farm or pensioner and annuitant households (about 2.5 points).

Better and Worse Market

Changes in nominal income were not completely covered by the flow of real income, for costs of living increased unevenly in several types of households, the most in farm (by a factor of 4.3) and farm-worker households (by a factor of 4.2) and the least in pensioner and annuitant households as well as in worker households (by a factor of 4). Also, the average annual rate of increase in cost of living in the 5-year period was highest for farm families (37.2 percent), and lowest for workers (35.6). In 1982 and 1984, the increase in the cost of

living was higher for low-income families, since in this period there was a significantly higher increase in food costs than in nonfood item costs, whereas in 1981, 1983, and 1985 it was the opposite.

The greatest decrease was in the value of real wages, which in most sectors of the economy was nearly 20 percent. The greatest fall occurred in transportation and communications, by almost 30 percent, and in the communal economy, by 25 percent, whereas the least, 8.2 percent, took place in finance and insurance. On the other hand, the real income of farmers or real pensioners and annuitants decreased by almost 15 percent.

The decrease in real income during the 5-year period for several household categories was not given, but it is possible to calculate it. Thus, in worker households it decreased by 13 percent, by 7 percent for farm workers, by 8 percent for farmers, and by 17 percent for pensioners and annuitants. In this last case, the fall in real income in the 5-year period was almost exactly the same as in the worst year of the crisis, 1982, when pensioner and annuitant households, thanks to various protective undertakings, relatively suffered the least loss. Since that time the protection was noticeably not very effective, since the 1981-85 balance appeared least favorable for these same households.

Real income is determined not only by the prices of goods, but also by their availability. In 1981-85, the population's discretionary fund grew by a factor of 3.9, and market supplies by 3.6. In 1980, market supplies constituted 92 percent of the population's discretionary fund; in 1981 it was 75.7 percent; in 1984, 90.5 percent; and in 1985, 85.9 percent.

Compared with 1980, the sale of goods in 1985 was 8.3 percent lower, based on constant prices. The sale of alcoholic beverages decreased the most, by 17 percent. Sale of food fell by 15.5 percent, but sale of nonfood items decreased only 0.4 percent. Included among the food articles, of which there were fewer supplies than in 1980, were grain-flour products (by over 20 percent, which, however, is sufficient for maintaining balance), cereals (by nearly half), meat (23 percent), animal fats (by 26 percent), and chocolate (by more than 60 percent). On the other hand, there were more candies (over 60 percent), cottage cheese (more than one-fourth), as well as yellow cheese and cheese spread (by 16 percent); and vegetable oils (almost 7 percent).

Among the nonfood articles, of which there were fewer supplies, were radio receivers (over 16 percent), black and white televisions (26 percent), tape recorders and dictaphones (almost half), kitchen utensils (30 percent), cloth coats (nearly 14 percent), and rubber and textile-rubber footwear (by almost half). There were significant increases in supplies of color televisions (74 percent), radio-tape recorders (45 percent), refrigerators and freezers and automatic washing machines (by over 40 percent), sewing machines (36 percent), stereophonic radio

receivers and ordinary washing machines and spin dryers (one-third), underwear (34 percent), cloth-top shoes 38 percent), woven fabric clothing (22 percent), hosiery products 18 percent), and laundry powders and granules (23 percent). Despite the increase in supply, the demand for many of these articles was not satisfied, however.

The sale of services decreased slightly in the 5-year period, by not quite 2 percent, but in several areas the decrease was strongly felt. For example, industrial services declined by 23.5 percent; construction by 13.8 percent; trade by 24.5 percent; agricultural by 22.3 percent; laundry by 13.6 percent; culture and art by 44.4 percent; and physical education, tourism, and recreation by 6.5 percent.

On the other hand, financial and insurance services increased (57.6 percent), as did supplies of piped [natural] gas (58 percent), electric energy (49 percent), transport (29 percent), housing (21 percent), communications (3.5 percent), city public transportation (7.6 percent), educational and upbringing (5 percent), health care and social welfare (15 percent), and lawyers' services 155 percent).

Changes in Consumption

Corresponding to changes in income and in the market are changes in consumption, which during the 5-year period decreased in all types of households except on farms, where it increased 4.8 percent, including a 3.2 percent increase for food and a 5.5 percent increase in nonfood articles and services. So the gains in rural areas were thus confirmed.

In worker households, consumption fell 10.5 percent; in farm-worker households, 8.1 percent; and for pensioners and annuitants, 11.3 percent. The consumption of food generally increased, from a 3.2 percent increase on farms to a 4.1 percent increase in worker households, with the exception of pensioners and annuitants, where it fell 7.8 percent. On the other hand, consumption of nonfood articles and services fell by 11.3 (to 14.8 percent), this time with the exception of farm households.

In this 5-year period expenses for food constituted the largest share of the budget in pensioner and annuitant households (from 47.4 to 57.1 percent) and the least in worker households (from 38.9 to 48.4 percent). Compared with 1980, the proportion of food expenses in 1985 to overall expenses remained higher, whereas in all types of households they were lower for nonfood items, and so there were no favorable changes in them.

The macroeconomic data show that the consumption of meat and meat products decreased nearly 19 percent during the 5-year period; of fruit and fruit products, 23 percent; rice, 40 percent; grain and potato products, 9 percent; fish, 4 percent; fats, 5 percent, including a 12-percent decrease in animal fats; and oil, 4.5 percent.

On the other hand, the consumption of vegetables increased 4 percent; milk and milk products, about 4 percent; and vegetable oils, 1.3 percent.

In terms of energy equivalents, the consumption of food in 1985 was more than 6 percent lower than in 1980, and more than 7 percent less protein was consumed. This included nearly 7 percent less fat and 6 percent less carbohydrates.

In several types of households the indicators of a fall or rise in consumption of foodstuffs were differentiated. For example, consumption of meat and meat products in pensioner and annuitant households fell 20 percent, and in worker households 16 percent, but on farms and in farm-worker households it grew 9.4 and 6.4 percent, respectively. Also, the consumption of fruit and fruit products in rural households was significantly larger than in 1980, by 15 percent in farm-worker households and 32 percent on farms, although the overall consumption fell.

As a result, the energy and nutrient value of the average daily diet on farms and in farm-worker households in 1985 was nearly the same as in 1980, whereas it fell in the remaining households. Rural families were nourished better than urban families in many respects. (In 1985, meat consumption on farms was more than 25 percent higher than in worker households).

Farm and farm-worker households also improved their stocks of durable goods. This is especially true concerning color televisions and automatic washing machines, the number of which (per 100 households) tripled in comparison with 1980, and even increased by more than a factor of 4 in the case of automatic washers in farm-worker households. The number of cars in these households also increased by nearly a factor of 2. However, rural households are still significantly less well stocked with high-quality goods compared with worker households, and also somewhat worse than pensioner and annuitant households. In 1985 in farm households there were 7 color televisions and 11 automatic washers per 100 households; 7 and 13, respectively, for farm workers; 23 and 39 for workers; but 8 and 14 for pensioners. The difference was smaller for cars, with 27 per 100 worker households, 22 for farm workers, and 22 for farmers, but here pensioners and annuitants fall behind with 7 cars per 100 households.

The housing waiting list is even longer than that for several market wares. In 1981-85 in Poland 5.1 to 5.5 apartments per 100 individuals were made available for occupancy. This puts our country in one of the last places in Europe with respect to effectiveness of housing construction, as stated in the GUS publication.

Housing Conditions

In this regard also, during this 5-year period rural areas were in a more advantageous situation than cities, for while the number of apartments made available for use in cities fell 18 percent, the number in rural areas grew by 9 percent. The number of rooms per apartment increased both in rural and urban areas, but in cities this went from 3.12 to 3.18, and from 3.32 to 3.40 in rural areas. The average apartment size increased from 50 to 51.2 square meters in cities and from 62.1 to 63.8 square meters in rural areas.

The improvement in equipping dwellings with plumbing in rural areas was also relatively large, nevertheless, rural areas still are not as well equipped. The most recent data from the last microcensus (1984) are cited in the study, and these show that almost 7.6 million individuals, of which 6.2 million are rural, did not have water in their homes; 12.4 million, of which 8.9 million are rural, had no toilets; and 12.5 million, of which 8.1 million are rural, had no washrooms.

But, at the same time, about 79 percent of the urban population and almost 38 percent of the rural population had all basic plumbing in their homes.

Data from family budgets show that in 1985 more than 98 percent of households connected with agriculture owned their own homes, while, among workers, only every fifth one was in such a situation, and among pensioners, more than one in three. However, it is worth noting that if in farm and farm-worker households there were almost no changes in this regard during the 5-year period, then among pensioners the percentage of dwelling owners increased markedly (by over 10 points), and it also grew among workers, although to a lesser degree (over 3 points). The share of households renting homes fell proportionately, markedly in the case of pensioners and annuitants, and slightly among worker families, although this share is still high. Almost as many worker families live in their "own" cooperative apartments as rent (38 percent). But pensioners and annuitants most often rent apartments (about 40 percent), and only every fifth household unit owns a cooperative apartment.

However, the biggest change seen in regard to housing conditions is the increase by a dozen or so to 20 points in the percentage of farm and farm-worker households that have sink-baths or other plumbing. Admittedly in this regard these households have not yet caught up with worker families or pensioners and annuitants (the difference reaches 30 to 40 points, only between farm-worker and pensioner households the distance is half as much), but they took part in significant housing progress, which cannot be said of the remaining households or overall.

It is estimated that there are 113 households per 100 dwellings. As before, significantly fewer apartments are built in comparison with the number of married couples included, so the index could become worse in that the difference decreased from 136,000 apartments in 1981 to 77,200 in 1985. Of course, this is no thanks to the

construction industry. The only plus is the fact that the average annual rate of growth in housing resources (1.72 percent) outstripped the population's growth rate (0.86 percent).

At the end of 1985 nearly 2.1 million members and candidates (having come of age) were waiting for cooperative apartments, whereas nearly 162,000 were trying to get into state-allocated housing, and 388,000 were waiting for workplace-supplied housing.

Something for the Spirit

There were no fundamental changes noted in the area of education and upbringing.

The disproportion between urban and rural areas was maintained, rural areas having the advantage with respect to the number of students per teacher or per classroom. In 1985, 1.4 million children benefitted from nursery school, which is 11.7 percent more than in 1980. Half of these children were 3 to 6 years old (58.7 percent of the urban and 38.1 percent of the rural). There were 119 children for every 100 places (124 in 1980). However, the statistics for the 6-year period are inflated by those attending the so-called zero-level. Only one in three of the youngest children went to nursery school, and in 1985 only a little less than 2 percent more than in 1980.

There was certain progress in publishing house production, but the number of titles issued, including those published for the first time, was consistently about 20 percent lower than in 1980. During this time the production of scientific literature and textbooks declined. On the other hand, editions of popular literature and belles-lettres increased by a factor of 2. The sale of newspapers decreased by 12 copies per inhabitant, and by more for periodicals. In 1985 it was possible to buy a magazine every 15 days, while in 1980 it was every 16 days.

The number of libraries and branch libraries increased, but the number of so-called library stations decreased, which leads to the suspicion that in practice things have not changed much. Circulation was an outward appearance. Interest in reading declined, because of thematic "staleness" of the collections and their physical deterioration. Museums and museum exhibits became more numerous, which perhaps did not provoke any special notice, for the number of visitors was almost the same as in 1980, and there were fewer exclusive school trips.

Theaters and musical institutions gave more performances and concerts, but also there were fewer spectators than in 1980. Concert hall activity survived the serious crisis. Films and movie showings also declined, but the number of moviegoers grew (by 10 percent).

Only radio and television developed without disturbances, both with regard to range of activities and also program length (quality is a subjective matter). The

number of radio subscribers in 1985 exceeded 10 million, and the number of television subscribers reached 9.5 million. Regression was also noted in tourism, both as regards the base (in the 5-year period lodging places decreased by 11.7 percent) and those willing to utilize it (19.2 percent fewer than in 1980). The vacation base also shrank, causing a gap that was filled by workplaces, which increased the number of their own resort places. Only in the number of vacationers was there no increase. Besides this, classified tourism organized by PTTK [Polish Tourist and Local Studies Society] enjoyed less interest than previously.

There were only half the number of tourist trips abroad than in 1980 (and only slightly more than in 1970-71). This affected mainly socialist countries, to which 2.7 million individuals went in 1985, or 56.7 percent fewer than in 1980. In contrast, 826,000 persons went to capitalist countries, which is 18.8 percent more.

Mortality Rate Increase

The skimpy data on health care and social welfare show that slight progress was made in this area. The number of physicians and obstetricians and—to the smallest degree—nurses increased a little, both in absolute numbers and per 10,000 population. However, this last index did not improve with respect to dentists and pharmacists. The number of beds increased a little, by 0.4 percent when calculated per 10,000 persons, but only in general hospitals.

In psychiatric hospitals they declined by 11.1 percent. The number of clinics and health centers also increased slightly, but, at the same time, 12 industrial and 41 cooperative clinics were closed (so perhaps again activity was an outward appearance). The number of pharmacists (generally accessible) increased 6.2 percent, and the number of places in social assistance houses grew 6.3 percent, with a simultaneous 17-percent decrease in the number of persons waiting for a place.

Mortality increased. In 1980 the death rate was 9.9 percent, and in 1985 it was 10.3 percent. (In 1981-83 the number of deaths decreased compared with 1980, and later increased significantly.) Death rates in all age groups are greater for men than for women, but the death rate for men, except among the age group 50-64, is decreasing and at a faster rate than for women, for whom the death rate even increased slightly. Three-fourths of the total number of deaths in 1985 were caused in turn by circulatory system diseases and tumors, as well as by accidents and poisoning.

The picture of the population's standard of living in the 5-year period is undoubtedly pessimistic. After all, it would be difficult to expect anything else under crisis conditions. However, one thing is thought provoking and hits home: the real lack of priorities. As a result, in the changes occurring it would be difficult to find some direction or stable trend. That that improved one year

often worsened in the next, and the balance came out to zero or near zero. This is also a method for surviving difficult years; however, it turns out that, in view of social considerations, it would be more advantageous to ensure marked progress in certain areas (which ones is a question of choice and agreement), even sacrificing the rest.

It is also evident that consumption clearly lost ground to other needs of the economy; yet the worst is that it is not known (and, moreover, still is not known now) which ones we really would like to have. We are comparing everything with 1980, for there are no other points of reference, but is it really necessary to aim at replicating and exceeding the consumption of 5 years before in every area?

These doubts do not allow for an unequivocally positive evaluation of the material progress of rural areas, or also rather, taking note of the enormous contrasts, of some rural inhabitants, and a rather small percentage of them at that. The consequences of this progress, however, on the quality and modernity of consumption are vital. If this consumption will be wasteful, irrational, and largely for show and one may suspect that it is developing in this direction, then the triumph of rural areas—if their gains are maintained—will be largely Pyrrhic.

13324/12223

YUGOSLAVIA

Deterrents to Croatian Investment in Kosovo Viewed

28000248 Zagreb VJESNIK (SEDIAM DANA supplement) in Serbo-Croatian 25 Jul 87 p 5

[Article by Ivo Jakovljevic]

[Text] The most recent status report on investments of the economy of SR Croatia in SAP Kosovo which we have received from the republic Economic Chamber, where all information on the policy of regional development is gathered and new activities between Croatia and Kosovo are coordinated, shows that 36 new development projects are now being financed, and 100 work organizations from Croatia are involved in new and old projects. But what is really new about these new projects, and are there two sides to the coin?

Ever since the 1981 social plan for the country's development and the enactments and social compacts updated at that time made it possible for economic organizations from the advanced republics to invest half of the resources for the underdeveloped directly into joint projects instead of merely paying everything into an account of the Fund for Faster Development of the Underdeveloped, there has been a great deal of change in

the relationship between the advanced and the underdeveloped, but certain disputed matters concerning more harmonious regional development in Yugoslavia have also become topical in the new light. What is actually involved?

First let the numbers speak for themselves. From the beginning of that key year 1981 up to mid-1987 business organizations from Croatia signed 52 self-management accords and annexes on pooling labor and capital with partners in Kosovo. By means of those documents collectives from Croatia invested 27 billion dinars directly in Kosovo, thus providing jobs for 9,200 more people. But the 50-percent limit on resources for joint ventures has not been reached; had it been entirely used, Croatia would have had to invest 62 billion through the mandatory loan for more rapid development of underdeveloped Kosovo and the same amount again through joint investment with organizations of associated labor in that province. So, of the available 50 percent of total resources for Croatia, only 22 percent have been committed through joint projects, and all the rest in the form of the mandatory loan. What are the reasons for such limited interest on the part of business organizations from this more advanced republic to invest directly in the Kosovo economy?

If Economic Interest Were Paramount...

We learned from Stjepan Vrabec, coordinator of this entire effort in the Economic Chamber of Croatia, that even those funds pooled in joint projects in the Kosovo economy cover only 35 percent of their total value, and the larger remainder of 65 percent of their cost is being financed on the basis of credit. Among the economic motives for investing in Kosovo we might single out the transfer of technology, equipment, and organization of work, along with the fact that it is easier to make an investment in Kosovo than in more highly developed Croatia, and then there is the less expensive manpower, market expansion, ensured supply of raw materials, and so on. But along with this there is the obvious political interest in influencing the efficiency of economic activity in the Kosovo economy through joint ventures between the advanced and underdeveloped. All of this would be easier, as shown by past experience. Vrabec says, if joint economic interest were paramount and there were a less decisive influence of administrative bodies in the province. Mutual interests would be pursued more easily if the Kosovo economy had clear development plans and if several opštinas or work organizations in Kosovo were not at odds over the location of a program, and then mediation of sociopolitical bodies in the province is requested. One thing that makes investments in underdeveloped regions, Kosovo particularly, less attractive is the illiquidity of the banks there, and payment priorities often put pressure on joint projects, since there are always obligations that are more important at the moment and payments that have come due for certain investment projects in the past.

In all of this emphasis is still being put on what is referred to as the fund-oriented approach to financing the more rapid development of the underdeveloped, more precisely, to the social welfare aspect of investments instead of the market aspect and the business aspect. But if that same market principle is functioning poorly even in the more advanced communities, it is really an illusion to expect that it will operate perfectly in Kosovo.

We were told by Dr Aleksandar Bogunovic, vice president of the Economic Chamber and a scientist who has been concerned with the problems of regional development in Yugoslavia for a long time now, that our country has established more favorable regulations concerning joint ventures with foreigners than is the case with the enactments regulating the domestic pooling of labor and capital. In practice there are cases when those from the more advanced communities who are investing in joint projects in the less developed regions of the country are only investing capital, and after the investment is made they lose all control over it. That is why for Bogunovic it is an open question whether the power of any sociopolitical community in Yugoslavia must be stronger than the mutual interest of investors in some project? For example, we provide technical assistance to Libya, but it is difficult to do this with all the elaborate jurisdictions in Kosovo or anywhere else in the less developed regions in Yugoslavia. This follows from the fact that in our country everyone, both the advanced and the underdeveloped, have a great deal of knowledge, but all they lack is the resources; it is important, then, just to collect the resources from somewhere by some mechanism, and the matter will be settled. But economic developments, the profitability of projects, and business efficiency in the less advanced regions of the country, and particularly under these joint programs, largely refutes this hypothesis.

No One Knows the Figures on Profitability

It is thus an almost comical fact that in practice no one knows or publishes figures on the profitability of joint ventures in the less advanced regions of the country. For example, we offer to foreigners the possibility of direct investment in Yugoslavia, but it is difficult for business

organizations from the advanced areas to obtain that opportunity in the underdeveloped regions. That is why there are cases when many business organizations from Croatia prefer to pay the mandatory loan for the fund as a kind of tax than to subject their people to what they believe is mistreatment in carrying out the various projects.

Later Bogunovic said: "Economic policy in Yugoslavia must reveal the real dimension of the problems with more rapid development of the underdeveloped regions, introduce market conditions of business activity throughout the country and a number of necessary market institutions if government intervention for more rapid development of the underdeveloped is to be possible in this context, and without it there can hardly be any harmonious regional development of the country. And in Kosovo it is borne out, probably in the most drastic fashion, that for development of the underdeveloped in Yugoslavia it is not enough just to get some money from somewhere, but it is important above all to think about the optimality of investment projects, about their market value and future, and then to realize that questions of efficiency, productivity, and business profitability are just as important there as they are in the advanced communities, if not more so, so that every dinar that travels from the advanced to the underdeveloped brings a return that is in the mutual interest."

Incidentally, those from Croatia which so far have made the largest direct investments in Kosovo are "Djuro Djakovic," "Koka" of Varazdin, "Podravka" of Koprivnica, "Borovo" of Borovo, "Gavrilovic" of Petrinja, "Gradina" of Pula, "Metalmont" of Zagreb, INA, "Vutex" of Vukovar, "Pazinka" of Pazin, "Pobjeda" and "Unitas" of Zagreb, and certain others. Among those hundreds of work organizations which have found that they have an interest in Kosovo, most of them are in electric machinebuilding, the agroindustrial complex, the textile and shoe industries, and small business. But it is obvious that in the context of the stabilization policy regional development throughout the country must also be put on a sounder economic footing. Only in that case is it possible to achieve the goals of social welfare policy, which in this time of crisis would seem to be an unenvied priority.

POLAND

Depictions of Stalin in Literature Noted
Znakiem Wariat, Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No. 36,
5 Sep 87 p 11

[Article by Ryszard Marek Gronski: "The Face"]

[Text] A major element of the changes occurring in the USSR is calling a spade a spade, abandonment of euphemisms, and linguistic masquerades. The name of that era—Stalinism—is again mentioned in the press. Previously, the time-honored "personality cult" had served as a surrogate for that term—cult meaning merely idolatry and image worship. An even milder version was "the period of mistakes and deformations." Skeptics immediately had paraphrased this locution as "the period of special considerations and exculpations."

Together with Stalinism, Stalin has also emerged from nonexistence and is again attracting the interest of historians, writers, journalists, and ordinary people, who try to find the key to his mentality, to understand how a little-known activist climbed to the peak of power and exercised it in a manner worthy of an attentive reader of "The Prince," although it is known that Stalin lost no time on reading Machiavelli, since he was self-taught also in the art of rulership. In the currently popular play by Mikhail Shatov, "The Peace of Brest," Stalin is portrayed as being still obedient and subservient to Lenin's authority and barely commencing the game that in the future will have eliminated all major figures from the stage.

In the letters and notes of Bulgakov that have only now been published in their entirety, Stalin's shadow lies on pages written against a background of mental torment. As related by the writer's wife, the telephone rang—a call from the Kremlin, with the voice having a strong Georgian accent, in order to surprise Bulgakov the playwright with a coup de theatre that he could not have foreseen or imagined while writing at his desk.

It appears that Polish readers, too, are about to encounter the hero of hundreds of poems and songs from years past. Not infrequently, the authors will be those who had at the time been ideologically overpowered and who now are turning from flatterers and panegyrists into in-depth explorers of truth and unmaskers of crimes. The subject is certainly attractive to them, after all, it is of interest to the entire world—and how many such subjects does the indigenous writer have up his sleeve, considering that descriptions of the martial law and internment have ceased to be of interest to anyone?

In addition, Polish literature, theatre, and cinema are losing their export potential at present, at foreign festivals, the Russians themselves are going to show adaptations of Dostoevsky's writings and works analyzing conflicts and dark sides of life in the socialist societies. There is a plethora of new talent, with manuscripts piled

on shelves and in drawers [an allusion to so-called drawer literature or *samudaf*???], as is nowadays known to impression and publishers. Gubarev's play about the Chernobyl disaster, "The Sarcophagus," is a runaway success in London and is being shown to full houses by the Royal Shakespeare Company.

Despite the existence of a Polish-language translation of "The Sarcophagus" (published in DIALOG, No. 4), Polish theater was not among the first to present this play, because in this country there is a great reluctance to stage topical plays that can elicit a lively response. Why pursue the latest innovations when it is always possible to dig out some French comedy or adapt to the stage a novel by Gombrowicz, since these guarantee the level [of culture] and pious boredom?

That torpidity characterizing our intellectual life is surely also the reason we are still waiting to portray Stalin as he really was. The initiative in this respect has been modest. As for "Slowo o Stalim" [a panegyric to Stalin], it would be better not to mention it. As for circumstantial strophes, it would be healthier to forget them. The best poem following the death of the Helmsman and Standard-Bearer was written by a shaken poetess who grieves nowadays because artists are treading barren—despite the rain of awards—soil. It is a fact that in that time the soil had still been fertilized, as explained by her sincere despair.

The doorbell, the sharp bell, is ringing in ears. Who's at the threshold? What's the news, and why so early? I don't want to know. Perhaps I am still asleep. I shall not come and open the door.

The only test worthy of being published (this time officially [rather than by the underground press]) is the excellent excerpt from Andrzejewski's "Muzyka" [Pulp] dealing with the—of course, telephone—conversation between Stalin and Boris Pasternak. This excerpt, which is a story on its own, is missing from the editions of that book. Perhaps it will be included in the works of that writer being prepared for publication by Czytelnik Press.

Let me revert to the issue of the return of Stalin as a topic, as a problem that has to be coped with; contrary to appearances, this is not merely a question of history. For it is only now that Stalin is really dying, now that each new day is dissolving the indurations and encrustations of the new reality he had created. It is only now that the Stalinism rooted in the mentality and habits of the exercise of uncontrolled power is becoming a museum exhibit. It is only now that the FACE that had accompanied me everywhere in my youth, whether on first pages of newspapers and covers of books or on motion picture screens and factory walls, is receding into the gallery of the portraits of official personages.

When did I see that face for the first time? The film of memory reels back toward the year 1944, the route of passage of the frontline. Groups of people returning to a

little town. In the center of the road drove army trucks as well as carts with ladderlike sides. Wounded soldiers lay on straw, blood seeping through their bandages. Above the carts, flies circled in a blue cloud. Along the roadside stood rows of hastily erected little mounds of earth topped with red stars cut out of tin cans. We passed many such tombs.

We were halted in front of a bridge whence the silhouettes of the parish church and steep house roofs could already be seen.

"Why are they not letting us pass?" my mother was agitated. My father, who knew Russian, tried to talk with the soldiers, but they were silently watching the bridge; just then a large rectangle of roughly glued cardboard was being fastened to the railing. Even and rhythmic hammering resounded. When they finished, the two soldiers leaped from the railing onto the bridge. An officer in a round hat with a violet band approached them. He tugged at the cloth covering the rectangle. The cloth fell into the dark river gorge. The soldiers signaled that we could proceed.

Painted on the cardboard was a man wearing a uniform. While crossing the bridge, the refugees looked up. Their gaze was attracted by the huge face. A black moustache shone as if lacquered against a white-yellow background.

"Stalin," my father said.

And so, crossing a bridge suspended over the river gorge, I entered a world where everything had a meaning: the stealthy steps of Timurites wanting to split wood for an old woman, a pipe sent in honor of a 70th birthday by a French peasant, Michurin planting apple trees, and that faith that is given to us only in our youth.

1386

YUGOSLAVIA

Attitudes to Social Distinctions Explored
Zivotna Belgrade NEDELJNE INFORMACIJE,
NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian 9 Aug 87 pp 14-16

[Article by Milan Milosevic: "The Key to Power"]

[Text] "Economic, political, and other social inequalities have become not only too great, but also dysfunctional." Dr Mihajlo Popovic concluded in his final commentary on the survey, "Social Inequities," which has recently been published. "It is not possible to go on without limit conducting a policy of 'solidarity' with losing enterprises, with those who are incompetent, and with those who do not work and at the same time apply the principle of remuneration according to work. It is not possible to develop a system of socialist democracy and at the same

time augment political inequalities between the 'ordinary citizens' and those who hold political and government positions, even though it be in the refurbished form of the delegate system."

A research team at the Institute for Sociological Research of the School of Philosophy at Belgrade University consisting of Mihajlo Popovic, Manja Bogdanovic, Sreten Vujovic, Borislav Dzurovecovic, Jelica Petrovic, Milena Davidovic, Danilo Mrkic, Vladimir Gosti, and Milorad Kirmeta studied social inequalities in the fields of housing, the material standard of living, education, employment, opportunity for mobility from one generation to another, sociopolitical activity, and the influence of various social strata in Belgrade.

The Standard of Living

In response to the question of how they make out when they have no money, most of them said that they suffer through it (27.8 percent)—which is most frequently the case with the management stratum and private operators, and this is followed by borrowing from friends (25 percent of the responses), which is most common among workers; parents are turned to in 18.5 percent of the cases, and here the stratum of specialists is the leader (31.9 percent), then comes doing some job (14 percent), which is most common among workers, and turning to relatives (private operators).

The most difficult thing would be to give up food (71.2 percent) and the easiest thing clothing (27.5 percent, and here the managers are in the lead), followed by drinks and cigarettes (28.8 percent, here the workers lead), giving up the car (17.8 percent, which is most common among government and political leaders). Differences in diet are visible, not so much in the number of meals as with respect to the quality of the diet: the supervisory strata stands out from the others in that it regularly consumes meat (70.8 percent of the cases), not far behind is the stratum of specialists and white-collar workers (55.8 percent), while, in the case of the working class, meat is regularly on the table in only 27.7 percent of the cases, and in 54 percent of the cases it is occasionally on the table.

Manja Bogdanovic is analyzing these figures, which indicate that the various strata have been hurt differently by the crisis: 87.8 percent of the leadership and supervisory personnel declared that their income is enough to live on, and only 9.8 percent have additional income.

The answers of managers in the economy and of specialists (noneconomic and economic) vary between 50 and 60 percent of those who say that their income is sufficient. 20 percent of the specialists outside the economy say that they have additional income, and 36.8 percent of the specialists in the economy say that their standard of living is threatened.

Going down on the hierarchical ladder from the office worker to the last rung, the worker, the percentage of those whose income is sufficient decreases (from 34.2 percent of the office personnel to 12.5 percent of the semiskilled workers), and there is an increase in the percentage of those who are more and more threatened (from 44.2 percent of the office personnel to 54.8 percent of the unskilled and semiskilled workers). More and more of them obtain additional sources of income as we go down: from 21.7 percent of the office personnel to 32.7 percent of the unskilled and semiskilled workers.

The private operators are closest to the managers in the economy: 71.42 percent of those in cities and two-thirds of the private farmers have enough to live on. Even among those, some are threatened (19 percent of the private operators in the city and 23 percent of the private farmers), and there are those who seek additional sources of income (9.2 percent of the private operators in the city and 11 percent of the private farmers).

According to these figures, office personnel are closest to the highly skilled workers, while the skilled, unskilled, and semiskilled workers are close to one another and are faring worst. Half of the working class feels threatened more and more, almost one-third seeks additional income, and only 16 percent have enough, by contrast with three-fourths of the managers, half of the specialists, and two-thirds of the private operators. The opinions of the respondents coincide with the analysis of data on the level of income.

Three-fourths of the respondents have nothing set aside for emergencies, and only 23 percent of them manage to save.

Salaries

As has been established in quite a number of surveys, differences in personal income are relatively small within the same work organization and show a leveling trend. The spread of personal income from one skill category to another within work collectives is shrinking. In that respect, the researchers conclude, Yugoslavia is one of the countries with the smallest differences in income. In about 60 percent of the enterprises the difference between the highest and lowest personal income is 1:2.9. It is more important, then, where someone works than what he does. However, 51 percent of the respondents in Belgrade feel that the differences in salaries are larger than they ought to be. It follows that half of the people in Belgrade are more inclined toward leveling than is now being practiced.

The way people interpret the differences that exist is important to a system's stability and efficiency; what causes do they use to explain them, and do they accept them or reject them? Most of the respondents (35.4 percent) think that the principal causes of material inequalities are differences in personal incomes and in

the economic conditions from one branch of the economy to another. The Belgrade respondents put speculation on the fringes of the law in second place (20.9 percent of the answers), and immediately after that come theft, bribes, corruption, and other unlawful acts (17.4 percent of the responses). Far below that the respondents put overtime work (8.1 percent), employment abroad (7.4 percent), work after hours in one's own enterprise (6.8 percent), and interest (1.9 percent). The workers convincingly gave the largest number of responses stating that theft, bribes, corruption, and the like were the principal causes of inequality. It is important to mention that at the time of the survey 61.8 percent of people in Belgrade were receiving a personal income that was below the average. The question of whether theft, bribes, and corruption are all that widespread or whether every other form of redistribution of income is perceived in that manner in the minds of the respondents remains a topic for another type of inquiry, the researchers say with restraint. But one might conclude that the crisis is turning the egalitarian outlook, which for a long time has been nurtured by the ideology, into deep satisfaction and a desire for a radical "setting things to rights."

Housing

Many inequalities are the result of the policy conducted over many years. To a considerably greater number the workers and urban and rural private operators live in their own houses and apartments; the workers live most frequently (45 percent) in family dwellings that are mostly concentrated on the outskirts. According to research done by Vesna Petic, living in a family dwelling is a desire of the middle class, but worker houses often do not meet that standard in their equipment, quality of construction, and location. The number of people subletting is highest among workers, while managers and specialists mainly live in socially owned housing. The specialists are mostly concentrated in collective buildings (85 percent of the tenants). This old datum has been backed up in this survey with data to the effect that in 1981 the average monthly rent per member of the household represented 3.8 percent of the family budget, while 4.3 percent of the family budget was spent for beverages and tobacco. In any case, the introduction of rents at the economic level has been postponed with the excuse that the standard of living must be protected. It is clear that it is the standard of living of the higher strata that is being protected.

Sreten Vujovic warns that social segregation of the urban tissue of Belgrade is continuing. The higher and middle strata are concentrated in the central opstinas, and the lower strata are living in the peripheral and suburban opstinas. Office workers with elementary schooling (25 percent) and then skilled and highly skilled workers (21.7 percent) are the largest groups among those who get up early, before 0500 hours.

The ruling groups possess real power to choose where they want to live, Vujovic says. In Belgrade, for example, there are three self-managed communities of interest for

housing: the Belgrade Housing Community, the Community of Interest for Housing Construction and Management of Housing To Meet the Needs of Workers and Officeholders of Federal Bodies and Agencies, and the Community of Interest for Housing Construction and Management of Housing To Meet the Needs of Military Personnel and Civilian Employees of the YPA. These three communities drew up the following agreement for the period 1976-1980 on distribution of sites: the community of interest of the YPA and federal bodies and agencies did not plan a single apartment for their personnel in the most remote and least desirable locations (Resnik, along the road to Obrenovac, and along the road to Batanjica). The YPA community has preferred and obtained sites in New Belgrade, which, Vujovic says, is well known for its concentration of the middle class, while the community of federal bodies and agencies has obtained the most attractive locations on Dedinje, Senjak, and in Vracar. For an immense number of respondents in Belgrade (80 percent) the most prestigious occupations are the following: army general, director of a large work organization, opstina president, lawyer, judge, physician, university professor, and scientist in the natural and social sciences, and then (for about 75 to 72 percent) engineer, artist, legal specialist, and economist. After this grouping, according to Borislav Dzurovic, come the production and service occupations: for 32 percent this is the private hosteler, for 23 percent the private craftsman, and for less than one-fifth a person with an office job, a mechanic, a technician with secondary training, an electrician, a construction worker, and, finally, a private farmer.

The Ranking of Occupations

Private farmers and workers attribute the greatest prestige to political leaders. It is indicative that no one esteems the occupation of private farmer except 11 percent of the workers.

Aspirations to move up in society are very strong, especially in the private operators: 58 percent of those born in rural areas have left for the city, 36 percent become workers, the group of private operators in the city has been abandoned by all of 83.3 percent of the children, and 53 percent join the worker group.

Two-thirds of sons of workers remain in the group of their origin; most go a step higher, and about 11 percent reach the upper strata of specialists.

The children of office personnel choose in equal numbers the occupation of their parents (32 percent), drop down to the lower worker stratum (32 percent), and climb up among the specialists.

In 50 percent of the cases children of specialists become specialists themselves, but in 26 percent of the cases they become office personnel. The sociologists conclude that

there is no self-renewal in the management stratum. Incidentally, two-thirds of the present managers come from the private sector (55.8 percent the children of peasants).

The strangest conclusion of this survey is that unemployment, although it is one of the decisive factors in the creation and deepening of social inequalities, has taken on the forms of allowed and accepted social inequality. The family accepts and bears the risk of those who are unemployed (largely educated members of the family). As we have seen, it also comes to the aid of young persons who are employed (it is a minor paradox that it is precisely the specialists who are in crisis that turn most to their parents). Two-thirds of the respondents were altogether unable to estimate how long their children would have to wait to get a job. Arrival at that estimate is not influenced either by social class or by the level of education or the level of political power that they possess. Milen Davidovic concludes in describing this strange resignation to the state of the facts and an uncertainty that neither money nor power can correct.

Power

On that subject, 87.4 percent of the respondents have little political power, 9.3 percent moderate power, and 3.2 percent a great deal of power. In the last group, people with responsible positions in the government and political leaders predominate (39.6 percent); in the group with moderate power the same segments also predominate (37.2 percent). Among them one-fourth are managers in the economy. Then there are specialists outside the economy (17.2 percent) and specialists in the economy. An analysis shows that government and political leaders have real power, that it is then distributed to some extent among the specialists, and that the working class and stratum of private operators actually do not have decisionmaking power.

It follows from the results of this survey, Vladimir Goati concludes, that party members are in the upper strata of the social pyramid and that they possess a higher social status than those who are not members of the party. At the same time, the more political power the members of the various strata possess, the more inclined they are to judge political inequalities to be small, nonexistent, or at least just as great as they ought to be, and the less political power they have, the more intensively the existing political inequalities are judged to be excessively great.

Political power constitutes a key dimension and the central axis of the individual's social status. A social hierarchy that as a rule is a copy of the political hierarchy has occurred as an inevitable consequence of this, Goati concludes.

One explanation Vladimir Goati gives for the political marginalization of the stratum of private operators is the fact that private operators are much less covered by the delegate system than those who are employed in the socialized sector, and they have fewer chances to protect their interests.

Measured in terms of the quantity of material and nonmaterial goods, the sample is distributed in such a way that the upper social position is occupied by 15.6 percent of the respondents, a middle position by 70.2 percent, and a quite low position by 14.2 percent. This division sets apart quite sharply the nonmanual strata of managers and specialists from the other social strata. People with responsibility in the government and political life convincingly have the highest social position, and they are followed at a decent distance by specialists outside the economy. They are followed, though not by much, by specialists in the economy, and the latter by managers in the economy, whose "average" is being reduced by the fact that there are a large number of lower-level supervisors.

Status

The grouping of unskilled and skilled workers and private farmers is divided according to whether they belong to the middle or lower stratum; 72 percent of the workers and 59 percent of the private farmers belong to the middle stratum.

A survey by Ivan Svetlik in Slovenia shows that in terms of the quality of life the position of private farmers is the lowest. The author of this analysis found that differences between those employed and those who are self-employed are greater than between those who are employed and those who are unemployed. This is interpreted in terms of the sociopolitical status of the various types of work.

"There is good reason to conclude that social-class inequalities have grown since 1980, when the very serious economic and social crisis began, a crisis that has not been overcome even today.... It is certain that the drastic drop in the standard of living has not affected all strata equally. Those with the lowest earnings have "suffered" the most, while the strata with high earnings have been adapting more easily to the galloping inflation." This conclusion by Dr Mihajlo Popovic clearly summarizes the sociological analysis of social inequalities, which in our context are becoming dysfunctional.

7045

Attitudes Toward Work Surveyed in Croatia 28000262 Belgrade NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian 9 Aug 87 pp 17-18

[Article by Ljuba Stojic: "Satisfaction 'By Necessity'"]

[Text] The connection between job satisfaction and productivity has never been reliably established by scientific research, but that has not made it any less

popular. At a time when the social crisis is deepening the problems of work motivation become more severe and are a political topic of the day. When the level of personal incomes is limited, material incentives are weakened, and in some places the need arises to resort to certain forgotten incentives such as badges for shock-workers and other "moral recognition."

Although its influence on labor productivity has not been clearly established, job satisfaction remains an important indicator of an individual's adaptability to the place he has in the division of labor. It is understandable, then, that the question of job satisfaction should be part of an extensive survey of the social structure of SR Croatia which specialists of the Social Research Institute in Zagreb conducted during 1984 and 1985 with about 4,500 respondents from all social strata. The results still have not been definitively processed, but certain portions have already been presented to the professional public.

At a recent meeting of the Sociology Society of Croatia in Zagreb there were several reports on partial results of this survey into the social structure, and among them Branko Kristofic presented the portion concerning job satisfaction.

It Is Not Easy To Admit

"The question was put differently than is usually done," sociologist Branko Kristofic explains in an interview with NIN. "Usually some scales are set up with between three and five levels to measure intensity of satisfaction and dissatisfaction. Here we requested only commitment—are you satisfied or are you not satisfied?"

"When the question is put with scales, then usually the middle levels are the most numerous," Kristofic adds. "That is not possible here, but the individual must commit himself, and most said they were satisfied." (See the table below.)

Social Groups and Job Satisfaction

Taking into account all the characteristics of your job, are you satisfied or dissatisfied?	Satisfied	Satisfied and Dissatisfied	Dissatisfied
Politicians	70%	10%	20%
Managers in the economy	71%	5%	24%
"System" specialists	73%	5%	22%
"Necessary" specialists	78%	5%	17%
Skilled and highly skilled personnel	68%	4%	28%
Office personnel	72%	3%	25%
Unskilled and semiskilled workers	68%	5%	27%

In view of the times we live in it would be normal to expect that a majority would choose dissatisfaction with their job. How, then, is one to interpret this result?

"It is rather difficult to admit that you are not satisfied with your job as a whole," Kristofic says, "if that job has any importance to you. Then certain things in your life break down."

A better understanding of the importance which people give to satisfaction or dissatisfaction with their jobs can to some extent be obtained from their answers to the question "Why?"

In the "nonworker" strata the reasons given most frequently have to do with the intrinsic values which the job has for the person, such as creativity, initiative, independence or opportunity for promotion. Those responses were most frequent among enterprise managers (22 percent) and least frequent among specialists doing necessary work (14 percent)—although even this is greater than in the worker strata.

Among the reasons given by manual workers there is one category that stands out because it refers to job satisfaction as satisfaction "by necessity." These are answers of the type "There is nothing else I can do," "A man has to live," or "I have gotten used to this job." Almost a third of the unskilled and semiskilled workers gave this explanation as to why they were satisfied with their jobs (30 percent) and the figure was slightly higher than one-tenth of the skilled and highly skilled personnel (12 percent), while it occurred quite rarely in the other strata.

"It is not evident why there should be satisfaction at all," says sociologist Kristofic, "except that the people have simply decided that that is the way it will be. It must be borne in mind that in terms of working conditions and standard of living they are the very bottom of society. They are reduced to fighting for their very survival. The real question in such a situation is whether any explanation can be found for their position as a whole. Being satisfied with your job, really satisfied, seems like a luxury from that viewpoint. Their satisfaction comes down to the phrase 'by necessity.' It is better for me to be satisfied than dissatisfied than dissatisfied, when there can be no change in my situation. Why should I get frustrated for nothing, right?"

The nature of the job essentially determines the limits of satisfaction for each stratum, since in this survey the social strata were defined both by their position in the technical division of labor and also by the status which goes with that. Members of certain strata, then, form their expectations freely, unaware that they move within limits of a "given level of aspirations" determined by their very membership in that stratum.

Not All Routine Jobs Are the Same

However, there is no doubt whatsoever that the class of "collective owners," by the very nature of their managerial jobs, are in an altogether different situation from the working class, especially its lowest stratum—the unskilled and semiskilled workers. The politicians and enterprise managers are somewhere outside and above the conventional sphere of work and that is why there are no internal differences among them with respect to job satisfaction as a function of those dimensions which are exceedingly important to the workers.

The dimension in which the social strata surveyed differ most regularly is the existence of supervision of their work "from above." This kind of supervision exists for 1 percent of the enterprise managers and 13 percent of the politicians, 22 percent of the system specialists and 21 percent of the necessary educated people, 60 percent of the office workers, 81 percent of the skilled and highly skilled personnel and 94 percent of the unskilled and semiskilled workers.

Performance of highly diverse jobs increases satisfaction in all strata except the unskilled and semiskilled workers. They on the other hand are more satisfied when they do repetitive routine jobs. "This is obviously related to the nature of their work," Kristofic says. "If you cannot change it, then you want to minimize energy. Under those conditions diversity only makes your life more complicated."

If the skilled and highly skilled personnel differ from the unskilled and semiskilled workers with respect to their predisposition toward "more civilized" types of work with more diversity, interesting characteristics and creativity, with respect to difficult conditions at the work station these two strata of the working class are on a par. The division with respect to the difficult nature of the working conditions follows the line of distinction between manual and nonmanual labor. Noise, uncomfortable temperature (now hot, now cold), dirty, suffocating and cramped space, and finally danger to health and life (for 54 percent of the skilled and highly skilled workers and 52 percent of the unskilled and semiskilled workers) are associated with manual work.

However, working conditions do not have an equal effect on satisfaction and dissatisfaction with one's job. The existence of favorable conditions does not increase job satisfaction, but unfavorable conditions do create dissatisfaction.

The same is the case with the personal income. When it falls below a certain limit, it produces dissatisfaction. Among the skilled and highly skilled workers 48 percent had low income, and this figure was all of 62 percent among the unskilled and semiskilled workers.

How does this (partial) dissatisfaction manifest itself?

"In our context it is difficult to talk about any articulated attitudes of the class. But if we ask ourselves who is setting the tone in the working class, then it is the unskilled and semiskilled workers, since they are the most numerous," says Branko Kristofic. We know from earlier sociological studies of self-management relations in work organizations that those who do not have power to make decisions about their situation expressed satisfaction by displaying "negative power" in the production process itself, so that they offer silent resistance, they do not show up for work, they strike spontaneously.

"At the beginning of this year we had a record number of strikes, some of them, like the one in Labin, even breaking records for their duration. This survey was

done 2 or 3 years ago, when the crisis had already set in, but it was not so severe as it is today. Most people were in general satisfied with their jobs. When today we have so many strikes as an expression of 'negative power' of the workers, then in my opinion this obviously indicates the relativity of that satisfaction. If something arises, as was the case with Mikulic's intervention law, then dissatisfaction breaks out into flame suddenly from a situation of apparent calm."

7045

END

**END OF
FICHE**

DATE FILMED

17 Nov. 1987